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            Abstract  
This thesis examines the call for reform1 in the governance of risk and control within major 
construction programmes in the UK. Over the next 8 years, Construction 2025 describes aspirations 
for major improvements in productivity, cost efficiency and delivery lead times.2 However, the 
pathway to reform remains unclear. Major infrastructure projects have a history of dissonance where 
competing value systems can create friction. However, the productive friction from multiple 
evaluative perspectives can also be a fundamental part of resolving emergent and perplexing 
problems. Construction 2025 highlights the need to develop stronger delivery relationships with an 
emphasis on the early engagement of suppliers and “fixing” the front-end of projects through more 
rigorous procurement strategies. It also notes that “much” of the waste in construction is 
fundamentally linked to the treatment of risk. Intelligent Clients, such as Heathrow, have been 
identified as exemplars in developing superior models of risk governance that work “with” suppliers 
to articulate the nature of value and evaluative purpose (CE, 2009).  This thesis is a study of the 
composition and evolution of control in the construction of Terminal 5 (T5) and the more recent 
Terminal 2 (T2) at Heathrow.  
Terminal 5 is considered a landmark case that challenged traditional self-seeking opportunism with a 
lean partnering philosophy delivered through integrated teams. A year later Terminal 2 moved away 
from the partnering with suppliers, engaging a 3rd party integrator managed through an intelligent 
control system. At the time this raised concerns that T2 represented a relinquishing of the project 
management capability developed on T5 and a weaker model of integration. However, T2 was a 
success. This thesis draws on extensive project-based technical data, interviews with industry experts 
and policy reports to build a comparative picture of the calculative infrastructures. Temporal 
bracketing is used to trace the patterns of development into “phases of control” as a sequence of 
evaluative orders. Both cases move the conception of control beyond directive forms of control “over” 
resources to consider the nature of social integration and the complexity of enrolling allied interests. 
The findings explore a variety of innovative calculative technologies that translated tensions into 
productive friction. In both cases Heathrow did not fix the front-end.  Instead an adaptive calculative 
infrastructure mediated collective deliberation, critical inquiry and emergent learning. These findings 
suggest that the current reform discussion3 would benefit from more explicit consideration of the 
importance of architectures of control in making projects valuable, governing risk and shaping conduct 
towards enterprise and discovery.     
                                                          
1 Construction 2025; Constructing Excellence, 2009; Egan, 1998; ICE, 2017 
2 Construction 2025 targets are 33% lower initial & whole life costs and 50% faster deliver from inception 
3 Construction 2025; ICE, 2017  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 The Broken Business Model  
The primary aim of this thesis is to address the call for reform in the governance of risk and 
control by construction clients in major programmes in the UK (CS2025; CE, 2009; ICE, 2017). 
For more than 20 years the industry has highlighted the need for greater collaboration in 
construction to improve productivity, delivery cycles and client value (Latham, 1994; Egan, 
1998). However, since the economic downturn in 2008, collaboration has suffered and a more 
“claims orientated” behaviour has been observed with construction clients “chasing work at 
unsustainable margins” and “jettisoning of quality and sustainability initiatives” (CE, 2009, p19). 
Over the next 8 years global construction is expected to dramatically grow by 70% (CS2025, p5).  
Construction 2025 outlines commitments to improve global competitiveness and efficiency 
through the reduction of costs by 33%, delivery times by 50%, lower greenhouse gas emissions 
by 50% and an improvement in the trade gap by 50% by 2025. In the Autumn of 2015 the 
construction industry gathered for a summit to debate strategies and plans over the next 10 
years. In 2015 a vision for construction was described by the Chief Construction Advisor as:  
“..a world where buildings and infrastructure are conceived and built much faster with 
greater whole life value and better carbon and energy performance. With construction 
driving growth across the whole economy with UK companies working in partnership at 
home and overseas.”    (Hansford, 2015) 
This strategic vision requires a radical transformation in productivity within construction. 
However, Hansford the Chief Construction Advisor noted progress has been slow because of the 
“Broken Business Model” in the UK with the largest contractors delivering a modest 1-2% 
margin7. Persistent commercial friction has frustrated attempts to improve quality and value. 
The Head of Business Models in the Construction Leadership Council commented that it is “not 
right to have projects delivered late” (Sow, 2015). In this sense, the broken business model is 
the outcome of an inability to overcome persistent practices that legitimise lateness and weak 
                                                          
7 The margin data discussed by Hansford was released in September 2015 based on the CN 100 index. 
This data recorded a 12 month fall in average operating margins from 2.5% (2014) to 1.2% (2015) for the 
largest 25 contractors in the industry.  
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margins a symptom of poor control and competing commercial interests that have frustrated 
attempts to improve efficiency.  
The business model literature defines the “building blocks” of the business model as a value 
proposition, customer interface and the mechanisms of management or “infrastructure” where 
partner networks and competencies are brought together resulting in costs and revenues 
(Osterwalder et al, 2005). Traditional construction business models are client-led with 
contractors responding to initial specifications developed by the client. In turn, the client 
initiates the “supply chain” of contractors, subcontractors and consultants (Cox and Townsend, 
1998). The “strategic procurement” (ibid) of the main contractors follows and at this later stage 
“mechanisms of management” organise the partner networks through a project organisation. If 
we consider Teece’s classic definition of a business model:   
 “….the design or architecture of the value creation, delivery, and capture mechanisms it 
employs. The essence of a business model is in defining the manner by which the enterprise 
delivers value to customers, entices customers to pay for value, and converts those payments to 
profit. It thus reflects management’s hypothesis about what customers want, how they want it, 
and how the enterprise can organize to best meet those needs, get paid for doing so, and make 
a profit.” (Teece, 2010, p172) 
Teece distinguishes between the customer (client), enterprise (accountable for service delivery) 
and how the enterprise is organised to meet the needs of the client. In construction the creation, 
capture and delivery of value takes place through a “project” organisation. The client plays an 
active role in articulating their perception of how the value proposition will be delivered and 
ultimately this is captured in the contract and initial baseline plan8. Coordinating the joint efforts 
of the client and supply network involves complex organisation and sophisticated approaches 
to synchronise cooperation (Söderlund, 2012).  Different business models reflect a varying 
appetite for pooling knowledge between partner networks and the client.  Organising co-
production through project organisations involves a degree of structural complexity9 and 
coordination mechanisms to balance the network of “cooperative agreements” focused on 
delivering the value proposition (Mokhlesian and Holmen, 2012; Cox and Townsend, 1998; 
Söderlund, 2012).  
                                                          
8 Baseline plans are the formally approved version of the budget used by major stakeholders when 
making comparisons (PMBOK 2015, p534) 
9 Structural Complexity describes the arrangement of the component parts of a project (Brady and 
Davies 2014) 
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Teece notes that at the heart of a business model is the challenge of designing and sustaining a 
competitively viable model which not only delivers but also captures value. In this context, he 
notes that value capture requires business models that: 
“yield value propositions that are compelling to customers, achieve advantageous cost and risk 
structures, and enables significant value capture by the business that generates and delivers 
products and services”  (Teece, 2010, p174).  
The construction client-contractor model described so far fails on a number of these points by 
delivering projects late and over budget to clients with excessive cost and risk structures that  
deliver punitive margins to contractors.  The mechanisms of management and control are failing 
to engage partner networks and competing interests have frustrated attempts to improve 
quality and value.  
1.1.1 Reform in Governing Risk 
The management of change and risk across the supply network is a source of commercial tension 
in large-scale projects (CS2025). Knight’s classic work links both risk and uncertainty to the fact 
that knowledge of the future is “imperfect” due to the unknown and indeterminate nature of 
change (Knight, 1921).  Knight distinguishes between risk and uncertainty by describing risk as 
“measurable” incertitude. Within projects this is conceptualised as a “variance” to plan caused 
by an “uncertain event or condition” that can have a positive or negative effect (PMBOK, 2015, 
p559). This variance refers specifically to the agreed plan where deviations in performance are 
viewed as a risk. Attempts to control variations in performance have resulted in more emphasis 
on the definition of scope within the initiation and planning of a project (Morris, 2003; 1994; 
Loch et al 2006). However, scope “lock-in” can result in lost opportunities for performance 
improvement as changes emerge. Lock into early stage commitments can be compounded by 
inflexible project management tools where supplier teams are penalised and “team member’s 
careers may suffer because they are evaluated against targets that have become irrelevant 
during the project” (De Meyer et al, 2006, p3). Although advances in risk technologies make it 
possible to explore alternative plans, risk aversion has frustrated attempts to actively manage 
risk (ibid).  
Within construction there is a history of competitive tendering practices that can create intense 
price competition (Egan, 1998; CE, 2009). In turn, awarding contracts on the basis of lowest 
“fixed” tender price can result in suppliers aggressively defending their margins (Egan 1998).  
This can result in “risk-dumping” practices where the initial fixed price is protected by “dumping” 
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the accountability for scope variations onto others (Brady and Davies, 2011). Risk dumping can 
destabilise the performance of the supply network as suppliers build in false contingencies as 
“pseudo comfort” (Power, 2007) to protect against unforeseen additional costs. Construction 
2025 notes that “much waste is driven through the approach to risk across the supply chain” 
(CS2025, p10) and although key industry reports recommend organising projects in a way that 
identifies who is “best placed” to manage risk (CE, 2009, p27), progress has been slow.  
Early stage lock-in and risk dumping practices can combine to create resistance to attempts to 
generate efficiencies and cost savings. Construction projects involve the coordination of a 
complex “network of interfaces” between organisations which can create an array of hidden 
interdependencies (Gann and Salter, 2000; Brady and Davies, 2014).  In this context, the client 
holds some oversight responsibility for balancing interactions and “know-how” between 
organisations. However, different types of risks require different management strategies. 
Although greater information can improve judgement when dealing with epistemic forms of 
“known unknowns”, hidden “know how” or “unknown knowns” can involve political motives 
(Winch, 2012).  These motives can block the willingness to share risk management “know how”.  
Gann and Salter, 2000, p961 note that:  
 “the management of technical know-how has become a significant strategic consideration for 
suppliers and operators. There is a need for integrity of information between suppliers, designers, 
systems integrators, engineers, constructors, clients and end-users. Yet firms tend to manage 
risk by retaining information crucial to systems integration within their own sphere of control, 
rather than by transferring know-how between the temporary coalitions of firms with whom they 
collaborate”      
This quote highlights trade-offs and tensions between openness and protecting strategically 
important “know how” that can frustrate the sharing of information. Gann and Salter highlight 
the fragile nature of relationships as temporary “coalitions” which create insufficient 
justification to transfer strategically valuable risk-based knowledge. These “political” motives 
block knowledge sharing necessary to resolve technical problems. In turn, this complicates the 
identification of “who” is best placed to manage risks between consultants, suppliers and 
construction clients.  
Traditional risk-averse practices such as risk dumping and hiding strategic knowledge have been 
legitimised for many years, reflecting a deep concern for the commercially destabilising effects 
of uncertainty (CS2025; CE, 2009). These issues highlight a failure in the governance of risk.   
Power’s 2007 work on “organized uncertainty” is relevant here because it considers governing 
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risk as part of an institutional process. Power notes that risk only becomes an “empirical fact” 
when it is captured within the management system of representation, which defines the essence 
of “what” a risk is (Power, 2007, p3). Power suggests that governing “risk” is both an outcome 
and a process where risk management discourse emerges as a reflection of different appetites 
for risk. However, a major challenge for risk management is sustaining control in a way that 
effectively deals with complex problems rather than a rational “pretence” of control or even 
worse a mechanism to justify the building of contingencies in the form of “layers of pseudo 
comfort” (ibid, p201). Power describes a continuous and dynamic tension between “enterprise” 
as value-creating autonomy versus “auditability” and centralised regulation through checks to 
test due process (ibid, p197). In this context, governing risk involves a dynamic process of 
balancing trade-offs associated with themes that underpin enterprise vs auditability such as 
“enterprise versus discipline, of freedom versus accountability, and democracy versus 
managerialism, and of opportunity versus auditability” (ibid, p203).  
Power describes the governance of risk as an ongoing and unstable process which involves 
steering and defining the nature of acceptable deviations despite the likelihood that the plans 
to deliver “ends-in-view” 10(Dewey, 1939, p52) will change. He suggests that “good” governance 
of risk moves away from purely emphasising quantitative predictions to a broader activity 
described by Power, 2007, p202 as:      
 “….alternative futures of the present, rather than quantitative ambitions to predict the future”  
This quote highlights the view that superior forms of governance move away from prescriptive 
attempts to lock into detailed quantified risk metrics and instead seek to build, test and explore 
alternative future configurations. These ideas reflect the literature on organising for discovery 
(Dougherty, 2016) which recommends that in inherently complex settings, abductive learning 
routines11 are more appropriate than deductive models based on testing fixed assumptions. In 
this context, governing risk would involve testing alternative hypotheses to understand possible 
deviations from plan rather than predicting a fixed pathway to the future. Dougherty’s work 
recommends abductive learning routines combined with collaborative practices described as 
“heedful interrelating” to shape joint action towards common purpose as a superior way of 
managing emergent change (Dougherty, 2016, p25). These themes recommend that managing 
complexity requires a degree of experimentation and acceptance that discovery ideally draws 
                                                          
10 Dewey’s “ends-in view” are expected outcomes based on “anticipated” ends (Dewey, 1939, p52) 
11 Abductive learning routines are described as patterns of practice that test novel hypothesis about 
what might be going on (Dougherty, 2016, p21) 
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on collaborative efforts and the pooling and sharing of knowledge. However, a more open and 
experimental approach to risk governance also requires what was described over 20 years ago 
as countering the strongly “in-grained” adversarial culture (Latham, 1994) which has persistently 
frustrated progress. The transformation of risk governance within construction requires a 
significant change in the traditional approaches to control to move away from early stage lock-
in, hiding waste and strategic knowledge. The key themes in the need to reform governing risk 
in construction are synthesised below. 
1.1.2 Reform: A Synthesis of Themes  
Reform in governing risk rests on the transformation of a deep concern for the destabilising 
effects of uncertainty amongst clients and suppliers. Traditional risk management practices 
reflect close regulation of performance with upfront definition of expectations in the early 
stages of project initiation. However, although the committed outcomes of a project are agreed 
within the early stages of a programme, the pathways to achieve these outcomes will change 
because of the emergent nature of complexity. The literature on governing risk and innovation 
within complexity warns that an over-emphasis on prediction and regulation to predetermined 
targets could result in lost opportunities for value creation. Instead “good” governance should 
enable abduction and collective exploration toward imagined futures (Power, 2007; Dougherty, 
2016). These recommendations require control approaches that transform the traditional hiding 
of “know-how”, working together to discover solutions rather than risk “dumping” on others.  
Sustaining discovery involves trade-offs and tensions between “enterprise” and “auditability” 
with modes of governance that enable learning rather than closing down opportunities for 
novelty. However, currently the standard instruments and technologies used to manage risk 
within projects remove deviations from committed plans rather than encouraging 
experimentation (De Meyer et al, 2006; Loch et al 2006). These points all combine to highlight a 
spiral of risk aversion and a need for more collective deliberation (CE, 2009; Egan, 1998; 
Dougherty, 2016). The next section considers the exemplars in the construction industry as 
“Intelligent Clients” identified as those who have overcome these incumbent practices by 
developing superior models of risk governance. Within this context, Heathrow is considered an 
exemplar Intelligent Client (CE, 2009; Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2014) that 
successfully adopted innovative approaches to governing risk.  
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1.2 Intelligent Clients 
After the economic downturn of 2008 the term Intelligent Client emerged to describe major 
infrastructure clients who could navigate the harsher economic climate (CE, 2009). Intelligent 
Clients were identified as being able to transform how they engaged “with” suppliers to deliver 
superior levels of productivity. In 2009 Wolstenholme’s report “Never Waste a Good Crisis” 
identified Intelligent Client success as being linked to the adoption of long-term commercial 
relationships and the adaptation of “business models” to reflect “Egan” principles 12(ibid). Egan 
was the Chief Executive of the BAA13 and considered a significant figure within the industry 14 
but also a major force behind the innovative Terminal 5 partnering methodology. This 
methodology was derived from Egan’s experience in the car industry, combining lean principles 
of component standardisation, pre-assembly and state of the art logistics with the ongoing 
development of scope to take advantage of team learning (Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 
2011). Much of the thinking behind T5 informed his influential 1998 report “Rethinking 
Construction” which described a pathway to transforming value within construction by 
partnering to drive up quality. The evaluative principles described in the report recommended 
moving away from short-term contractual relationships to long-term partnerships. Partnerships 
focused on delivering a vision of exceptional performance, pooling expert knowledge and 
rigorously monitoring quality improvements. The incentives underpinning this type of model 
would focus on performance improvement rather than a lock-in to pre-determined targets. 
Performance improvements would be sustained by developing a reward structure to incentivise 
team problem solving. Wolstenholme’s 2009 report revisited progress and reform across the 
industry since 1998 and noted the success of a few large Intelligent Clients: 
“So, which sectors have shown improvement and how have they achieved it? Inevitably, it has 
tended to be the major clients with repeat construction business who have developed in-house 
intelligent client teams. Successful teams have consistently integrated their processes and 
achieved results through a sustained programme of change - many adopting Egan principles and 
adapting their business model to incentivise and promote best practice”  (CE, 2009, p13) 
This quote links improvement to “in-house” client teams, long-term relationships and Egan 
principles.  However, success also required an engaged supply network willing to collaborate in 
order to sustain performance improvement (CE, 2009). Improving business model performance 
                                                          
12 The Egan principles are examined in more depth in Chapter 4. 
13 The BAA, British Airports Authority.   
14 Brady and Davies, 2011; Constructing Excellence, 2009; Doherty, 2008; Nightingale and Brady, 2011 
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required consensus to balance competing aims and interests by “integrating processes” to 
achieve a common set of normative expectations. The Egan-style “best practices” promoted 
evaluative principles to encourage performance improvement. However, within the report there 
are no explicit references to the capabilities underpinning “best” practice, or indeed to the 
nature of integrating processes necessary to sustain change.  
In 2013 the Intelligent Client concept was examined in more depth by the Institute of Civil 
Engineers (ICE) report which developed a capability framework and “check-list” of principles to 
rate the ability of a client in “being” intelligent. The Capability Framework provides a useful 
insight into the role expectations and normative values underpinning the Intelligent Client 
concept. In this context, it describes the role of the Intelligent Client as managing “relationships” 
to maximise value:    
“Specifying the requirements to external participants and managing delivery outcomes. 
Fundamental to this is the selection of appropriate private sector participants and the 
management of those relationships to maximise value.”  (ICE, 2013, p2) 
The framework emphasises the client’s central importance in front-end planning to set up the 
initial business case, arrange funding, and translate stakeholder requirements into an 
organisational design for delivery (ibid, p5). The degree of involvement in managing delivery and 
co-production is described as adopting “appropriate” strategies and solutions to balance trade-
offs between centralised control and flexibility. However, rather than elaborating upon the 
nature of different appetites for oversight the framework emphasises the importance of 
supporting delivery relationships with “effective” governance arrangements and appropriate 
“interface management” (ibid, p17). In this context, “effective” governance arrangements are 
described as visible authority structures that reflect and engender “integrity” with “open” and 
“honest” communication.  Interface management is described as appropriate when it bridges or 
aligns diverse behaviours towards agreed outcomes and expectations (ibid, p19). In this context, 
the Intelligent Client’s role involves:  
“communication, integration and incentivisation” in a way that “challenges adversarial 
behaviour and establishes a safe and collaborative culture”.   (ICE, 2013, p20) 
The Intelligent Client is seen as a mediator who stabilises tensions through “alignment” and 
interventions focused on “communication, integration and incentivisation”. Interactions at 
interfaces are perceived as potentially contested because of competing interests. In this context, 
the Intelligent Client’s role involves developing a collaborative culture to counter adversarial 
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behaviour by encouraging “openness” and principles of “integrity” as a superior form of 
engagement. The framework emphasises the importance of financial incentives and 
“communication” in supporting this alignment. However, there is no explicit discussion to clarify 
the types of incentives or the role of the client in improving communication to align evaluative 
perspectives. This framework describes a “wish-list” of outcomes linking terms such as 
“integration” and “incentives” with collaborative cultures and “effective management”. 
However, the Intelligent Client models of governance, degree of involvement in delivery and the 
treatment of risk are not directly addressed other than by recommending a controls design that 
is “appropriate” and “visible”.   
Traditional mechanisms of management are failing to engage partner networks. Although 
Intelligent Clients are described as the minority of successful clients who have developed models 
of governance to enable collaborative deliver relationships, there is little specific detail about 
the composition of control. The ICE Capability Framework recommends normative principles of 
openness and honesty as important conditions to enable collaboration. However, there is little 
discussion about how openness is sustained when faced with incertitude and tensions over the 
project delivery cycle. The Heathrow cases therefore represent important sites to elaborate on 
these themes and examine the models of governance and control which were capable of 
governing risk.  
1.2.1 Heathrow as an Exemplar “Intelligent Client” 
Heathrow is an important client to the construction industry holding a key role in the 
“Construction Client Group” and acting as a representative to the government on a number of 
reform initiatives15. The construction of Heathrow 5 (T5) is celebrated as one of the most 
successful airport constructions in Europe delivering the construction of a £4.3bn Terminal on 
time and budget (Brady and Davies, 2014). It is also considered a landmark example because of 
its partnering philosophy which drew on the knowledge of the “best” in the industry combined 
with expertise from the oil, gas and the car industries (Brady and Davies, 2011). A long planning 
period informed significant “front-end” strategizing and the programme drew on successful 
commercial practices from other industries such as integrated16 teams and gain-sharing 
incentives (Brady and Davies, 2011;14; Davies et al, 2009; Nightingale and Brady, 2011). Much 
of this learning was captured in a bespoke umbrella contract, the T5 Agreement, which ascribed 
a normative code of conduct based on pooling knowledge and partnering for performance 
                                                          
15 Notably through Wolstenholme and Egan’s task forces and recently Project 13 examined in chapter 4 
16 Integrated teams were multi-functional and inter-organisational project teams 
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improvement (ibid). Rather than early stage “lock-in” to scope, the control system was designed 
to support concurrent engineering and construction which resulted in a long period of design 
development. This enabled teams to engage in exploratory activities to develop superior 
solutions through an integrated team structure that supported decentralised decision-making 
(Brady and Davies, 2010). Throughout the programme change experts worked with suppliers to 
improve collaborative working practices and counter old “individualised” and adversarial 
behaviours (Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2011).  
Within 12 months of T5 opening, the construction of a £2.5bn Terminal 2 (T2) was commissioned 
through a commercial framework which moved away from partnering to engage 3rd party 
Complex Building Integrators (CBIs) to manage the supply network. A standardised “New 
Engineering Contract” (NEC3)17 clearly defined lines of accountability between the CBIs and the 
client. Rather than partnering with suppliers, the role of the client focused on oversight and 
“clearing away obstacles” (Morgan, 2009). This model of risk governance emphasised regulation 
where “intelligent” data provided the foundation for a more arms-length and virtual approach 
to control.  Much of the existing T5 literature links the success of T5 to the creation of integrated 
teams, a bespoke contract and the client’s primary role as a “systems integrator” (Davies et al, 
2009, Brady and Davies, 2011;2014; Brady et al, 2006)). These features were missing from T2 
and instead the importance of the “numbers” and control technologies became a central feature 
for governance. In 2012, an article noted that in adopting this new approach on T2, Heathrow 
had effectively outsourced its “systems integration role” and relinquished its “project 
management capability” (Brady and Davies, 2011). However, in 2014 the construction of 
Terminal 2 was hailed a success with the state-of-the-art “Queens Terminal” opening to budget 
and on-time with a similar level of value for money to T5. There is currently no substantial 
research into T2 and therefore a major contribution of this thesis is to examine “how” Heathrow 
made this transition. This therefore frames the primary research question: 
Q1 How did Heathrow learn to govern through numbers?  
These points are relevant for the “Intelligent Client” discussion because the contrasting T2 and 
T5 approaches suggest a variety of successful models of governance. The intention of this thesis 
is to compare and contrast the control and risk governance approach on both Heathrow 
programmes to contribute to the industry-level reform debate.  The next section examines in 
                                                          
17 The NEC3 is the post 2005 version of the NEC contracts (endorsed by the public sector). 
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more depth the existing Heathrow literature to understand the composition of the risk and 
control architecture developed for T5.  
1.3 Risk and Control Innovation at Terminal 5 
Existing literature highlights that the construction of T5 was an exemplar in client-supplier 
partnering and learning by engendering the sharing of knowledge across the whole construction 
team (Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2011;2014; Gil, 2009; CE, 2009). The BAA adopted a 
client-led risk management framework underpinned by collaborative principles. Integrated 
supplier teams grouped together different organisations into a delivery team structure. Teams 
were recruited based on not only their technical knowledge but also willingness to pool 
knowledge, share targets and cost information in an open-book environment18 (Gil et al, 2012; 
Davies et al, 2009; Nicolini et al, 2000; Brady and Davies, 2011). For its time, T5 adopted a 
“radical” risk model moved away from traditional “risk dumping” (Brady and Davies, 2011) 
practices to fully reimburse in-scope costs. In-scope costs were reimbursed on a cost-plus basis 
which guaranteed payment plus a margin on all costs agreed to be “within” scope (Brady and 
Davies, 2011; Davies et al, 2009). Existing literature highlights the fundamental importance of 
this concept described as the “client bears the risk” as enabling the supply chain to focus on co-
production rather than concerns for payment (ibid). Teams were engaged through tasks focused 
on collective problem solving to achieve levels of performance deemed as exceptional (T5 
Handbook, 1998, Gil et al, 2012; Brady and Davies, 2011). The T5 Agreement was supported by 
a Handbook issued to all first-tier suppliers which outlined “how” teams were expected to 
manage risk and the incentive and reward processes (Brady and Davies, 2014; 2011; Doherty, 
2008). The client’s role is described as a central coordinator or “systems integrator” organising 
operations in a way that enabled knowledge transfer (Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2011; 
2014). A value-based incentive structure was developed to co-incentivise teams to deliver 
superior levels of performance19.  
 
The construction of T5 represents a remarkable model of collaboration that challenged 
traditional self-seeking behaviours. Transparency is also a major theme and the expectation of 
openly sharing performance information amongst a variety of organisations was a major 
innovation. The client-led strategy of “bearing” the risk and guaranteeing in-scope cost 
                                                          
18 Open-Book refers to the disclosure and sharing of performance data in order to improve 
transparency. Sharing may reflect a significant change from traditional practices when data is viewed as 
sensitive and/or part of competitive advantage (Mouritsen et al, 2001) 
19 Value-based incentives monitored specific KPIs as a mix of cost, schedule, safety and quality targets 
(Handbook, 1998).   
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reimbursement to delivery teams created a degree of certainty for suppliers. However, it also 
provided an incentive for suppliers to over-estimate initial “in-scope” baseline costs. Concurrent 
engineering and design resulted in a protracted period of flexible planning and “fluid” scope.  
Traditionally suppliers would resist shared accountability combined with fluid scope and yet on 
T5 this combination was accepted. The existing literature touches on some of these points and 
can be divided into 2 schools. The first set of papers 20emphasises the centralised role of the 
client as the “systems integrator” offering leadership oversight to enable the transformation to 
a new lean model for performance improvement. The second set21 emphasises a variety of 
actors and technologies that combined to enable progress through the adaptation of plans, 
incentives and risk management approaches. The next section examines the systems integrator 
model in more depth.   
 
1.3.1 The Systems Integrator 
Brady and Davies’ 2011 paper examines the emergence of capabilities and learning emphasising 
the long 7-year period of up-front planning and strategising to prepare for construction. This 
paper describes the central role of the client in steering and shaping the programme by 
brokering knowledge and integrating interests towards cooperation. The transformation of 
traditional practices is linked to the creation of integrated teams for co-production where the 
client’s risk bearing role created an environment conducive to innovation. The client bearing the 
risk switched attention away from risk averse practices which enabled suppliers to bring their 
“best” capabilities to the programme. The gradual building of team capability to innovate was 
linked to performance rewards and the encouragement of cooperative practices. Although this 
paper recognises the importance of control in the co-evolution of learning between teams and 
the client, there is little discussion of the control architecture that shaped progress.  
The systems integrator as a controller and coordinator of knowledge was examined in more 
depth in Davies et al, 2009. This paper develops the concepts underpinning organising for lean 
performance improvement where the client held strategic vision and operational oversight to 
enable efficiency through replication. In this context integration is conceived as an operational 
and engineering challenge where the systems integrator oversees the “functioning” of the 
system. 
 
                                                          
20 Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2011;2014 
21 Gil, 2009; Gil et al, 2012; Gil and Tether, 2011; Nightingale and Brady, 2011 
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This is described as:  
“System integrators outsource portions of design, production and construction whilst keeping 
some in-house capabilities to integrate components and deliver a fully functioning system 
against time, cost and quality targets” (Davies et al, 2009, p111)  
This perspective views a project as a “systems” with “subsystems” and component parts which 
are brought together by an integrator who coordinates progress towards agreed performance 
targets. The paper suggests that the integrator’s challenge is an engineering one; ensuring 
operational integration by enabling a coherent and functioning system with synchronised 
components. The systems integrator is conceptualised as a leader encouraging continued 
performance and “bearing” rather than “sharing” risk. This lean model emphasised the oversight 
of risks and standardised processes to engineer performance improvement by incrementally 
removing waste. Project management tools are described as supporting architecture to enable 
the systems integrator to manage and work with teams in “reducing costs, minimising waste, 
improving safety in design and construction” (ibid, p112). Although the paper describes the 
importance of project management processes and performance principles there is no discussion 
of the composition of evaluative frameworks necessary to sustain co-production. Security for 
suppliers through long-term partnership agreements and full cost reimbursement is viewed as 
a sufficient condition to enable sustained efforts towards performance improvement. Although 
governing conduct in this setting infers a complex control architecture to oversee progress and 
balance the dynamics of continuous improvement, there is no discussion about the complexity 
of management control.  
The Brady and Davies, 2014 paper explores some of these concepts, recognising the existence 
of “dynamic” complexity in projects and emergent relationships described as relations “between 
components within the system and environment”, which change over time (Brady and Davies, 
p24). This paper draws on Sayles and Chandler’s 1971 classic view of a systems integrator 
(Söderlund, 2012; Brady and Davies, 2014) as a baseline concept composed of:  
“contractual agreements, shared goals, planning and persuasion to encourage close cooperation 
of multiple organizations involved in addressing the messy interdependencies between them to 
achieve the systems-wide goals”   (Brady and Davies, 2014, p22) 
This quote demonstrates the importance of a control architecture to balance cooperation across 
a variety of organisations to deliver purposive goals. Later the paper highlights the dynamic 
nature of complex coordination noting the importance of incentives in shaping behaviour. 
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However, the client is seen as the primary integrator rewarding collaborative behaviours and 
exploration. Although there is discussion about the success of adaptive planning and the ongoing 
focus of driving performance outcomes, there is no explicit discussion about the composition of 
management control.  The paper concludes by recommending a lifecycle focus in future studies 
to consider how management practices can align complexities over the delivery cycle (ibid, p36). 
This point highlights the need for extended research into the mechanisms of performance 
management and control used over the programme life to manage “risk” complexities. These 
points combine to highlight a major gap in the existing literature, and although there is explicit 
discussion of the client governing conduct through control technologies which developed 
cooperation, defined lean processes, mitigated complexities; there is no explicit discussion of 
the control architecture that shaped these outcomes. 
The literature examined so far addresses themes of coordination and control with an emphasis 
on the client as an integrator rather than the performance management frameworks developed 
to enable control. There is an important gap and opportunity for research to examine “how” the 
design and delivery of the T5 control architecture sustained this complex partnering model. In 
turn, the findings could provide a basis to develop a broader understanding of the performance 
improvement approach that enabled control.   
1.3.2 Complexity and Integration  
Within major construction programmes the concept of complexity is important because it 
creates a means-end indeterminacy that can frustrate planning, coordination and control 
(Scranton, 2015). Project complexity is linked to the interdependence of tasks, but also to the 
variety of diverse relations amongst stakeholders (De Meyer et at, 2006; Söderlund, 2012; 2010; 
Clegg et al, 2012). The Latin derivation of the word “complex” brings the two parts “com” 
meaning together and “plex” meaning woven.  Within major programmes the existence of 
interwoven interdependences and shared accountabilities create major tensions (Scott et al, 
2011; Clegg et al, 2012; Bresnan and Marshall, 2012). Dynamic complexity means that external 
change can destabilise plans resulting in social misalignments, cultural differences and political 
conflicts which can disrupt progress (Scott et al, 2011; Brady and Davies, 2014; Clegg et al, 2012). 
So far, the literature highlights “intelligent” clients as navigating this complexity by developing 
mechanisms of management through integrated teams and incentives to reward common 
purpose. On T5, the systems integrator governed conduct by encouraging teams to accept a 
degree of uncertainty and variability in plans knowing that the “client bears the risk” (Brady and 
Davies, 2011; Davies et al, 2009). The T5 literature focuses on systems integration through 
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functional techniques of production and control as material and physical control “over” the 
project (Lockwood, 1964; Clegg, 1989). The emphasis is on design and control outcomes where 
different forms of incentives are assumed to facilitate and empower resource allocation.  
However, “governing” and the reproduction of control practices can be more fully understood 
if the focus moves away from functional design features and the assumption that placing 
incentives automatically shapes derivative control outcomes (Miller and O’Leary, 2007). Instead 
it is important to examine “how” control technologies such as incentives mobilise social 
practices within their institutional context and setting (Hopwood and Miller, 1994; Miller and 
O’Leary, 1994; Power, 2007; 2015; Miller and Power, 2013). 
Lockwood’s 1964 study into “integration” is relevant here because it distinguishes between 
“systems integration” and “social integration”. Systems integration is considered to be the 
material and physical means of control over an institution to stabilise order. These means of 
control include disciplinary rules and regulations intended to facilitate and empower resource 
allocation and action (Lockwood, 1964; Clegg, 1989; Mouzelis, 1997). However, in contrast, 
social integration refers to the nature of agency and the shaping of values to reproduce or 
challenge meaning where the dynamics of agency inter-play with institutional structures (ibid). 
The literature examined so far refers to material forms of control and the role of a centralised 
systems “integrator” in organising and configuring knowledge transfer across project settings. 
The emphasis is on different arrangements of technologies (single model design environments, 
incentives, partnership frameworks) to facilitate coordination. However, there is limited 
discussion of the complexity of control reproduction and resistance or the interactions 
necessary to shape meaning and agreement.  Returning to Sayles and Chandler’s 1971 systems 
integrator concept, this describes technologies of control and the need for persuasion and 
cooperation to deliver strategic goals. Projects are organisational forms developed to resolve 
unique problems by engaging various experts to develop complex solutions (Söderlund and Tell, 
2012; Scranton, 2015). Project delivery is dependent on engaging the cooperation of a variety 
of experts (Söderlund, 2012; Grabher, 2004). Control technologies provide the mechanisms of 
management for delivery by shaping conduct, defining standards of delivery and assigning 
accountability for performance success and failure. These points are central to the broken 
business model debate and a lack of social integration can be a primary source of resistance, 
blocking the development of common purpose above self-seeking opportunism. Some of these 
issues of social integration and control reproduction are discussed in second set of Heathrow T5 
papers below. 
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1.3.3 Social Integration “through” Mediatory Technologies 
Within the Heathrow literature there are a second set of papers highlighting social integration 
themes. The first is Gil and Tether’s (2011) study of the relationship between design flexibility 
at Heathrow and risk management practices. This work is important because it highlights a 
reflexive interplay between design and risk technologies that shaped meaning whilst developing 
relationships. The paper highlights that within T5, the willingness to develop flexible designs 
(safeguards and adaptive designs) by developers was moderated by cooperative relations with 
the (project) customer. However, when designs became inflexible, risk management (change 
control22) technologies mediated interactions to prevent tensions and overruns. This paper 
highlights a reflexivity between technologies and relationships where modifications helped to 
sustain the engagement of a progressive dialogue that balanced potentially destabilising 
episodes between the developers and customers. 
Articles by Gil’s et al, 2012 and Gil, 2009 examine the nature of relational partnering approach 
adopted on T5 and how cooperation amongst suppliers was sustained (Gil, 2009; Gil et al, 2012). 
These papers highlight persistent tensions within the supply network engaged on T5 where 
incentives regulated conduct.  Complex interdependencies between sub-projects were 
combined with design fluidity to create “scope gaps” and ambiguity. This created tensions where 
suppliers were “like a number of ant nests, not quite at war with each other but all wrestling 
over the same territory” (ibid, p162). These instances demonstrated points where over-lapping 
accountability created ambiguity resulting in a “clash” of values between a commitment to 
partnering and an individualised “opportunistic silo mentality”. The modification of evaluation 
principles built into incentives helped to stabilise tensions. Over time, this learning became 
embodied within the reward structures creating a “repository of knowledge” on how to govern 
(Gil, 2009, p163). These points echo some concepts of social integration where control 
technologies shaped allied interests through a recursive negotiation to settle and stabilise 
tensions.  In turn, learning was captured and embodied within new evaluative assumptions and 
rewards structures. This paper highlights a mediatory role for incentives in adapting to balance 
tensions thereby enabling learning and control.   
Nightingale and Brady’s 2011 paper on projects and predictability emphasises the emergence of 
learning on T5. The paper describes a gradual adaptation and accumulation of knowledge 
captured and embodied within plans.  
                                                          
22 Change control is a process of approval or rejection of requested modifications to the baseline plan 
(PMBOK 2015, p530) 
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Nightingale and Brady, 2011, p106:    
“The knowledge required to change the world to match the plan is not a “mirror of nature” and 
instead involves implementing plans that are realistic rather than true or false. They become 
increasingly factual over time as they adjust to the world and the world adjusts to them”  
These ideas describe a process of building a deeper level of knowledge where reflexive learning 
was embodied within more realistic plans. In this context, planning and plans were conceived as 
“scaffolding” to coordinate distributed behaviour of (systematically) connected people. This 
paper describes the shaping of behaviour over time through a process akin to the mediatory role 
of other planning technologies described by Miller and O’Leary, 2007 as “envisioning” a future 
whilst connecting action across domains towards an envisioned outcome. On T5 the process of 
mediation consummated action and in this context plans were central to creating not only 
knowledge but also agreement. Nightingale and Brady, 2011, p96:   
 “realistic plans can be critically engaged with and can provide the basis for structured 
disagreement as well as shared confidence about future courses of action”    
 This description highlights that realistic plans acted as “mediating” technologies, ordering 
disagreements and compromises to shape behaviour towards intended future outcomes. Rather 
than implementing pre-determined plans, the adaptation of plans enabled structured 
agreements underpinned by refined evaluative assumptions.  
These 4 papers highlight the social complexity of control and the reflexive and mediatory role of 
plans, incentives and risk management technologies in shaping behaviour. Rather than 
describing control technologies as tools to assemble pre-determined assumptions they 
recognise the conjoined process of representing and intervening to steer and shape conduct 
(Miller and O’Leary, 2007; Miller and Power, 2013; Hacking, 1983). In turn, shaping behaviour 
and conduct emerged “through” a process of control and social integration steered by control 
technologies. In this context control technologies can act as “calculative” technologies when 
they make “calculations” 23enabling comparison and measurement of conduct (Jeacle, 2012; 
Miller and O’Leary, 2007; Miller and Power, 2013; Callon and Muniesa, 2005). As agents accept 
responsibilities and reproduce calculative practices, they became “calculable” by animating the 
financial standards and norms captured within the calculative technologies (Miller and Power, 
2013; Miller, 2001). These points start to introduce the concept of social control, animating 
                                                          
23 Drawing from Callon and Muniesa “calculations” involve objectification and comparison over 3 main 
steps 1. Detachment to a space where an object is manipulated 2. Sorting 3. The result is extracted so 
that it can circulate elsewhere (Callon and Muniesa 2005) 
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action and the mediatory role of technologies where mediation involves drawing together 
people and ideas (Miller and O’Leary, 2007; Miller and Power, 2013). These concepts are 
elaborated in the next chapter. 
1.4 Sustaining Control 
Sustaining control is a fundamental principle to the progressive nature of projects which are 
temporary organisational forms that achieve success by delivering goals within a specified 
timeframe (Söderlund and Tell, 2012; Söderlund, 2012). The concept of “pace”24 has been 
highlighted as a key driver in determining the urgency and momentum built into the 
organisation of projects and the scheduling of project time (Shenhar and Dvir, 2007; Ylijoki, 
2003). Sustaining productivity involves a continuous process of control due to the interrelated 
nature of time-critical tasks within a supply network. However, sustaining control is complicated 
by emergent and perplexing problems (Dewey, 1910) which can destabilise the fragile and 
temporary alliances (Gann and Salter, 2000) that form the basis of many major projects.  
Contested periods can cause deviations and lateness to schedules agreed within the project. So 
far, the T5 literature has identified an important role for calculative technologies such as 
incentives, plans and change controls in sustaining engagement and preventing lateness.  Rather 
than being viewed as static instruments for sporadic measurement and readjustment towards 
fixed goals, prior literature describes a mediatory role for calculative technologies.  Reflexive 
learning emerged over time linked to the capture and modification of new assumptions which 
embodied compromises to provide stability (Nightingale and Brady, 2011; Gil and Tether, 2011; 
Gil et al, 2012).  The idea of calculative technologies as mediators to enrol social practice moves 
the debate beyond control as a derivative outcome of monitoring and measurement to consider 
“how” calculative technologies sustained control. This provides the second research question 
for this thesis: 
Q2: How did the calculative infrastructure mediate and sustain control?  
This question uses the infrastructure of “calculative” technologies as the object of study. The 
term calculative infrastructures draw together some of the earlier concepts of plans as project 
scaffolding25 (as both a process and outcome of planning) with work by accounting academics 
who conceptualise the combination of calculative technologies as creating a “vast calculative 
infrastructures” (Miller and Power, 2013). Infrastructures are conceptualised as emergent and 
accumulated structures of calculative technologies that shape social practices in a conjoined 
                                                          
24 Shenhar and Dvir, 2007 describe pace as the degree of urgency (normal, fast, critical) 
25 Nightingale and Brady, 2011 
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process of representing and intervening (Power, 2015). The prior T5 literature refers to a 
combination of plans, incentives and change controls as mediatory technologies and these ideas 
are extended to understand “how” they intertwined and evolved to sustain control. However, 
rather than contrasting the design principles for governance between T2 and T5 in a static 
comparison, the studies trace the co-evolution of the different calculative infrastructures. By 
examining the changing composition of the infrastructures, the studies examine “how” control 
was sustained and the models of governance that emerged to shape and guide conduct.  
1.5 Making a Contribution  
The overarching intention of this thesis is to address the need for reform in the governance of 
risk and control within major construction programmes by using Heathrow as an exemplar 
Intelligent Client. The broken business model debate highlights the need for transformation in 
contractor margins and more efficient delivery cycles. There is a need for improved mechanisms 
of management to sustain networks of cooperation across the supply network. However, 
despite over 20 years of reform discussion describing the need for more collaborative working 
practices, progress has been slow. There is a deep concern at the client and industry level of the 
destabilising effects of emergent change and this has resulted in an aversion to risk with early 
stage lock-in to plans and commercial frameworks that dump the accountability for risk on to 
others. Within construction, project risk is defined as a variance from plans and it is this deviation 
from agreed commitments that requires calculative infrastructures able to shape and steer 
performance in a way that proactively manages change.    
Power’s (2007; 2015) work highlights how governing risk is shaped by an appetite for aversity. 
This appetite is captured in the management system through calculative technologies which 
define when performance deviations become risks and therefore “when” and “how” they are 
managed. Rather than governing risk through audit and surveillance, in complex settings, a 
learning approach is recommended (Power, 2007). Engaging abductive routines tempered by 
heedfulness of others’ actions is recommended as a “better” approach, enabling adaptation of 
plans and evaluative principles (Dougherty, 2016). This point brings us to Heathrow as a site for 
risk innovation with T5 celebrated for its client-led risk model, encouraging supplier enterprise 
and the contrasting intelligent system developed for T2. The Heathrow cases provide an 
important opportunity to examine in depth the development of an infrastructure which shaped 
innovative approaches for risk governance. It is the intention of this thesis to contribute to the 
reform debate by providing an insight into “how” Heathrow successfully navigated complexity 
and risk during the construction of both terminals.  
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The policy literature highlights the progress of “Intelligent Clients” in driving through 
improvements in the quality and delivery of major projects (CE, 2009). The 2009 Constructing 
Excellence report attributed some of this success to the capabilities of Intelligent Client teams 
in sustaining progress by integrating processes and sanctioning best practice through incentives. 
The ICE’s 2013 Capability Framework elaborates some themes highlighting the importance of 
the client’s role in developing mechanisms to support more open communication.  In this 
context, the client plays an oversight role encouraging normative values of sharing and working 
together to counter adversarial tensions. This oversight role is sustained through authority 
structures and governance arrangements to support a collaborative culture based on honesty 
and integrity (ICE, 2013). Oversight is supported by incentive structures designed to “align” and 
integrate delivery goals. These points suggest a major role for Intelligent Clients in sustaining 
productive relationships by building an evaluative order to sustain co-production. This order is 
perceived as stable once divergent perspectives are “bridged”, aligned and integrated (ibid). 
However, the ICE report does not elaborate on “how” integration would be achieved or how far 
deviations are acceptable as a normal process of discovery and exploration.  Although there is 
recognition that Intelligent Clients have specific controls capabilities to support oversight, 
mitigate tensions and balance divergent interests, the calculative infrastructures necessary to 
sustain these activities are not explicitly addressed.     
Themes of integration, alignment and oversight are covered in the Heathrow T5 literature. The 
“systems integrator” literature emphasises the client as a leader, overseeing integrated teams 
engaged in shared problem solving. In this context, the client holds primary responsibility for 
coordinating efficient processes and knowledge transfer between integrated teams. Incentives 
and the bespoke contract are highlighted as important in ascribing a code of conduct to sustain 
partnering and performance improvement. However, there is little detail of how these 
technologies shaped engagement as the programme progressed. The second set 26 of T5 papers 
address some of these points by highlighting a dynamic and mediatory role for plans, incentives 
and risk management technologies. In this context, calculative technologies sustained progress 
by shaping interests and adapting to capture new assumptions. These papers highlight the 
emergence of situations on T5 that tested plans and reward structures resulting in adaptation 
to sustain agreement. These findings expand the concept of integration beyond systems 
integration as “control over” resource allocation resulting in a derivative form of material 
control. Instead, they introduce ideas of social integration and the shaping of a disposition 
                                                          
26 Gil and Tether, 2011; Gil, 2009; Gil et al, 2012; Nightingale and Brady, 2011 
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towards common purpose and the persuasion and negotiation of agreement and allied interests 
(Clegg, 1989; Lockwood, 1964; Mouzelis, 1997). Rather than focusing purely on systems 
integration by economic incentives, social integration emphasises the importance of fixing 
meaning and purpose in order to sustain the reproduction of control. This moves the debate 
beyond making assumptions about the relationship between incentives nudging a desired 
outcome, to studying the process of deliberation and agreement necessary to enrol suppliers.    
However, although the second set of papers acknowledge the important role of mediatory 
technologies in sustaining a shared sense of common purpose, there is little discussion of “how” 
or indeed “when” contested situations tested the calculative infrastructure.  
1.5.1 Gaps in the Existing Literature 
The existing T5 literature describes T5 as an exemplar case and an important site for innovation 
in the governance of risk. However, there is a major gap in the study of the process of control 
and the composition of control technologies that provided the scaffolding for progress and 
delivery to be sustained.  Although some of the literature describes social integration through 
evaluation to mediate progress, they do not describe the principles that were modified to 
sustain delivery. This gap in the literature provides an opportunity to revisit the T5 case and 
examine in depth the composition of control technologies and the generative processes that 
governed conduct and sustained control.  
For T2 there is no substantive literature examining the construction of the terminal or the 
project delivery and management. However, T2 is an important comparative case to T5 because 
it represented a departure from the partnering model considered central to the success of T5. 
Instead the adoption of a standard New Engineering Contract, the appointment of Complex 
Build Integrators and risk sharing arrangements stepped away from the functional features of 
T5 which were attributed to T5’s success. Instead, the client invested in a sophisticated 
“intelligent” system to monitor progress and hold suppliers to account. This approach is more 
standard across modern construction programmes and so it provides an important case for 
comparison. From an Intelligent Client perspective, the ICE framework recommends governing 
normative values that encourage “integrity”, “honesty” and moral constraint as a powerful way 
of countering adversarialism (ICE, 2013). On T2, the arms-length approach to control moved 
away from ascribing a code of conduct. The absence of a handbook outlining acceptable 
standards of conduct raises questions about “how” social integration was managed and how 
“accountability” could be sustained through a virtual system of control. These points highlight 
22 
 
 
 
the importance of building a comparative case to consider “How did Heathrow Learn to Govern 
Through the Numbers”? 
1.5.2 Integration, Evaluation and Delivery  
A large body of the existing project management literature focuses on planning and the failure 
to accurately predict delivery outcomes in large-scale projects (Flyvberg, 2012; Flyvberg and 
Cowi, 2004). This can lead to an emphasis on early-stage data gathering and subsequent 
monitoring to implement more precise forecasting routines (De Meyer et al, 2006; Loch et al, 
2006). However, the policy discussion explored in this chapter has revealed a social complexity 
within delivery and a need to improve cooperative delivery relationships as a pathway to reform. 
The controls architecture plays a central role in shaping cooperation and conduct towards a 
common sense of evaluative purpose. However, large-scale projects are complex settings where 
conflicting evaluative priorities also require careful oversight to “align” agreement towards 
intended outcomes. This leads to the second research question which focuses on the 
performative nature of calculative infrastructures to pose the question: “How did the calculative 
infrastructures mediate and sustain control? “. This question considers “how” suppliers were 
enrolled in order to sustain control. Although the existing T5 literature highlights a mediatory 
role for individual technologies, there is little detail about “how” or “when” mediation took place 
or the evaluative principles which were modified to govern conduct. This thesis extends these 
ideas to examine the evolution of the calculative infrastructures that enabled and sustained 
control. These ideas are examined over the following seven chapters and the chapter summaries 
are described in the next section.   
1.6 The Chapter Outlines 
The structure of this thesis follows with chapter 2 which is a literature review which leads to the 
development of a conceptual framework. This is followed by the methodological chapter 
describing and explaining the data collection and analysis approaches. Chapter 4 is an empirical 
chapter which examines the industry level reform discussion linking the themes for reform to 
the Heathrow cases. Chapters 5 and 6 are the empirical case chapters describing the Terminal 5 
“Doing Risk Differently” case and the Terminal 2 “Intelligent Foresight”. Chapter 7 develops the 
comparative analysis and discussion which is followed by a final policy conclusion chapter.  The 
chapter summaries are elaborated in the following pages.   
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1.6.1 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 2 draws initially on Miller’s 2001 work on “Governing by Numbers” and Miller and 
Power’s 2013 paper to examine the mediatory role of calculative technologies in governing 
conduct in complex settings. Miller and Power’s 2013 paper is used to develop a conceptual 
framework that examines the way in which control is sustained by governing conduct through 
the assignment (territorializing) and acceptance of accountability (subjectivizing) through 
calculable spaces.  Concepts such as “controversies” and the machinations of “enrolment” of 
allied interests to settle intense debates are examined as a way of understanding the unstable 
processes of control. These ideas are combined into a conceptual framework that traces the 
development of the programme through successive phases of control to build a picture of the 
evolution of the calculative infrastructure.  Further literature is examined to explore the link 
between an appetite for risk and the nature of stability and sustained control. Initially the 
literature explores the inherent indeterminacy of control in project settings and the importance 
of reflexive learning in navigating the complexity of projects. Dougherty’s 2016 work on 
innovation in complex settings introduces the concepts of “abductive routines” and “heedful 
interrelating” as ways of animating discovery. Stark’s 2009 work examines the concept of 
organising dissonance in a way to balance tensions into productive friction. These ideas lead to 
a discussion of the complexity of governing risk in projects which considers different appetites 
for risk, discovery and ambiguity. The chapter concludes with a discussion about the use of the 
conceptual framework to trace the emergence of spaces, evaluative principles and technologies 
to understand “how” control was actually sustained over the delivery cycle.  
1.6.2 Chapter 3: Methodology 
Chapter 3 describes how the empirical materials were collected and the process methodology 
adopted to analyse the development of the calculative infrastructures between 1996-2014.  
Data was collected over an intense 14-month period creating an archive of project-based data 
(interviews, observations and reports), industry level reports and technical controls documents. 
Initially, unstructured exploratory interviews 27were recorded and transcribed and over time 
they became more focused on specific events, technologies and control themes. Temporal 
bracketing provided a method to break the data into blocks of time called “phases of control” 
which were punctuated by periods of controversy. Thematic analysis was used as a way of 
identifying the dominant themes within each “phase of control” and the groupings of sub-
themes. Gradually a narrative “plot” was developed of the generative interactions through 
                                                          
27 In total 62 hours of interviews were conducted amongst 20 key interviewees. 
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calculable spaces within each phase of control and the “dominant” evaluative principles. This 
led to an analysis of the changing composition of calculable spaces and the machinations of 
enrolment to settle tensions. By tracing the progression “across” the phases of control; a holistic 
picture of the evolution of the different calculative infrastructures was developed. The final 
sections of this chapter reflect on the way in which process thinking requires a careful tracing of 
the emergence of control but also substantial access to the field and care in dealing with 
business-sensitive issues.   
1.6.3 Chapter 4: The Broken Business Model? 
This chapter examines the contextual setting for construction which formed the background for 
the Heathrow cases. Initially it explores the concepts of the underbidding game and persistent 
trade-offs and dissonance that prevents performance improvement. The broken business model 
debate is then framed within the current policy context for Intelligent Clients. The second 
section examines persistent gaps between policy aspirations and practice by considering the 
main evaluative principles and models of governance recommended in key industry reports.  
Egan’s 1998 Rethinking Construction is re-visited to compare the emerging debate between a 
lean model for performance improvement and the Built Environment model captured in 
Wolstenholme’s 2009 report “Never Waste a Good Crisis”. This discussion provides a historical 
context for the more recent Construction 2025 report and the current Intelligent Client debate. 
A comparison of the different normative themes underpinning the Egan, Wolstenholme and 
Construction 2025 business models is developed to contrast the evaluative orders and 
assumptions underpinning how value is conceived and captured. This creates a framework of 
emerging themes associated with how improved risk governance is conceptualised and the 
industry perspective on the role of technologies in improving delivery. In the final section these 
themes provide a basis to consider specific principles underpinning early stage enrolment on 
both T2 and T5 and the development of models of governance intended to balance risk and 
discovery.  
1.6.4 Chapter 5: Terminal 5 “Doing Risk Differently” 
Chapter 5 initially explores the T5 timeline and control methodology developed to enable 
performance improvement. Key principles and procedures underpinning fluid territories of 
accountability are examined alongside the need for collective evaluation through performance 
reports as a way to integrate thinking. The next section develops a narrative of the sequence of 
events within each control phase and the evolution of evaluative principles underpinning each 
phase.   The three phases are described as “the client holds the risk”, “one version of the truth” 
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and “foresight”. Within each phase, key technologies such as specific monthly reports, cyclical 
reviews28 and initiatives29 are described to identify evaluative priorities and principles. In the 
next section, the way in which technologies enrolled suppliers is discussed in more depth within 
each control phase. The settlement of specific tensions associated with fluid scope versus lock-
in and safe versus realistic forecasts are examined. This leads to a discussion of how 
controversies were settled and the gradual development of the calculative infrastructure across 
the control phases. The final section returns to the “learning to govern through numbers” 
discussion and describes the co-evolution of the emergent learning approach with the 
development of a calculative infrastructure. This last section reflects on the willingness of 
Heathrow to learn from controversy by investing in an adaptive infrastructure to sustain 
collective evaluation.  
1.6.5 Chapter 6: Intelligent Foresight in Terminal 2 
Chapter 6 initially examines the T2 timeline and the move away from partnering to a more 
regulated approach.  The principles underpinning the control framework are developed with a 
focus on risk management strategies, approaches to develop a sense of common purpose 
through the “right” kind of incentives and priorities such as safety. The next section develops 
the sequence of events into three phases of control: “single version of the truth”, the 
“dashboard” and the “golden thread”. In each of the phases the evaluative principles, 
technologies and their role in mediating enrolment are examined. Key technologies such as 
monthly performance reports, the dashboard and fortnightly reviews are examined to develop 
a baseline of evaluative principles. The following section, examines how key technologies 
enrolled different groups and the gradual development of the golden thread of control. In the 
final section the debate returns to “learning to govern” describing how the intelligent system 
sustained regulatory oversight by adapting accountabilities in response to performance risks. 
The ongoing adaptation of calculative technologies enabled Heathrow to take advantage of 
emergence.  
1.6.6 Chapter 7: Discussion: Making Projects Valuable 
Initially this chapter revisits the need for reform in governing risk and the contrasting appetites 
for discovery and risk described in the T2 and T5 cases. Similarities are observed in the role that 
evaluation plays in steering the programme towards a common sense of meaning and purpose. 
However, different patterns of fabrication and learning were observed between Terminal 5’s 
                                                          
28 The Integrated Baseline Review 
29 Total Cost Management 
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emphasis on collective evaluation versus the more client directed approach on T2. The next 
section returns to the progression through the phases of control on Terminal 5 to describe an 
initial unsettled phase, to mediating an “order” to encourage credible forecasts. Sustained 
control is linked to the replication of monthly reporting rituals and the fixing of risk citizenship 
principles into an infrastructure of rewards and targets. The following section focuses on the 
phases of control on T2 and progression from an initial period of testing the integrity of data, to 
a period of development of the client’s diagnostic capability and finally a recovery phase. 
Sustained control is linked to the dashboard and sophisticated risk management strategies 
which organised dissonant tensions. By the final phase, a lengthy process of “translation” was 
observed that gradually enrolled the 2nd tier into accepting accountability for new recovery 
plans. The final section of the chapter develops a comparative discussion of the T5 infrastructure 
for performance improvement versus the T2 regulatory model of governance. This leads to a 
final discussion of an “intelligent” emergent learning approach as a way of sustaining control 
within major projects.  
1.6.7 Chapter 8: Conclusion: The Intelligent Client  
This conclusion chapter returns to the discussion about the need for clients to develop adaptive 
approaches to governing risk and the success of both Heathrow programmes in gradually 
mobilising a common sense of evaluative purpose. The following section summarises how the 
T5 calculative infrastructure sustained and mediated control by describing the recursive process 
of testing and contesting that led to the legitimation of lean principles and risk citizenship. This 
leads to a discussion of T2 and the development of an adaptive calculative infrastructure that 
shaped client intelligence whilst gradually enrolling the wider supply network towards delivering 
the critical path30. The following section returns to Egan and Wolstenholme and the complexity 
of developing calculative infrastructures to challenge a traditional aversion to scope change. The 
potential for reform in delivery relationships is considered and the importance of recognising 
the role of controls architectures in integrating evaluative purpose. Construction 2025 is re-
examined and the concept of learning and sustaining critical inquiry by fabricating risks. The final 
section suggests further areas for research including more research into the broken business 
model and models of virtual control, control innovations in governing risk and the benefit of 
process research for further studies of projects.  
 
                                                          
30 Critical path refers to the sequence of activities which must be completed to deliver the project “on 
time” (PMBOK, 2015) 
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1.7 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the main questions and themes underpinning this thesis. So far, the 
discussion has identified a failure in large-scale construction projects to develop mechanisms of 
management capable of sustaining cooperation across the supply network. In this context, large-
scale projects involve plural tensions and emergent risks which can destabilise progress. 
Traditional approaches to control reflect an aversion to risk with early stage lock-in to plans and 
commercial frameworks that transfer risk to others rather than proactively managing change. 
The Heathrow cases provide an important opportunity to examine two contrasting models of 
governance which successfully navigated emergence and complexity. The research questions 
outlined in this chapter focus on tracing the transition between the two different models of 
governance. The questions focus on the evolution of the calculative infrastructures and the 
generative nature of calculative technologies in mediating and steering both programmes 
towards completion. The discussion so far has highlighted theoretical concepts such as “social 
integration” and the role of technologies and infrastructures in enrolling a common sense of 
meaning and purpose. The next chapter reviews the literature to develop these concepts further 
in order to examine issues associated with the reproduction of control in complex settings and 
the different ways in which calculative technologies can govern conduct.   
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
This literature review is problem-focused with an intention of drawing together literature 
primarily from accounting, organization and innovation studies to consider the main themes 
associated with the complexity of governing conduct and sustaining control within large-scale 
projects. In this context, governance is considered as a dynamic process of shaping and steering 
action, from the Latin term of “gubernare” or “to guide”. Governance takes place through an 
architecture of project control practices and technologies designed to steer conduct towards a 
defined “value system, responsibilities, process and policies” (Mueller, 2012, p306). However, 
steering conduct in major projects is complicated because the “ends-in-view” (Dewey, 1939) can 
change. Construction projects have a history of adversarialism and commercial friction which 
can create an unstable control environment (CE, 2009). To deter adversarial behaviours, 
rigorous “checks and balances” are often adopted to discourage this (Flyvberg, 2012). Although 
models of risk governance are recommended to encourage openness (ICE, 2013), this can be 
viewed as surveillance and met with resistance resulting in hiding inconvenient knowledge. The 
innovation and organizational literature recommends that in complex settings collective 
deliberation is needed to resolve perplexing problems as they emerge (Dougherty, 2016; Stark, 
2009; Weick, 1995). However, traditional project management approaches favour front-end 
planning and early stage lock-in (De Meyer et al, 2006). Governing conduct in this environment 
requires a calculative infrastructure capable of sustaining control by balancing competing 
interests whilst encouraging openness and a “spirit of enterprise” in adversity (Power, 2007). A 
calculative infrastructure to steer projects towards a common sense of evaluative purpose and 
away from lateness, waste and poor value.   
The previous chapter characterised Heathrow as an important empirical site for risk-control 
innovation. The construction of Terminal 5 seems to represent a spirit of enterprise with a lean 
partnering model adopted to encourage performance improvement (Davies et al, 2009; Brady 
and Davies, 2011). Rather than early stage lock-in, engineering plans and designs evolved over 
time. Calculative technologies, such as flexible budgets, a reimbursable guarantee and value-
based gain-sharing incentives, played a mediatory role in sanctioning an appetite for discovery 
(Gil, 2009; Nightingale and Brady, 2011). Within a year of completion, Terminal 2 moved to a 
more arms-length model defined through a standard New Engineering Contract. This regulatory 
approach focused on client oversight through an intelligent system which held suppliers “to 
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account” against planned commitments. Prior literature links delivery success at Terminal 5 to 
co-located integrated teams, gain sharing incentives and rigorous client oversight in managing 
risks (Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2011; 2014). However, the Terminal 2 approach 
seemed to move away from these features to “action at a distance” (Rose and Miller, 1992; 
Robson, 1992) managed through a performance management system that shared accountability 
for risk. These two different models of governance raise a number of questions about “how” 
control was sustained given the very different appetites for centralised regulation versus 
partnering for performance improvement.  
Learning to govern through numbers at Heathrow involved two different models of control: 
participatory versus centralised planning; client-led risk management versus shared 
accountability; and co-located versus distributed teams. However, over time both programmes 
delivered successful outcomes and similar levels of value for money. The following sections 
examine the relevant literature on governing conduct in complex settings and the potentially 
powerful role of evaluation in shaping common purpose. The next section examines the 
management control literature to understand different aspects of the social reproduction of 
control and the role of calculations, technologies and spaces in mobilising action at a distance.  
2.1.1 Governing by Numbers? 
Miller’s 2001 paper “Governing by Numbers” considers the role of the numbers as a technology 
of government. Miller describes how governing conduct takes place through the assembly of 
ideas and responsibilities into calculable practices. Practices are shaped by technologies such as 
budgets and reports that define responsibilities. This work moves away from viewing calculative 
practices as an objective and technical form of measurement to consider social control and its 
reproduction. In this context, governing involves shaping attention towards being responsible 
within specified parameters “rather than confront individuals daily over the allocation of 
resources, why not provide funds who have both the responsibility and the freedom to spend 
the money as they see fit” (Miller, 2001, p381). These concepts are linked to “governmentality” 
from Foucault’s work on power where governing involves an “ensemble of institutions” but also 
calculations and tactics to sustain disciplinary power (Foucault, 1979; Rose and Miller, 1992). In 
this context governing “by” the numbers involves social control where “the manager can be 
represented as an object, evaluated and acted upon by others as a result of visibility, 
calculability, and comparability that accounting provides” (Miller 2001, p387). This body of 
literature has been used to understand “action at distance” (Rose and Miller 1992) and the 
steering of conduct by calculative technologies that confer responsibility towards normative 
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standards of conduct (Miller, 1992). Action is mobilised and sustained when accountability is 
assigned but also accepted by responsible actors. The concept of being “calculable” involves the 
setting of financial targets and norms that confer budgetary responsibility and also an 
acceptance of responsibilities (ibid). In this sense people become calculable when they respond 
to reports that show a variance to expected plans by intervening to make corrections.  
This branch of literature emphasises regulatory control by “normalising” deviations amongst 
peripheral actors towards “what ought to happen” (Macintosh and Scapens, 1991, p460;   
Hoskins and Macve, 1988; Hopwood, 1990). This suggests a hierarchical form of disciplinary 
power over individuals. This power can be latent by building expectations of “invisible 
supervision” which has a dispositional power in terms of creating an “internalized self-discipline” 
where workers anticipate scrutiny and surveillance (Hoskins and Macve, 1988). However, rather 
than this disciplinary power being linked to the “will of the boss”, it can also be part of a wider 
architecture of “norms and standards” (Miller and O’Leary, 1987). In a later 2007 paper Miller 
and O’Leary moved away from focusing on organisational relationships to the mediatory role of 
accounting “instruments” that control by connecting ideas and people across organisations in a 
common vision. These points are important for the study of major projects because control 
spaces extend beyond a dyadic relationship between one client and the major supplier. Instead, 
projects involve a lateral network or “project ecology” made up of different relational layers 
from personal to institutional which encompass a wide epistemic community of experts 
(Grabher and Ibert, 2012). When project networks are conceptualised in this way it highlights 
the importance of enrolling and sustaining engagement across a complex portfolio of 
relationships. Several studies have focused on the mediatory role of accounting in guiding 
network partners towards common goals and priorities (Carlsson-Wall et al, 2009; Hakansson 
and Lind, 2004). The heterogeneous and unstable nature of network relationships has 
highlighted the importance of closely observing the performativity of control within its context 
(Hakansson et al, 2010; Hakansson and Lind, 2004). Rather than assuming fixed “loci” of control, 
scholars suggest that:   
“It is more pertinent to trace continual changes in loci of control rather than trying to identify a 
specific centre that exerts action at a distance” which assume “linear and uniform time and 
space”  (Quattrone and Hopper, 2005, p760) 
This quote warns against making assumptions about action at a distance and the loci of control 
and instead studying the settlement of ongoing tensions and ties associated with sustaining 
control. Management control scholars note that control can take many heterogeneous forms 
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which are fundamentally embedded within its social context which makes “understanding 
multiple attempts to create order, spaces and times” an “uneasy task” (Quattrone and Hopper, 
2005, p. 761). These points lead to a body of research focused on “mediation” and the role of 
different forms of calculative technologies in linking together actors, ideas and organisations 
into collective endeavours.   
2.1.2 Mediation: Instability and Enrolment  
A large body of research31 has emphasised the mediatory role of different forms of management 
control technologies as actors or inscriptions in governing and shaping action by mobilising 
alliances. Many of the accounting studies focus on different aspects of accounting mediation 
from “affect” and an emotive “edge” as a way of sustaining network relations (Boedker and 
Chua, 2013) or the visual power of different forms of report (Busco and Quattrone, 2015; 
Quattrone 2017; Justesen and Mouritsen, 2009) or settlements of controversy associated with 
change (Preston et al, 1992; Quattrone 2017; Chua 1995). Several of Mouritsen’s studies focus 
on specific calculations such as the functional analysis within target costing as a way of creating 
a narrative (Mouritsen et al, 2001) or cost calculations that steered technology organisations 
towards new product and sourcing strategies (Mouritsen et al, 2009) or calculations to structure 
network complementarities between organisations (Mouristen and Thrane, 2006). Some studies 
focus on a single technology, such as Busco and Quattrone’s 2015 study of the visual power of 
the balance scorecard in discovering strategic vision. This case considers a balance scorecard 
report as a visual “performable space”32 to discover future strategies. The scorecard mediated 
discovery by interrogating, ordering and motivating inquiry captured in KPIs and plans as an 
“ecology of signs”. Over time inquiry was “sustained” by a sequence of cyclical reviews where 
the visualisation motivated interrogation into relationships “between objects, spaces, images, 
words, and texts resulting in a continuous enactment of knowledge and beliefs” (Busco and 
Quattrone, 2015, p1256). This concept of sustained inquiry in complex and “ambiguous” settings 
is also examined in Quattrone’s 2017 33paper which considers the semiotic power of specific 
visualisations, such as the Terminal 2A Dashboard. These studies move away from emphasising 
disciplinary control as a way of sustaining action at a distance. Instead the focus moves to the 
                                                          
31 Notably; Preston et al, 1992; Robson, 1992; Chua, 1995; Quatronne and Hopper, 2005; Chua and 
Mahama, 2007; Mouritsen and Thrane, 2006; Mouritsen et al, 2001; 2009; Boedecker and Chua, 2013; 
Busco and Quattrone, 2015; Quattrone 2017; Jutesen and Mouritsen, 2009. 
32 This space became performable by reflection and exploration into strategies - not alignment, but a 
“translation” which reflected a continual “ordering” of strategic vision (Busco and Quattrone, 2015) 
33 This paper is discussed in more depth in chapter 6 - but it considers how the Terminal 2A Dashboard 
acted as a tool for visual rhetoric to 1. Mediate ambiguities 2. Sustain inquiry described as “in-divisions”, 
“in-tensions” and “in-difference” 
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mediatory role for technologies in persuading and negotiating network relations where the 
outcome is some form of stability and control.  
The study of governing conduct at Heathrow focuses on a unit of analysis broader than a single 
calculation or visual tool. Instead, the Heathrow cases consider the notion of “sustained” control 
by considering mediation through a variety of “key” technologies and spaces that settled 
progress over the delivery cycle. The study of controversies is a useful way of observing the 
machinations and modifications of different technologies necessary for control by settling 
agreements (Power, 2015; Chua, 1995; Preston et al, 1992). Drawing on STS concepts, the study 
of “controversies” involves focusing on unforeseen events and the emergence of contested 
interpretations and different knowledge claims that challenge the existing order (Latour, 1987; 
Callon, 1986; Pinch and Bijker, 1987). Tracing gradual enrolments within controversies can 
identify underlying hidden agendas and competing interests associated with change (Hopwood, 
1973; Preston et al 1992).  
2.1.3 Fabrication 
Callon’s 1986 study of the enrolment of support for a conservation strategy at St. Brieuc Bay 
provides a useful framework to break the “sociology of translations” down into four progressive 
stages. In this context, a translation is considered as a process of stabilising identities and the 
basis for interactions within a network of relations (Callon, 1986). The sociology of translations 
can be used to examine the role of calculations in settling diverse interests. The four stages 
34involve moving from an initial perceptible solution (problematization) through to framing 
values (Interessement) and enrolling (Enrolment) others into a common meaning legitimately 
sustained (mobilization) through technologies. The term fabrication refers to the movement 
through all four phases from problematisation through to settlement after enrolment. This is 
significant because it represents the point of settlement when new evaluative principles or 
technologies became acceptable and stable in terms of form and use (Latour, 1987). The concept 
of fabrication has been used to trace the stabilisation of enrolment associated with new 
accounting systems (Preston et al, 1992; Chua, 1995).  
 
 
                                                          
34 Please note that the terms “problematization” will become problematisation, enrolment and 
mobilisation but retaining interessement for the remainder of the thesis 
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Preston et al’s 1992 study of the implementation of a new budgeting system notes that: 
“the process of fabrication also includes individuals' interpretations of, and responses to, the 
proposed or implemented system. In this respect both intentional and unintentional 
consequences” (Preston et al, 1992, p567) 
Studies of fabrication consider unintended controversies associated with change. They also 
trace the modifications and debates necessary to move from controversy in problematisation 
debates through to order and mobilisation. Breaking translations into stages of enrolment can 
reveal the debates and themes that shaped relationships into productive compromises. It is also 
a useful way of examining the nature of modifications in technologies that led to new “ties” 
linking people, organisations and objectives together (Miller and O’Leary, 2007). The length and 
pace of the translation also gives an indication of instability and depth of change. Mouritsen et 
al’s 2009 paper distinguishes between different types of translation based on the significance of 
the change. In this context, the pace and impact of translations were described as “short” and 
simple routine translations versus more complex “long” translations. Long translations involved 
longer periods of controversy and contested strategic debates from competing calculations. 
These concepts are useful ways of considering the length of a controversy and the specific role 
of certain calculations and technologies in stabilising order.  
Concepts of translation and fabrication offer a useful way of conceptualising progressive change 
by tracing the modifications and debates necessary to stabilise network relations. However, 
when the methods adopt a performative35 case study approach, the focus is purely on tracing 
the interactions and ties as they emerge. The aim here is to focus on observable practice to 
understand “which” actors contribute to the calculative phenomena’s significance. Performative 
methods recommend keeping the “social flat” to avoid making a priori assumptions (Jutesen and 
Mouritsen, 2011; Mouritsen et al, 2010). Keeping the social flat is seen as a way of accepting 
relational heterogeneity 36and therefore focusing on practice and performativity as it unfolds 
(Hansen, 2011; Mouritsen et al, 2010). However, by de-emphasising the historical context, 
drivers for change may be hidden within the observed case. This can lead to misinterpretation 
and overlooking important explanations of “why” action takes place (Greenhalgh and Stones, 
                                                          
35 Performative case studies focus on “following the actor” and the creation of new network ties 
through the enactment of representations (Mouritsen et al 2010; Hansen 2011)  
36 Latour notes that “..in principle (it) is possible to discover properties which are typical of life in society, 
and could explain the social link and its evolution, though in practice they might be difficult to detect” 
(Latour, 1986, p.272)  
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2010, p1288). Miller and Power’s most recent paper addresses some of these issues by 
broadening the conception of control beyond specific “loci” or individual “actors” to focus on 
“infrastructure”. In this context, infrastructure is conceptualised as an entangled “complex” of 
calculative technologies, people and practices that accumulate over time (Power, 2015; Miller 
and Power, 2013). This infrastructure is described as a vast “calculative” infrastructure and it is 
examined in more depth in the following section. 
 2.1.4 Calculative Infrastructures 
Miller and Power’s 2013 paper brings together concepts of governing through the assembly of 
calculative technologies into calculable spaces where mediation takes place. This work 
synthesises a huge body of literature from organization and accounting studies to create a 
baseline of concepts that describe “how” accounting enables governance. Rather than focusing 
on a single locus of control or calculative activity, it describes a “complex” of entangled roles 
described as 1. Territorializing 2. Mediating 3. Adjudicating 4. Subjectivizing. These roles 
combine to create a dynamic and emergent phenomenon described as a vast calculative 
infrastructure”. The multiple roles are described as:  
“We identify four key roles of accounting; first territorializing, the recursive construction of the 
calculable spaces that actors inhabit within organizations and society; second mediating, that 
much of what accounting instruments and ideas do is link up distinct actors, aspirations and 
arenas; third adjudicating that accounting plays an decisive role in evaluating the performance 
of individuals and organizations, also in determining failing and failures; and fourth, that 
accounting is a subjectivizing practice par excellence, that it both subjects individuals to control 
or regulation by another, while entailing the presumption of an individual free to choose” 
        (Miller and Power, 2013, p557) 
These roles take place in “calculable” spaces where calculations associated with costs and 
revenues are captured and responsibility is assigned to individuals, teams or other forms of 
institutional unit (Miller, 1992; Miller and Power, 2013). In this context “cost centres” and other 
forms of budget become calculable spaces when they capture and assign calculations intended 
to steer conduct towards specific performance standards and targets. This process is described 
as a recursive process of “territorializing” where calculative technologies capture, assign, 
compare and “adjudicate” performance within calculable spaces. In this context, Miller and 
Power 2013 introduce the concept of mediation where ideas travel and evaluative principles are 
mobilized through deliberation and discursive forums. This mediatory role of accounting is also 
explained in terms of building a “common narrative” and purpose amongst “subjects” where 
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evaluation plays a key role in steering action towards acceptable standards of conduct. Miller 
and Power note that the four “roles” combine in different ways within their contextual setting.  
However, control is sustained by “subjectivization” and regulation involves two “aspects”:  
 
1. Being subject to control by another  
2. Freedom of choice with reference to defined financial standards and norms.  
The combination of these aspects is important as subjectivization moves beyond just disciplinary 
control to freedom of choice within defined parameters of “attention”. In this context, they 
stress that the concept of subjectivizing moves beyond describing passive organizational dupes 
to active agents with economic freedom to fulfil roles and priorities. This final point stresses the 
heart of control lies in the acceptance of being “calculable” and fulfilling accountabilities that 
are assigned. In short, being calculable involves the acceptance of governance and being “held 
to account”.  
Miller and Power’s 2013 paper describes calculable spaces as a heterogenous and emergent 
phenomena recursively constructed over time. The outcome and processes of mediation are 
captured and embodied within a calculative infrastructure which evolves through an entangled 
combination of mediatory technologies and practices. The concept of an emergent calculative 
infrastructure is examined in more depth in Power’s 2015 paper “How accounting begins: Object 
formation and the accretion of infrastructure”. In this paper Power examines the gradual 
acceptance and diffusion of accounting for impact through Impact Case Studies within UK 
Universities. This paper develops a framework to trace “how” performance principles move 
from an orchestration of ideas to stabilized practices through an infrastructure. Drawing heavily 
on Star’s 2010 work, the concept of an infrastructure is examined as an “invisible”37 organisation 
of people and artefacts that gradually organises performance values. However, when 
controversies challenge the composition of the infrastructure critical elements become visible. 
Power applies these concepts to examine “problematization” themes and tensions associated 
with the impact agenda. The case then traces the stabilisation of order through an unfolding 
suite of governing roles, evaluative rules and collective routines conceptualised as the 
organisational infrastructure.  
Power’s case utilises several concepts to inform further studies of infrastructure. Firstly, it 
identifies an important link between the establishment of accounting and time whereby the 
                                                          
37 Star (2010) highlights the invisible nature of infrastructure because of its “embedded” transparency 
borne out of the fact that it does not require “reinvention” each time it is assembled and used. 
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legitimation of performance apparatus is gradual. In Power’s case, the infrastructure that 
supported implementation accumulated over time and this “accretion” involved changing 
priorities and performance tensions. Secondly, the case highlights the importance of situated 
and in-depth studies of control and the recognition that social control may be both fragile and 
unstable. These two points combine to suggest that studies of calculative infrastructures require 
methods sensitive to the importance of the situated context and the effects of controversy on 
the emergence of control.  
Miller and Power’s 2013 framework links control to dynamic processes that emerge over time 
“through” calculative technologies and spaces. The framework draws on literature that 
recognises the social complexity of control beyond a hierarchical view of disciplinary control 
over others. Instead, control is linked to the recursive construction of territories of 
accountability and a mediatory role for technologies in stabilising network relations. However, 
mediation is closely linked to adjudication where “action at a distance” involves an order of 
evaluative priorities that define the nature of success or failure. Miller and Power describe 
adjudication through accounting that “classifies, counts, enumerates, summarizes, and 
compares” (Miller and Power, 2013, p584). The outcome of adjudication and mediation is a 
dominant evaluative “order” captured within the infrastructure. However, in Miller and Power’s 
paper there is little discussion about the processes of adjudication in shaping and steering 
evaluative purpose. In the next section, further literature is examined that is focused on the 
“making of value” and order. 
2.1.5 Evaluative Order  
Although Miller and Power’s framework describes an important adjudicatory role for 
technologies and spaces in subjectivizing individuals, there is little discussion about the nature 
of judgement, comparison and justifications. Many of these principles are examined within the 
valuation 38 studies literature.  Dewey’s 1939 the Theory of Valuation is important here:  
“Speaking literally, there are no such things as values. … There are things, all sorts of things, 
having the unique, the experienced, but undefinable, quality of value. Values in the plural, or 
value in the singular, is merely a convenient abbreviation for an object, event, situation, 
possessing the quality” (Dewey, 1939, p2) 
                                                          
38 For example: Antal et al, 2015; Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 2009; Kornberger et al, 2015; Dewey, 
1939; Lamont, 2012; Espeland and Stevens, 2008; Espeland and Lom, 2015 
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 In this context, evaluation involves an “object” and evaluative judgement about the possession 
of a quality or standard (Lamont, 2012). Commensurability involves “checks and balances” 
against these principles to test for proof of “worthiness” by comparing performance against 
standards (Espeland and Stevens, 2008; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Kornberger at al, 2015). 
The act of judgement confers value on an object by defining “what counts” as valuable (Espeland 
and Stevens, 2008; Kornberger at al, 2015). In turn, judgement involves sanctioning past 
decisions as a proof of the legitimacy of choices previously made. Dewey’s 1939 quote describes 
the key role of evaluation and “estimates of worth” on collective action and planned conduct: 
“All deliberate, all planned human conduct, personal and collective seems to be influenced, if not 
controlled, by estimates of value or worth of ends to be attained”  (Dewey, 1939, p2)                
In this context judgement involves making comparisons against an order of priorities that reflect 
“worthiness” based on a schema of performance principles (Lamont, 2012; Espeland and 
Stevens, 2008). For projects this can involve an assessment of “ends to be attained” (Dewey, 
1939) which can alter and change as new pathways emerge. These ideas describe how the 
process of evaluation and estimation of worth can shape action towards an evaluative order.  
The concept of different forms of “moral order” is examined in Boltanski and Thévenots’ 2006 
work: “On Justification: economies of worth”. Their work draws on political philosophy to 
develop an abstract analysis of different social worlds underpinned by a contrasting framework 
of values to govern relationships. The nature of worth is considered as 6 different common types 
of social model39 or “polity” underpinned by patterns of beliefs to govern over relationships. 
Rather than being a static state, each “polity” can evolve over time and move through “states of 
worthiness”. Technologies act as “objects” which reflect the orders that they “reside in”. 
However, “objects” can also be instrumental in social change by testing the evaluative principles 
that assign worth. This testing and contesting involves “acts of justification” which are attempts 
to compete in order to legitimise views.  
Boltanski and Thévenot’s “On Justification” focuses on moral economies and the objectification 
of evaluative principles within a moral order of worth. This work is considered important 
because it introduced the notion of “worth” as a fusion of values and value (Stark, 2009). Moral 
orders of worth reflect a schema of “the good, the just and the fair” based on different criteria 
for judgement (Antal et al, 2015). These ideas describe different appetites or dominant themes 
                                                          
39 Which are Civic; Market; Industrial; Domestic; Inspiration and Fame  
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described as “higher order” or lower order principles. Stability or social change involves a testing 
and contesting of the worthiness of these principles through justified acts. Boltanski and 
Thévenot describe forms of settlement and compromise other than justified acts such as 
“pardoning”, where past justified acts are waived to settle contested disputes in order to enable 
progression. However, although Boltanski and Thévenot discuss social change there is little 
explicit detail about the drivers for progression. This last point is examined in depth by Antal, 
Hutter and Stark in their 2015 book “Moments of Valuation” which extends some of the 
concepts from Boltanski and Thévenot’s work to consider controversy and change. Moments of 
valuation are considered as situated “sites” where “dissonant tensions” between different value 
systems can lead to novelty:   
“in order to become something new, for a while, a variegated process of social interaction takes 
place: the deviant, the tenuous, the rough is recognised in specific situations, and it is estimated 
in terms of established value scales” (Antal, Hutter, Stark, 2015, p6)  
This quote describes an initial period of instability and gradual acceptance of novelty by 
comparing the “new” against existing “value scales” to decide if the new is acceptable. This work 
recommends that studies of evaluation and evaluative orders should focus on situated “sites” 
of valuation and controversies challenging evaluative orders. In this context, the study of 
contested moments is intended to raise the visibility of the underlying “values attributed, the 
controversies and interpretations expressed” (Antal et al, 2015, p6). This work suggests that 
studies of evaluative orders would ideally be situated with an emphasis on tracing change. This 
tracing focuses on modifications in evaluative principles but also the technologies used to 
attribute and assign value. These points highlight the importance of studying calculative 
technologies and how they “make things valuable” by attributing and assigning value through 
acts of evaluation (Kornberger et al, 2015; Antal et al, 2015). 
2.1.6 Synthesis of Themes  
The introduction to this chapter described a tension between the need to develop controls 
infrastructures capable of dealing with emergent change and the tendency for traditional 
project control approaches to closely regulate change by locking into initial plans. Underlying 
this are issues associated with regulating conduct and controlling the nature of action at a 
distance. Miller’s “Governing by numbers” introduced the concepts of “being calculable”, i.e. an 
acceptance of different forms of control to shape action towards normative standards of 
conduct. These ideas were extended in Miller and Power’s 2013 paper to cover the role of 
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calculable spaces in assigning accountability. Their paper stresses that at the heart of control is 
an acceptance by “subjects” or subjectivization where calculative technologies shape conduct 
towards an acceptable level of freedom and regulation. Miller and Power’s framework describes 
a mediatory role for accounting where evaluative judgements can animate and steer ideas 
towards a common narrative (Miller and Power, 2013, p581). These concepts suggest a dynamic 
environment where the outcome of control emerges over time. Power’s 2015 paper highlights 
a gradual accretion of ideas shaped “by” and captured “in” an infrastructure of technologies, 
evaluative principles and practices. Power’s paper is important here because it suggests that 
studies of calculative infrastructures need to be sensitive to both emergence and instability. 
Rather than assuming that control is “implemented”, the study of controversy can highlight the 
critical features of technologies that serve to stabilise order. Focusing on the debates around 
problematisation and the settling of tensions can highlight the nature of modifications necessary 
to sustain control. These ideas are combined to create a conceptual framework.   
2.2 The Conceptual Framework 
This framework, figure 2.1, draws from Miller and Power’s 2013 publication to consider “how” 
control was sustained on both Heathrow programmes. It breaks down the composition of 
control into calculable spaces as the central unit of analysis.  The framework will be used to trace 
how calculable spaces evolved over time into a wider “calculative infrastructure”. 
Figure 2.1: The Conceptual Framework for Sustaining Control  
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In the framework, governing conduct is conceptualised as a recursive process of territorializing 
(assigning) calculable spaces and subjectivization through calculative technologies. Calculative 
technologies are the key reports and cyclical reviews used to attribute and assign accountability 
for the delivery of value. These technologies represent an order of principles and priorities that 
shape acts of justification as well as a basis for evaluative judgement. Controversies provide the 
setting to consider how specific calculable spaces evolved and the machinations of enrolling 
different interests and the modifications necessary to engage agreement. The concept of 
fabrication provides a point in time to assess stability and progress, and the nature of 
compromises necessary to sustain “order”. The conceptual framework distinguishes between 
calculative technologies and calculable spaces. Calculative technologies perform calculations 
that objectify, compare, manipulate and extract results (Callon and Muniesa, 2005; Jeacle, 2012; 
Rose and Miller, 1992). Calculative technologies adjudicate performance by testing for worth 
against a schema of performance principles. However, calculable spaces are sites where 
calculative technologies perform by shaping conduct where subjects accept responsibilities 
(Miller, 1992). Calculable spaces are spaces where actors respond to reports and budgets that 
show a variance by intervening to make corrections. In short, the “able” at the end of 
“calculable” implies assignment, acceptance and reproduction.  
The upper part of the framework describes the creation of an evaluative order through the 
construction of calculable spaces. The lower part describes the machinations necessary to settle 
problematisation tensions. At the point of fabrication, order is sustained and a new set of 
evaluative principles and technologies are re-assembled. The final arrow represents a loop and 
cycle of control where controversies are settled and progress is sustained. This framework 
provides a basis to trace progress through successive phases of control over the delivery cycle 
to build a picture of the evolution of the calculative infrastructure. The intention here is to 
understand how progress was sustained and the nature of adaptations necessary to settle 
performance tensions. This is intended to build a picture of patterns of development and 
uncover the nature of the dominant evaluative orders captured in the infrastructure that 
resulted in the governance of the programmes.  
So far, the accounting control literature has highlighted the importance of understanding the 
situated context for control. The conceptual framework has been created to trace the recursive 
development of calculable spaces and evaluative principles which settled tensions. However, 
the last chapter described plural tensions within large-scale projects which create a dynamic 
control environment. In turn an array of interdependencies can create instability when 
emergent change challenges existing plans. The innovation literature recommends organising 
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for complexity by adopting abductive learning routines and heedful ways of interrelating to 
encourage ongoing collective problem solving (Dougherty, 2016). However, traditionally 
construction projects are marked by an in-grained “adversarial culture” (Latham, 1994), a 
tendency towards lock-in rather than learning and self-seeking opportunism above sharing 
knowledge. These factors can create persistent tensions and competing evaluative priorities. In 
response to this, an appetite for risk and discovery is developed and a strategy to govern conduct 
which reflects an “order of worth” (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006) which may favour autonomy 
and “enterprise” or perhaps a more cautious appetite for regulation and “auditability” (Power, 
2007). As newness emerges this can result in an intolerance for change and a removal of 
deviations or perhaps an acceptance and adaptation. An appetite for risk and discovery are 
important factors that influence how control is sustained and the nature of settlements.   The 
following section considers literature linked to these themes of sustaining the reproduction of 
control in complex settings. This draws from innovation literature, organization theory and 
accounting literature to consider different approaches to organising for discovery and learning 
within unstable and messy large-scale projects. Themes associated with trade-offs and tensions 
associated with competing value systems are considered as well as the literature on governing 
risk. This literature then provides a background and contextual setting for the reform discussion 
and control agenda that underpins the Heathrow cases. The following section starts with 
Scranton’s 2015 paper on large-scale projects, learning and the indeterminacy of control.   
2.3 Navigating Complexity in Projects 
Scranton’s 2015 paper on the history of projects highlights how projects can be viewed as an 
organisational form specifically set up as an instrument to resolve a complex problem identified 
at the beginning of the temporary organisation. Project scholars have indicated that the bespoke 
design of a project offers a more flexible way of organising knowledge and learning than more 
rigid functional forms of organisation (Söderlund and Tell, 2012; Hobday, 1998, 2000; Söderlund 
2012). However, project flexibility requires approaches to control capable of adaptation in order 
to capture emergent learning whilst sustaining an acceptable level of control. This involves a 
complex balancing of a networks of cooperative relationships in a way that can sustain progress 
and the pace necessary to deliver projects on time and to budgets (Söderlund, 2012; Shenhar 
and Dvir, 2007). However, the nature of dynamic complexity of projects can mean that emergent 
change can destabilise plans resulting in a misalignment of goals (Brady and Davies, 2014).  
 
42 
 
 
 
Scranton quotes Bauman (below) in a glorious description of some fundamental problems that 
challenge control within major projects: 
 “A project is not a reality. It is ‘under-determined’; there is no certainty that your aims will be 
fulfilled. There is always a risk that a mistake could be made, that a wrong turn could be taken 
and then, instead of implementing the project, you will actually make its implementation more 
difficult. So, there is a risk of many, many people whose work should be coordinated but might 
not be. And there is also the problem of trust. Could you actually trust them, that left to their 
own resources, without instruction, without attention paid to them, without correcting their false 
moves, they will actually work towards implementation of the project?”    
                        (Scranton, 2015, p7) 
This quote describes the control challenge where a project is used as an instrument for 
resolution but the pathway to success is unclear and indeterminate. Although projects are set 
up to “make things different”, the nature of complexity can mean that the pathway to 
progression can be non-linear and complex (Plowman et al, 2007). Scranton’s quote describes 
the perils of path-dependent lock-in when the pathway chosen becomes inappropriate. This can 
be further frustrated by unpredictable forms of emergent action and knowledge, as unruly 
distributed interactions create an incompatibility when the control model seeks to regulate 
conditions which no longer exist (Nightingale, 2004; Dougherty, 2016; Seo and Creed, 2002). The 
need for coordination is amplified because of task and team interdependencies but also shared 
accountabilities. Scranton’s quote also introduces the complex issue of coordinating collective 
action on a large scale of “many many people” (Scranton, 2015, p7). This reveals specific tensions 
between the need for predictability (can you trust them?) and the need to support autonomy in 
localised decision making. This point illustrates a dichotomy in control design between 
surveillance and regulation, and more autonomous approaches to enable devolved decision-
making. These points emphasise the challenges of organising project control in a way that 
balances concerns for the regulation of performance whilst still encouraging the emergence of 
novel ideas and local knowledge.  
Scranton’s work describes the gradual emergence of an established project over time into a 
mature organisation of people, targets, information and rewards. This infrastructure enables the 
temporary organisation to “morph” into a project enterprise. However, this development 
involves “capable teams” and the pooling of knowledge to navigate incertitude.  
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Scranton, 2015, p4 notes that:  
“..because the means to the goals are not obvious or are complex, if understood, teamwork (not 
task assignment) is crucial, with feedback from multiple investigators, experiments, trials, or 
design-in-use providing invaluable, critical reflexivity”.         
This quote highlights how experimentation, the capturing of feedback and reflexive learning play 
a key role in sustaining progress within major projects. These points resonate with ideas from 
Nightingale and Brady’s 2011 paper that describes reflexive learning on Terminal 5. This paper 
describes how people became a “source of predictable behaviour”, pooling knowledge captured 
in plans enabling the project to move towards the overall desired outcome. However, organising 
multiple investigators can be complex. Scranton highlights the fundamental importance of a 
“team orientation” shaped by “who’s on the team, how they were chosen and by whom and 
what are their responsibilities.” (Scranton, 2015, p4). These points emphasise the importance of 
organising common purpose towards a “team orientation” that encourages collective learning.  
The organisation of inter-disciplinary learning is complicated and organisational theorists have, 
for many years, noted that it requires a complex institutional design to frame different “thought 
worlds” (Dougherty, 1992). In turn, certain types of tacit knowledge can be constrained to “local 
settings” or “different perspectives” and “meaning systems” that frustrate collective problem 
solving (Dougherty, 1992; Tyre and Von Hippel, 1997; Bechky, 2003). Carlile’s 2002 work in 
particular, stresses the difference between simple “knowledge transfer” and more complex 
forms of learning that require the transformation of both meaning and competing interests. 
When faced with these pragmatic boundaries, Carlile 2002 describes a need for greater effort 
and iterative tools that provide visibility of dependencies to translate political interests. 
However, change and ambiguity can frustrate attempts to organise learning. Although 
organising routines may temporarily stabilise divergent perspectives, this can be displaced when 
new problems emerge (Dougherty, 1992; Dougherty, 2016; Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2004). Weick’s 
1995 work on “sensemaking” is relevant here as it shows how the organisation of ambiguity 
requires a combination of interlocking routines and regulated control able to synthesise 
different perspectives. Weick contends that sensemaking required interlocking spaces for “inter-
subjectivity” tempered by control accountabilities which combine to provide “unity”40 (Weick, 
1995).  
                                                          
40 “How to accept the diversity and mutation of the world while retaining the minds power of analogy and 
unity so that this changing world shall not become meaningless”.   (Weick, 1995, p171) 
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The discussion so far has revealed the indeterminate nature of control in project settings and 
the difficulty in navigating complexity because the pathway to success is unclear. Although 
pooling knowledge and collective learning is recommended to resolve perplexing problems, 
harnessing the collective intelligence of a variety of diverse experts can be complicated. Weick’s 
1995 work is important because it details the need to balance inter-subjective tensions and 
common understanding and purpose. Carlile’s 2002 work reveals the need for iterative routines 
and visible infrastructures to enable learning and control in diverse and complex settings. These 
themes of iterative learning and common purpose are brought together in Dougherty’s 2016 
book on organising for discovery in complex settings.  
2.3.1 Taking Advantage of Emergence  
Dougherty’s latest 2016 book “Taking Advantage of Emergence” starts with a discussion about 
innovative problem solving in emergent and complex settings. Dougherty notes that complex 
innovation systems are marked by emergence, where solutions are likely to evolve from 
circumstances. In this context, she examines how self-organising systems underpinned by 
purposeful pursuit and continuous adaptation can lead to superior forms of stability without the 
need for centralised intervention. Dougherty highlights 3 features of organising for discovery:  
• A Division of Labour into 4 subsystems of discovery to address specific innovation 
perspectives that frame problem solving 
• Abductive learning routines that animate discovery across the four subsystems 
• Organizing infrastructure that keeps knowing sustained within doing 
2.3.1.1 Subsystems of Discovery  
Dougherty developed the concept of four “subsystems” to frame problem solving and the 
mobilisation of resources. The subsystems are described as a “division of labour” of values to 
organise and address the key problems which interplay and combine to create the overall 
innovation system. The four subsystems are:  
1. The Project – developing the functional elements  
2. Knowledge management 
3. Strategic management - marshalling knowledge resources 
4. Institutional complex innovation - orchestrating and reconfiguring relational goals  
The subsystems deal with the need to strategically organise innovation problems by considering 
the interplay between the project, knowledge and strategic management for value creation 
when orchestrating the institutional complex. The last perspective of institutional complex 
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innovation focuses on the orchestration of governance through configuring relational goals into 
a “collaborative commons” for value creation and knowledge management. Dougherty notes 
that the institutional complexity of innovation can result in getting stuck in a rigid “block-buster 
business model” where the infrastructure “does not generate enough value-creating 
opportunities to use all the innovations that can emerge” (Dougherty, 2016, p17). These points 
resonate issues of rigidity when organising “territories” for accountability within major projects 
that can inhibit the visibility of emergent opportunities. In this context, Dougherty claims that 
rigidity can be overcome when routines that support abductive learning widen the search space.    
2.3.1.2 Abductive Learning Routines for Heedful Interrelating  
Dougherty’s model describes the animation of governance through abductive learning routines, 
which are described as addressing problems where “knowledge is limited, incomplete and 
fragmented” (ibid p28). This involves testing for a “novel hypothesis about what might be going 
on” by drawing together diverse insights (ibid p21). Dougherty describes how abductive 
practices become recognisable learning routines as they develop into patterns of 
interdependent action to combine and recombine knowledge across the different subsystems. 
They are considered performative as they bring “problems forth” to create new routines that 
emerge “through the application of symbols, categories, labels and assumptions contained in 
the tools” (ibid p19). Over time these routines organise diverse perspectives into collective 
interaction and “doing”.  
Sustaining abduction involves “heedful interrelating” as a form of subordinating action towards 
a common purpose. Dougherty quotes Weick and Roberts 1993 on the collective mind, where 
heedful refers to reflective mental processes that consider the whole (ibid p146). In this context, 
heedful interrelating is defined as when people construct their own actions (contributing) whilst 
“envisioning” a system of joint action (representing) and interrelating (subordinating) their 
action with the group (ibid p25). Interaction and images create interconnections which help 
balance diverse perspectives. Pooling action can lead to novelty and “the emergence of a 
representation of a world that none of those involved individually could possess” (ibid p25). 
Drawing on Weick’s 2005 work on sensemaking, Dougherty warns that if attention is on the local 
situation and individualism, then shared situations may be neglected, thereby pulling the system 
apart. She notes that community and collective solidarity is fundamental to avoid “heedlessness” 
where there is a “failure to see and take note” (ibid p27).  
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Although Dougherty’s work emphasises the importance of organising problem-solving in the 
subsystems, it also notes that “rigid” institutional templates can be overcome by abductive 
routines. These are part of a wider infrastructure which acts by framing reflexive learning 
between diverse groups and locations. In turn technologies are performative as they structure 
and enact knowledge. Activities are sustained through problem solving in the form of 
experimentation, testing and fine-tuning. Different forms of experimentation are described as 
“elaboration” - a broader form of exploration of possible interdependencies versus a 
“narrowing” to examine the depth of a situation (ibid p45). These activities are made visible 
through “overlapping knowledge” that enables people to take responsibility for the parts of the 
process that they contribution to. In this context, the important role of a central “leader” is seen 
as a way of sanctioning collective learning by visibly rewarding heed and preserving stories of 
discovery and success.  
2.3.1.3 Sustaining Discovery?  
Dougherty’s work highlights key themes relevant for managing complex projects. Firstly, the 
importance of visibility of the “whole”, the need for “heed” and awareness of dependencies 
when coordinating collective action. In this context, a failure to sustain networks of cooperative 
partnerships across the supply network is a major issue41 for construction business models. 
Secondly, a model of discovery that encourages distributed forms of collective action organised 
towards a common search for improved performance, resonates some themes underpinning 
the T5 lean partnering model. In this context, Dougherty emphasises the key role of a mediating 
infrastructure 42of “tools” that embody assumptions and categories to sustain “knowing within 
doing”. Dougherty’s work describes the emergence of a heterarchical form of organisation that 
can draw together multiple perspectives through an infrastructure of routines and tools that 
support lateral forms of distributed learning. However, heterarchies represent a significant 
control challenge as they tend to diverge as competing values and interests redistribute or 
“drift” as time passes (Stark, 2009; Antal et al, 2015; Quattrone and Hopper, 2005). Much of 
Dougherty’s work is based on studies of pharmaceutical research teams searching for new viable 
products rather than the difficult and dissonant setting of a construction project. Although 
Dougherty notes that “power” and “politics” play a role in sustaining collective contribution, the 
processes behind these ideas are not explored in depth. However, issues of enrolment and 
                                                          
41 This is discussed in chapter 1 and examined in more depth in chapter 4 
42 On this point, Dougherty cites Nightingale (2004) on the importance of an infrastructure to support 
the co-evolution of knowledge and innovation and Yaqub and Nightingale (2012) on the discovery of 
vaccines to capture and coordinate accumulated and emergent knowledge. 
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balancing divergent interests and tensions are important themes for construction projects. In 
chapter 1 the discussion revealed how fragile and temporary delivery relationships fail to enrol 
a willingness to pool valuable “know-how”. Dissonant and competing tensions can frustrate and 
destabilise attempts to encourage heed and discovery. The next section considers the literature 
on dissonance and the balancing of tensions through evaluation.  
2.3.2 Organising Dissonance 
Stark’s (2009) work is underpinned by an assumption that organisations are plural and socially 
complex settings marked by competing tensions. Stark’s 2009 book “A Sense of Dissonance” 
describes the persistence of dissonance as competing value systems that require organisation 
in complex settings. Stark contends that the careful organisation of dissonant values can balance 
friction and translate negative tensions into “productive friction” (Stark, 2009, p18). Productive 
friction is linked to the creative generation of knowledge and novel forms of recombination that 
challenge taken for granted assumptions. However, Stark notes that balancing friction and 
tensions requires a framework to guide evaluation in a “principled and ordered” way (ibid p23). 
Stark describes how frameworks of evaluation with over-lapping performance criteria can 
support “reflexive cognition” (ibid, p4) within diverse groups. In turn, issues located at interface 
points are sites where tensions can arise because of overlapping values. At this interface, Stark 
describes how justification and the “giving of accounts” by people and the “keeping” of accounts 
can force collective reflection and dialogue to test performance principles (ibid, p25) and testing 
and exploration can take inquiry outside the “search space that is already known” (ibid p212). 
In this space, performance frameworks play a fundamental role in balancing contending 
evaluative principles and creating conditions for novelty to be viewed as acceptable rather than 
a form of deviance (Antal et al, 2015). Stark’s work is important because it reveals the productive 
nature of incertitude when organised to balance dissonance whilst fostering diverse 
perspectives into a collective “ah ha” (Antal et al, 2015, p5) to resolve perplexing problems. 
However, overlapping performance criteria require careful governance and set-up of conditions 
to encourage acceptance of novel forms of discovery.  
Although Stark’s work identifies the importance of organisation to sustain discovery he does not 
comment on the properties or composition of performance frameworks to sustain productive 
friction. This point is, however, explored in Chenhall et al (2013) which examines “how” the 
organisation of a performance management system can “sustain” productive friction. The paper 
examines changes in a quality reporting system in a geographically dispersed voluntary services 
organisation where reporting played a key role in organising complexity. The paper explores 
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“how” and “when” different modes of evaluation inspired either productive or destructive forms 
of compromise and the role of reports in providing a space for the negotiation of different 
evaluative principles. The paper reveals the importance of “concurrent visibility” of attributes 
that represented priorities and important values for some actors within performance reporting. 
This helped to sustain compromise and temporary settlement by representing these attributes 
in a visible format43. However, balanced tensions were threatened when reports gave 
precedence to a single perspective described as “stuckness” - a mode of evaluation that 
prevented a broader representation of values. The paper claims that reporting can become 
unproductive when open debate is inhibited or when the discussions move away from 
fundamental principles to the repetitive “mechanics” of accounting. This paper extends the 
importance that Stark places “on giving accounts” as a way of balancing tensions between 
multiple evaluative priorities.  
2.3.3 Synthesis of Themes 
Scranton’s 2015 description of a project as an instrument to resolve complex and indeterminate 
problems through the organisation of teams, provides a useful basis to consider the difficulty of 
controlling projects. Managing diverse perspectives into critical and reflexive learning presents 
a significant challenge when pathways to success are indeterminate. This challenge is amplified 
when teams of experts are from different “thought worlds” but also different organisations with 
competing political interests (Dougherty, 1992; Carlile, 2002). Dougherty’s 2016 book 
demonstrates that dynamic and complex settings can provide a control challenge. However, if 
organisations focus on encouraging abductive reasoning and heedful interrelating it is possible 
to navigate complexity. Stark’s 2009 book indicates that although dissonant tensions can stifle 
progress, if friction is organised through evaluation, then productive compromises can be 
achieved to sustain discovery. Dougherty 2016, Stark 2009 and Weick’s 1995 work recommends 
collaborative forms of collective evaluation that create intersubjectivity and shared 
accountability. Chenhall et al’s 2013 paper identifies a role here for reporting to enrol productive 
compromises by giving concurrent visibility of strategic priorities and higher order values. 
However, in construction there is a long history of adversarialism and “heedlessness” 
(Dougherty, 2016) which can be linked to a deep concern for the management of change and 
the financial effects of risk. This has dampened an appetite for collective discovery and 
enterprise in adversity (CE, 2009). The governance of risk within construction44 is a 
                                                          
43 The paper describes how a report enabled concurrent visibility of specific standards but also an 
acceptable degree of uniqueness through narratives and regional reporting. 
44 Constructing Excellence, 2009; Egan, 1998; Construction 2025; ICE, 2013 
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fundamentally important theme and central to any comparison of different approaches to 
governing conduct at Heathrow. In the next section, literature on the management and 
governance of risk is considered. 
2.4 Governing Risk within Projects  
Knight’s classic work distinguishes between uncertainty and risk based on measurable 
incertitude (Knight, 1921). In this sense, risk is an “identified danger” manifest in describable 
events with probabilities linked to possible future states. But in contrast, uncertainty involves 
unknowns as in “we know what we do not know, but that is all that we know” (Callon et al, 2011, 
p11). Power’s 2007 work on “Organized Uncertainty” focuses on the organisation of risk within 
different institutions noting that risk can be viewed as an “empirical fact” (Power, 2007, p3) that 
can manifest in many different perspectives - from hazards and dangers to volatility of financial 
returns in financial markets. Power notes that these different conceptions of risk become 
managed when they enter an institutional “system of representation” (ibid, p4) where 
technologies act as instruments or framing objects for action and intervention. In this context, 
uncertainty is transformed into a risk when it becomes an object of management, regardless of 
the information about probability (ibid, p6). Quoting Elwald, Power notes that:  
“Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; 
it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event”   
         (Power, 2007, p4) 
In project management, the generally accepted definition of risk is a variance from plan 
described as “an uncertain event or condition that if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect 
on a project’s objectives” (PMBOK, p559). In this context, project practitioners model and 
evaluate risk as events not captured in planned objectives which could manifest in changes in 
scope, schedule or cost. This focus on “variance” as a measure of risk has resulted in more 
emphasis on the front-end strategizing and rigorous planning (Winch, 2012; Morris, 2003; Gil 
and Tether, 2011). De Meyer et al (2006) detail how traditional risk management evaluates 
performance to planned targets in an approach that is “instructionalist” in the sense that the 
plan becomes the objective rather than a “means” to explore alternative ways of achieving the 
objectives. They note that when risks are defined as deviations from plan, the project mind-set 
assumes a “known terrain” of events, outcomes and a solution space. In turn, project risk 
technologies, such as the “risk register”, monitor progress in terms of deviations from plan as a 
form of management by exception.  
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Morris (2003) emphasises that priorities within risk management are shaped by contextual 
factors making it difficult to predict how to plan and manage a project. Instead, risk management 
is conceptualised as an ongoing iterative management “process” to measure, capture and 
analyse to develop mitigation strategies. Winch’s 2012 paper recommends improving the 
management of risk by tailoring the relevant information based on different states of unknown. 
Winch describes how collecting information can increase a confident cognitive “state of mind” 
to enable judgement because there is a clearer conception of potential threats and 
opportunities (Winch, 2012). Winch’s model describes different states of the “unknown” where 
the most common form “known unknowns” is dealt with by quantified risk analysis. In contrast, 
“unknown knowns” are political. Threats and opportunities are “deliberately” hidden and 
misrepresented to protect interests. In this context, Winch notes that opportunism can damage 
a project and more effort is required to build confidence and information. Finally, a deep level 
of uncertainty is identified as “unknown unknowns” where a state of ignorance exists. 
Winch’s cognitive model is a useful starting point to conceptualise different types of incertitude 
that may require different risk management strategies. It describes an inverse relationship 
between information confidence and the unknown. However, in complex settings increased 
information may increase awareness that the situation is more complex than initially thought.  
More information may result in less confidence and a cycle of more incertitude. Winch’s model 
also simplifies the indeterminacy within even the “known” and the political nature of 
inconvenient knowledge.  In contrast, Stirling (2010; 2009) explores the complexity of 
knowledge and warns against taking an over simplistic view in the assessment and regulation of 
risk. Stirling notes that the nature of knowledge is intrinsically complex and in some instances 
incommensurable “not amenable to simple aggregation” (Stirling, 2009, p36). When attempting 
to regulate risk it may be too simplistic to assume an independence between “facts” and values. 
This point highlights the value-laden nature of what may be presented as a “fact”. Stirling’s work 
highlights the need for more methodological care in considering responses to knowledge 
problems. In his 2010 article Stirling describes how certain forms of evaluation can act as a 
catalyst for deliberation where plural (with a variety of interpretations) and conditional (explicit 
exploration of alternatives) approaches move away from simply closing down justifications into 
single definitive responses.  
This work identifies important themes for the management of risk in projects. Firstly, it 
highlights a complex relational dynamic where political interests can influence how risk is 
defined, analysed and regulated. Within a policy setting, risk is closely linked to danger and 
harm, creating a tense environment for potential controversies and uncertainty. The legitimacy 
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of decision making can be contested and the regulation of risk influenced by power and politics 
where more democratic forms of governance can act as a panacea to avoid the perils of hiding 
risks and danger (Stirling 2010, 2009). This indicates a need to examine in more depth the 
contextual setting of controversies at Heathrow in order to understand how these tensions 
could influence the governance of risk. Secondly, it stresses issues of domination in defining 
which types of risk “count” as being worth more deliberation and visibility. These themes echo 
earlier discussions on conferring more legitimacy to specific dominant narratives (Miller and 
Power, 2013; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). Stirling reveals the silencing effects of power and 
potential bite-back when controversies amplify the effects of harm. This raises the question of 
how the invisibility of risk can amplify the effect of danger and how progressive dialogues may 
reduce potential harm.  
In a policy setting, more open dialogue and the exploration of multiple perspectives can mitigate 
against harm and the danger of technological lock-in. Issues of “lock-in” are also relevant to 
managing projects because project risk is referred to as an unforeseen variance. In this context, 
participation and exploration into evaluating alternative solutions may be shared.  However, the 
appetite for “how” risk issues are resolved involves institutional problem solving which reflects 
an appetite for varying levels of autonomy and participation in risk management. The next 
section examines Power’s 2007 work on the factors that can shape the institutional appetite.  
2.4.1 An Appetite for Risk  
Power 2007 notes that within organisations “uncertainty management” is more about 
organising complexity and stabilising knowledge networks than efforts to define and measure 
the probability of outcomes. Power’s work acknowledges and accepts the existence of            
value-laden assumptions within risk management and that these beliefs form the building blocks 
for risk governance. Power describes how incertitude means that organisational decision-
making is fundamentally a messy process shaped by variety of relationships, political 
motivations, personal experiences and “rules of thumb” (Power, 2007, p14). Stability can be 
achieved through a risk management infrastructure embodying material standards and 
guidelines with experts to guide the organisation of uncertainty. Risk technologies or 
instruments play an important role in shaping how risk is conceived, analysed and regulated.  
Power 2007 describes how governing risk involves both a process and outcome shaped by 
instruments where risk management reflects an appetite for risk. Governing risk involves a 
tension and dialectic between concepts of enterprise versus managerialism and auditability. 
One side represents traditional approaches to risk management that focus on the reduction of 
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harm by checking routines against predetermined standards. This is described as “auditability”, 
where governing involves precision, checking and compliance processes to identify variances to 
plan. However, Power highlights a newer model of risk governance, “Enterprise Risk 
Management” (ERM), where the management of risk involves checking routines but also value 
creation strategies. In this context, ERM is defined as a popular discourse based on making risk 
“everyone’s business” within an organisational setting (Power, 2007, p94). Power describes ERM 
as a new “risk appetite” which extends risk management beyond mitigation to consider risk as 
a variance in value expectations. In turn, risk management is conceived as managing value “at 
risk” and this concern is devolved through the enterprise as the dominant “rationality of 
governing”. This ERM rationality is describes as a style of “standard” making which typically has 
four key features (ibid, p80): 
• Recognising harm but also opportunity where the focus is on control variances to 
mitigate risk but also to enhance value  
• An emphasis on risk communication with a wide range of stakeholders drawing 
together a variety of different perspectives  
• Where responsibility and authority is assigned and allocated across the enterprise  
• The emphasis is on risk identification through visualizations and mapping using 
overview instruments rather than risk calculations.  
Power elaborates how these features are underpinned by a new “moral economy” (ibid, p95) 
where corporate citizens act in a way that is self-governing with a capacity to innovate. However, 
he notes that the freedom to innovate is underpinned by an organisation built on “proof” and 
“precision” and conceptions of accountability (ibid, p197). Leadership plays a central role in 
organising accountability but this requires visibility. Risk maps that highlight the impact and 
likelihood of risks and other overview “instruments” make the organisation “readable” to senior 
management (ibid, p81). Power describes how they create auditable evidence of risk 
management and a visual form that articulates the nature of risk. In some instances, they 
become centrally important in mobilising organisational consensus of the nature of risks.  
Within ERM, principles of governance represent a mix of the self-governing as “enterprise” with 
“auditability” based on precision, proof and control compliance (ibid, p197). Power notes that 
ERM involves autonomous common coalitions that reflect principles similar to “heedful 
interrelating” (Weick and Roberts, 1993; Dougherty, 2016) although responsibilities and 
performance expectations are more prescriptive and standardized. In this sense, ERM seeks to 
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develop citizens that act responsibly and heedfully within an evaluative framework. This 
encourages collective action but through a prescribed set of responsibilities.  
2.4.2 Synthesis of Themes 
Power (2007) and Stirling (2009; 2010) describe the value-laden nature of knowledge and the 
complexity of engaging with controversy and uncertainty. These ideas move the traditional 
project management focus away from conceptualising risk as an “unknown” to be discovered 
through the provision of more information, to a socially complex concept. Stirling’s work 
highlights a complex relational dynamic where political interests can influence how risk is 
evaluated and justified. Power’s work links these themes to an institutional “appetite” for risk 
which shapes how it is conceived and who is held to account for mitigating risk. Some of these 
themes tie back to the concepts of an “evaluative order” and “acts” of justification in shaping an 
organisational dialogue (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Miller and Power, 2013; Antal et al, 
2015; Kornberger et al, 2015). However, what counts as being worth more deliberation is 
defined within a complex infrastructure of institutional standards and guidelines. In this context, 
traditional approaches to project risk management involve compliance to procedures that 
emphasise the diligent recording of “proof” of risk events. However, in an ERM setting, 
subjectivization is more closely linked to corporate citizens accepting accountability for risk and 
entering a dialogue to justify improving value “at risk”. Power (2007) reveals the complexity of 
these different risk appetites and an ongoing trade-off between a desire for regulation and a 
need for discovery and enterprise in complex situations. Rather than viewing a risk appetite as 
a static concept, Power describes it as the emergence of a dominant institutional appetite 
governed through different styles of standard making. This final point is important because it 
emphasises the dynamic and heterogenous nature of risk shaped by its institutional context.  
2.5 Learning to Govern Through Numbers? 
This chapter has examined themes associated with management control, complexity and the 
governance of risk. The organisational and innovation literature has revealed important themes 
that complicate the reproduction of control within major projects. Navigating complexity 
through projects involves resolving indeterminate problems where the pathway to resolution is 
unclear. Scranton’s 2015 paper highlights the challenges of organising project control in a way 
that balances a desire for regulation with freedom to enable critical reflection amongst a diverse 
team of investigators. Dougherty’s 2016 work on organising for complexity highlights the 
benefits of distributed forms of organisation united towards a common goal of discovery 
through collective problem solving. Abductive learning routines play a key role in bringing 
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problems forth whilst organising diverse perspectives into collective discovery. However, 
sustained inquiry requires heedfulness and subordination when envisioning joint action. This 
point is important because Dougherty’s model is based on “collaborative commons” and 
acceptance of overlapping accountability for discovery. However, within construction, shared 
accountability and collective discovery are two main areas of concern and tension. Stark’s 2009 
work on dissonance describes productive friction and tensions in learning. Stark recommends 
organising search “spaces” and overlapping performance criteria that can balance multiple 
perspectives into a common sense of evaluative purpose. Chenhall et al’s 2013 paper extends 
these ideas into the importance of concurrent visibility of evaluative priorities to avoid 
“stuckness”. These ideas combine to describe how sustaining emergent learning in complexity 
requires common purpose, and material and abstract forms of governance that balance friction 
and tensions. However, controversies can destabilise progress when they challenge a sense of 
common purpose potentially leading to heedlessness. These points lead to issues of governing 
risk where incertitude can create a spiral of tensions associated with “hiding” knowledge to 
protect political interests.  
The review of the literature on risk within projects shows traditional views of risk as a variance 
from plan which can result in an overemphasis on fixing early-stage plans. The literature on the 
process of risk management recommends more sophisticated modelling to build confident 
judgement. However, Power and Stirling’s work describes complex social dynamics and tensions 
when institutions attempt to govern risk. Political interests and an institutional appetite for risk 
can shape not only how it is conceived and regulated but also who is held to account for risk. 
Power’s 2007 work on organising uncertainty describes governing risk as a process of stabilising 
networks of knowledge. This suggests that uncertainty management is more about shaping 
“order” than measuring probability outcomes. However, this shaping of order can involve an 
ongoing and dynamic process of balancing an appetite for enterprise with a need for regulation. 
This process takes place through an infrastructure of standards and guidelines which shape an 
acceptable appetite for risk.  
In summary, much of the literature on navigating the complexity of major projects recommends 
the benefits of collective learning. Dougherty’s 2016 and Stark’s 2009 work suggests a powerful 
role for collective evaluation and shared accountability in balancing competing interests. 
However, organising a shared sense of evaluative purpose requires an infrastructure to sustain 
control. In the opening section of this chapter some of the key features of the control 
approaches adopted on T2 and T5 were compared.  The contrasting models of control described 
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features of participatory versus centralised planning, client-led risk management versus shared 
accountability and distributed versus co-located teams. However, the accounting literature 
warns against an overemphasis of functional traits of specific loci of control.  Instead, it 
recommends accepting the unstable, intertwined and emergent nature of control (Power 2015; 
Miller and Power 2013). Therefore, the Heathrow cases will trace the “actual” development of 
the calculative infrastructures as they evolved over time. The conceptual framework provides a 
basis to break down the composition of the calculative infrastructures into a sequence of 
calculable spaces developed to mediate order. This framework is intended to support an analysis 
of “how” control was sustained despite controversy and change. The next chapter draws theses 
points together by describing the “process” methodology that was adopted to trace the 
development of the infrastructures over time.   
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
3.1 A Process Approach  
This chapter describes and explains the methods used to collect data and analyse the two 
comparative approaches to governance and control on T2 and T5. So far, the discussion has 
highlighted the unstable nature of the controls environment within major construction 
programmes and the emergence of controversies which can destabilise progress. This chapter 
describes the use of a process approach within this thesis in order to acknowledge the 
importance of complexity and the indeterminate nature of control within large-scale projects. 
Rather than making a static comparison between certain functional traits of the control 
architecture, the research design focused on tracing the evolution of the calculative 
infrastructures. In turn, the research questions are underpinned by an assumption45 that the 
controls environment at Heathrow was dynamic and calculative technologies played a 
mediatory role in settling order.  In the last chapter the literature review addressed different 
aspects of governing risk in complexity.  The review introduced the concept of fabrication and 
the usefulness of studying progression by focusing on controversy and the process of 
negotiation and the modifications necessary to stabilise agreement. These points have 
methodological implications because they highlight the importance of recognising temporality 
and the need to take time seriously (Burns, 2014) when examining the nature of control. This 
involves being sensitive to evolution whilst considering in some depth how periods of 
controversy effected the development of the calculative infrastructure. Within this thesis the 
central importance of emergence and controversy led to the adoption of a process approach as 
an underlying method that was sympathetic to the link between temporal progression and 
control (Langley, 1999; 2009a; 2009b; Langley et al, 2013; Burns, 2014).  
Process studies track the development of phenomenon through phases or states which enables 
a study of “actual” emergence and the generative drivers underpinning progression. The focus 
here is on creating a longitudinal chronology of events by tracing diachronic 46patterns of 
interactions into “what happened and who did what – when” (Langley, 1999, p692). This 
approach is sympathetic to the indeterminacy of control in projects. Langley notes that process 
studies avoid making static assumptions that are unsuitable for studies in complexity because 
“action under complexity interacts with its context to generate reactions, with unexpected 
ramifications that are absent from static models” (Langley, 1999, p412). This final point is 
                                                          
45 Based on claims made by the existing Heathrow literature 
46 Diachronic is “dealing with phenomena as they occur or change over time” (Webster’s 2007) 
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important because it acknowledges how this approach is focused on the study of “actual” 
interactions and practices rather than making claims about the strategic “mission” of control 47 
(Hopwood, 1979; Power and Gendron, 2015). Rather than oversimplifying assumptions about 
the linear progression in control, a process approach focuses on the actual sequence of events. 
Burns (2014) notes that this supports the analysis of “how” type questions: 
“process research incorporates notions of causality as constituted by sequences of 
interconnected events rather than through abstract correlations. Thus, such an approach 
promises to extend “know-how” theorising”      
                             (Burns, 2014, p74) 
Burn’s quote describes how this approach is more suited to “know-how” theorising because it 
moves away48 from making assumptions about how complex control moves from an initial 
orchestration to implementation. These points are important because the indeterminacy of 
control and the unforeseen effects of emergent change are significant problems for major 
construction projects.  
3.1.1 Temporal Bracketing  
Traditionally much of the project management literature has attempted to understand project 
phenomena by adopting a contingency approach that seeks to connect key functional traits49 to 
the contextual setting. Many of the existing Heathrow Terminal 5 studies50 focus on developing 
a link between the design traits of the programme and the innovative outcomes of this exemplar 
case to develop a picture of best practice. However, the danger of this approach is that 
functional attributes are wrongly assigned to successful outcomes because key events, 
interactions or choices that emerged “during” the programme can be overlooked. In this 
context, oversimplifying the relationship between outcomes, attributes and “time” could result 
in missing important progressive relationships that enabled success. In contrast, process 
approaches pay attention to time by tracing the sequence and movement between different 
states to understand important triggers and “drivers”. However, a longitudinal process study of 
                                                          
47 Hopwood’s classic quote about accounting mission: “Without [research oriented towards describing 
and understanding accounting systems in action], I feel, the behavioural and organizational study of 
accounting will increasingly exist in a void, within a world grounded on the myths of the accounting 
mission rather than the achievements of accounting in practice” (Hopwood, 1979, p147) 
48 Burns notes that a process orientation focuses on how and why organisational phenomena emerge, 
settle, change and unfold over time. This contrasts to variance questioning to identify co-variation 
among dependant and independent variables for “know-what” modelling of best organisational practice 
(Burns, 2014, p74) 
49 For example; Hobday, 2000; Soderlund and Tell, 2012. 
50 Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2011;2014. 
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the Heathrow control infrastructure over an 18-year period required a data analysis strategy to 
structure the research. Temporal bracketing (Langley, 1999; 2009a; Langley et al, 2013; 
Cacciatori, 2012) provided a technique to sort and convert the data into phases creating a 
structure to guide the analysis.  
3.1.2 Phases of Control 
Process approaches focus on the sequences and patterns of events, activities and choices rather 
than testing specific variable-based relationships (Burns, 2014; Langley, 1999). Temporal 
bracketing techniques break the data down into “blocks” of time creating comparative units of 
analysis to chart the progression of events and activities. These blocks or phases can provide a 
basis to analyse concepts “within each phase” whilst being sensitive to the importance of 
evolution, time and situated context. Langley notes that breaking the data into phases enables 
the analysis of “how” actions in one period lead to changes in subsequent periods (Langley, 
2009b). Central to the use of temporal bracketing is a clear definition of what constitutes the 
beginning and end of a phase. New phases represent new “states” where there is a discontinuity 
which stalls the accumulation and reoccurrence of the temporal flow (Langley, 1999; 2009b). In 
the Heathrow analysis, discontinuities are defined by “problematisation” where patterns of 
debate became intense because of a need to resolve a control-related controversy and tensions 
emerged that challenged the underlying evaluative order. In turn a sequence of “phases of 
control” were identified linking changing dominant control themes with modification and 
changes in the composition of calculable spaces. The intention of this analysis was to uncover 
the mediatory role of key calculative technologies by tracking the process of acceptance of new 
accountabilities and evaluative priorities.  
3.1.3 Research Design  
The discussion in the first chapter positioned the main research questions against the existing 
Heathrow literature. The “systems integrator” work51 emphasised the importance of client 
oversight and the client’s role in bearing commercial risk and orchestrating the pooling of 
knowledge. The second set of papers52 highlighted an important role for flexible plans and 
incentives in mediating a common sense of meaning and evaluative purpose. Although both sets 
of literature described an adaptive controls approach, neither contained descriptions of the 
                                                          
51 Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2011; 2014 
52 Nightingale and Brady, 2011; Gil, 2009; Gil et al, 2012 
59 
 
 
 
composition or process of control. For Terminal 2, there were no studies of the control approach. 
These “gaps” provided a basis to start to develop the comparative cases.  
Power and Gendron (2015) describe some of the formative design and collection challenges for 
research as striking a balance between density (depth) whilst developing sufficient richness 
(breadth) to enable the research to clearly establish the phenomena within its context. Locating 
“how” Heathrow learned to govern through the numbers required an appreciation of the 
broader contextual debates associated with the industry over the last 20 years, as well as a depth 
and density of knowledge about project controls. In the early stages, this involved collecting and 
studying documents associated with the current Industrial Strategy for Construction (CS2025) 
and key reports framing the “Intelligent Client” capability debate (ICE, 2013, 2017; CE, 2009). It 
was also important to develop an understanding of the background to the industry at the time 
of both programmes. For Terminal 5 (T5) this involved studying a range of influential industry 
reports from the mid-1990s and the relevant academic literature. For Terminal 2 (T2), the 
project controls frameworks reflected more standard industry technologies and principles. This 
made it easier to work outside of the case site. However, becoming familiar with the terminology 
and language of controls required practitioner training. Four levels of analysis were developed 
from a variety of sources:  
• Broken Business Model: This involved developing a picture of the control concerns 
within the industry by studying influential reports, attending an industry conference and 
a variety of interviews and workshops. This was necessary to be able to sufficiently 
engage with the reform discussion and avoid what Langley warns against as generating 
“banal” process insights53.  
 
• Calculable spaces: calculable spaces were the central “object” of the plot made up of 
calculative technologies which intervened to shape evaluative priorities and principles. 
These technologies included performance reports, procedural manuals, handbooks and 
guidelines. How accountabilities were assigned and the standards and targets built into 
these reports were scrutinised to understand the nature of adjudication within these 
spaces.  
 
                                                          
53 Langley’s “banal” process insights comment served as a significant warning. She describes the danger 
of vague discussions; such as ““organisational processes involve opposing forces, non-linear relationship 
and feedback loops” (Langley, 1999, p694)  
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• Phases of control: The Heathrow cases were broken down into a timeline of control 
phases. These phases were initially analysed to build a picture of a sequence of key 
events and mediatory technologies that stabilised progress within each phase. Specific 
attention was paid to dominant themes which described the order of evaluative 
principles within each phase. In turn emergent patterns of contested “tensions” were 
considered to understand the generative movement between the phases.  
 
• Calculative infrastructure: A picture of the calculative infrastructure that evolved to 
mediate and sustain control was developed by analysing the progression within and 
between the phases of control. The conceptual model was used to break down the 
composition of the calculable spaces within each phase. The nature of fabrication and 
the settlement of tensions was analysed to consider how the programme progressed 
from one phase to another.  
 
These four levels of analysis were gradually developed. Initially, data gathering started at the 
broad industry level and then efforts focused on creating a timeline of events and technologies 
that made up the calculable spaces. The next stage of analysis brought together the empirical 
data and theory underpinning the conceptual framework to describe the evaluative order and 
generative patterns of development within the control phases. The final stage of the analysis 
involved considering the movement between phases to develop a picture of the calculative 
infrastructure that evolved over time. Although an initial intense period of data collection took 
place over 14 months, the triangulation of the findings was more gradual because it involved an 
ongoing dialogue with industry contacts in the field.  
3.2 Data Collection  
Initially exploratory fieldwork focused on understanding the construction industry debates 
which shaped the context for each programme. For Terminal 5, the study covered the period 
from 1996 until 2006 with greater focus on the post procurement and pre-handover stage   
(1999-2005)54. For Terminal 2, the study covers from 2009 until 2014 when Terminal 2 opened. 
The Terminal 2 construction had 2 elements, the T2B construction 55for the satellite pier stands 
                                                          
54 The T5 study ends in 2005 because the programme was handed over to the operations readiness 
organisation in 2006. 
55 The T2B £0.6bn satellite pier was constructed by Balfour Beatty with phase 1 completed in November 
2009 and the final phase dovetailed into June 2014. Balfour Beatty used Logikal Projects for control and 
project management support. The control methodology described in the thesis doesn’t include this 
element of the Terminal 2 programme.  
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and the main Terminal, T2A. The Terminal 2 study mainly focuses on T2A because this 
represented the majority of the programme which was centrally managed through the 
Intelligent Client approach. The studies required access to project-based data to build a picture 
of the composition and evolution of the calculable spaces as the programmes moved through 
the phases of control. A wide variety of data was collected through 24 interviews, direct 
observations, project-based data, industry and policy documents. The data collected broadly fell 
into three levels:  
Industry Level: Key policy documents from 1996-2017 were collected and analysed to identify 
the trends in the debate about the need for reform in governing risk in construction. Background 
discussions, unstructured interviews and observations from trade-press, 1 conference and 
central government hosted working groups helped to identify the major “themes” influencing 
the Broken Business Models and Intelligent Client debate.  
Project-Based: Observations and unstructured interviews 56were undertaken over a 14- month 
period from the winter of 2014. Analysis was performed on “key” soft and hard copy documents 
which reflected the controls principles. Cyclical performance reports based on 6 monthly, 
quarterly and monthly reporting cycles were studied and “key” events were identified from a 
combination of primary and secondary sources. A large data base of knowledge was constructed 
of 170 main documents including procedural descriptions, process flows, checklists, 
PowerPoints and spreadsheets.  
Controls technologies: The study of controls required an understanding of the “language” and 
technical terminology at a project level but also from a policy perspective. Building this 
knowledge involved training in controls software and ongoing discussions with control 
practitioners, a variety of consultants and contacts within construction and central government. 
Keeping up with the evolving discussion was a fundamental feature of the research design to 
enhance the relevance of the conclusions in a way that could meaningfully inform the reform 
discussion.  
3.2.1. A Phased Approach 
Twenty-four interviews totalling 62 hours took place over 14 months with 20 different 
interviewees. The time taken in each interview, the generic professional background of the 
interviewees and their connection with the T2 and T5 programmes are detailed on page 62. 
Although sampling strategies and interview design is discussed in detail in section 3.2.4, the 
                                                          
56 See the table on page 62 
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general pattern of the research involved deeper but less formal engagement and access as the 
research progressed. In the later stages, interviews were no longer recorded but a diary and 
notes were kept in draft form (promptly after each session). All participants have anonymised 
identities but 52% agreed to be recorded and the recordings were transcribed. The table below 
summarises the key features of the interviews:  
Phases:  
Exploratory  
Fieldwork (2014) 
 
 
 
 
Role 
1.Industry Expert 1 
2.Major programme expert 
3. Director T5 and T2 
4.Partner/Consultant 1 
5.Project Manager T5 
6. Controller 1 
Hrs  
8 
4 
2 
2 
2 
3 
Interview Style  
Unstructured/not taped 
Unstructured/not taped 
Unstructured/taped 
Unstructured/taped 
Unstructured/taped 
Unstructured/taped 
Phase 1 (spring 2015) 
Building a comparative case 
1.Industry Expert 1 
4.Partner/Consultant 1 
6.Controller 1 
3.Director T5/T2  
7.Controller 2 
8.Partner/consultant 2 
3 
3 
2.5 
1.5 
3.5 
1.5 
Semi-structured/taped 
Semi-structured/taped 
Semi-structured/taped 
Semi-structured/taped 
Semi-structured/taped 
Semi-structured/taped 
Phase 2 (summer 2015) 
Joining the Project               
Eco-system 
9.Industry Leader 2 
2.Major Programme expert 
10.Industry Leader 1 
11.T5 Controller 1 
12.T2 project controller 
13.T5 Controller 2 
14.Project manager T5 (2)  
15.Manager T2 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1.5 
1.5 
2 
Semi-structured/taped 
Semi-structured/taped 
Semi-structured/taped 
Semi-structured/taped 
Semi-structured 
Semi-structured 
Semi-structured 
Semi-structured 
Phase 3 (autumn 2015) 
Policy Reform  
 
 
 
10.Industry Leader 1 
16.Industry Leader 3 
17.Government advisor 1 
18.Consultant 3 
19. Industry Expert 2 
20. Consultant 4 
1.5 
1.5 
1 
4 
2 
2 
Semi-structured 
Semi-structured 
Semi-structured 
Semi-structured 
Semi-structured 
Semi-structured 
Table 3.1: Key Features of Interviews 
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3.2.2 Exploratory Fieldwork   
Initially exploratory fieldwork collected information on project histories mainly from secondary 
sources and an initial timetable of events on T5 was drafted. Extensive data was already in place 
for T5 and several academics acted as sponsors by supporting preliminary questions and 
snowballing to other research groups and industry experts who might identify potential gaps in 
the research and suggest possible areas for further research. A strong cross-institutional 
collaboration was set up which sponsored initial access to key Heathrow project management 
and controls experts. By the end of 2014, an initial project was created to gather information 
about the contrasting approaches to governance on T2 and T5. An initial comparative case was 
built to highlight the key visual “spaces” and technologies for engagement on both programmes. 
At the end of 2014, a set of unstructured interviews were arranged to engage a small group of 
senior executives in a discussion about the different approaches to programme control and 
governance on T2 and T5. These interviews were taped and promptly transcribed. During this 
initial stage more access was granted and handbooks, manuals, PowerPoint charts and cyclical 
review data were gathered.  
3.2.3 From Pilot to Full Fieldwork 
3.2.3.1 Phase 1: Building a Comparative Case 
Collecting an initial timeline of data on the evaluative principles, reports, reviews and periods of 
controversies for T2 was relatively straightforward once access was agreed. However, building 
a comparative case for T5 was more of a challenge because of the project’s lengthy lifecycle, size 
and complexity. Although archives of interviews existed for T5, little research had focused on 
controls technologies and their emergence over time. For T5, themes associated with client risk, 
common purpose and lean approaches to performance improvement provided an initial basis 
for more in-depth fieldwork. Once the T5 programme controls handbooks were located this 
opened up a series of questions about the nature of calculable spaces, risk governance, and 
especially issues associated with “fluid” accountabilities and tensions associated with 
accountability for risk. This inspired a bank of semi-structured interviews which discussed and 
scrutinised various performance review and procedural documents. The focus of the discussion 
shifted between specific events and evaluative themes that seemed to link to enrolment and 
controversy during contested periods. These interviews involved people with a range of 
expertise from industry leaders who had worked on T5, ex-controllers and project managers.  
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3.2.3.2 Phase 2: Joining the Project Eco-System  
Until phase 2 there were several gaps, particularly around how the T5 dashboards and reports 
evolved and the composition of cyclical reporting forums. An industry and programme expert 
“tutor” (Cacciatori 2012) advised on a sampling strategy of key reports and helped to arrange a 
set of interviews with ex-managers and controllers to explore key events and themes. This 
snowballing was granted on the proviso that interviews were anonymised and all project reports 
containing live financial “data” remained confidential.  
Project management literature on project-based learning emphasises the importance of 
“project ecologies.” These benefit from economies of repetition by transferring learning from 
one project to another embodied within organisational “tools” and cultures which can be 
recombined in subsequent projects (Davies and Brady, 2000; Grabher and Ibert, 2012). This 
phenomenon helped the search for specific dashboards, reports and controls methods as the 
community of professionals shared best practices in a way that enabled key technologies to be 
traced, despite the almost 10-year gap between their original use. Over time, more informal 
access to this community helped to close conceptual gaps in the T5 case and by the end of 2016 
the 2 comparative cases emerged. 
3.2.3.3 Phase 3 Policy Reform  
In this final phase, meetings with key industry representatives revealed a specific issue linked to 
diverse perspectives, poor risk disbursement (dumping) and a lack of shared (common) purpose 
in construction. A key construction conference underscored these themes highlighting the 
weaknesses associated with trends in client and “complex build integrator” business models. 
Interviews snowballed into a set of meetings within central government and several working 
theme groups developed. I remain on the periphery of this work. Involvement with these groups 
helped to triangulate some research findings by identifying persistent conceptual themes but 
also resolving conceptual discrepancies.  
3.2.4 Sources, Sampling Approaches and Interview Design 
Gaining access to the appropriate organisations and people with the right kind of expertise was 
difficult. This made the data collection period longer than anticipated. The data collection 
strategy was constrained by the sensitive nature of the topic which required access to 
performance management reports and commercial frameworks. Also, the level of experience 
needed for the interviews required respondents with deep knowledge of the comparative risk, 
controls and commercial approaches. This required access to industry experts with sufficient 
experience to critically address complex controls issues rather than project-level managers with 
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routine knowledge. The sampling strategy was purposive in this sense, because interviewees 
were selected that had either strategic or in-depth expert knowledge.  I also studied the industry 
to improve the likelihood of “being invited back” or being able to “snowball” to other contacts. 
This required credible conduct57 and an ability to demonstrate sufficient industry knowledge to 
engage with respondents. However, in the exploratory stages, there was an initial “intense” 
period of training and research to develop a potential list of contacts. This required persistence 
and acceptance that building a pipeline of potential interviewees would be time consuming but 
also “tricky” because of pre-existing relationships with other academic institutions which took 
precedence. Serendipity played a role and over time some significant industry figures 
contributed. However, initial access would not have been possible without the kindness of a few 
key academics and industry contacts.    
3.2.4.1 Phase 1 The Comparative Case 
As the research moved from a pilot to full fieldwork, it became clear that although the 
development of the T2 case was rapid, T5 proved more complex. Archives of documents and 
transcripts existed and it was hoped that they would provide some background for the 
comparative case. Unfortunately, it became apparent that they lacked the detail necessary and 
so, rather than negotiating access, building a separate archive became a priority. Gathering a 
bank of T5 documents took time but gradually cyclical performance reports, project documents 
and handbooks were collected which enabled the move into full fieldwork. The bank of 
documents was used to build a timeline of events, technologies and periods of change. This 
timeline underpinned the design of semi-structured interviews and key respondents were 
selected based on the depth of their working knowledge of the controls architecture. Interviews 
were “structured” around general themes but “unstructured” in terms of what the person chose 
to emphasise (Dougherty, 1992; Cacciatori, 2012). Triangulation between interview transcripts, 
technical controls documents and cyclical performance reports continued to reflect dominant 
themes and conceptual and timeline “gaps” (Eisenhardt, 1989). Further interviews were 
arranged to address persistent themes and the conceptual framework was used to organise 
questions about the evaluative principles and the use of specific technologies to assign 
accountability and shape conduct. The findings formed the start of the construction of the 
“phases of control” thematic analysis on T5. This analysis was already complete for T2.  
 
 
                                                          
57 My commercial background and experience of business networking helped. 
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3.2.4.2 Phase 2 the Eco-System 
By the summer of 2015 inconsistencies in the T5 plot remained, particularly regarding the 
evolution of T5 reporting forums, dashboards and accountability for risk. An industry “tutor” 
played a central role in helping to guide sampling and sourcing strategies to close the gap. At 
this point, the research became more immersed in the context, with more informal access to 
data on the proviso that confidentially was paramount. Direct observation of “state of-the-art” 
controls and risk tools on other projects, and access to archives which referenced the T5 risk 
methodology uncovered the central themes underpinning risk management on both 
programmes. During this phase, interviews with senior industry figures opened up a dialogue 
which helped broaden my appreciation of the industry level debate and to connect the 
Heathrow findings to the broken business model risk management debate.  
3.2.4.3 Phase 3 Policy Reform  
This final stage involved unstructured meetings, a conference and working groups which yielded 
a list of potential sources. The level of expertise and richness of the participants and their 
contacts helped to improve my base knowledge of the relevant themes for reform and the link 
between “projects”, the construction industry and the role of the government. Working group 
sessions were not recorded and Chatham House rules applied. During this phase, a small number 
of semi-structured interviews were conducted and written up. They focused on connecting the 
Heathrow cases to wider industry level issues, and they helped to reconcile the empirical 
Heathrow story with the conceptual assumptions that underpinned the policy debate and the 
language used. This last stage helped shape the Intelligent Client conclusions to be more 
relevant to policy and the current reform debate.  
3.3 Data Analysis 
Data analysis involved three broad stages; exploratory stage, full fieldwork and a final phase of 
analysis which led to tracing the patterns of development of the different calculative 
infrastructures. These are described below.  
3.3.1 Exploratory Stages 
This initial stage involved going back and forth between the data, the research questions and 
the prior Heathrow literature to identify gaps that required more scrutiny and data gathering. 
Early stage unstructured interviews described familiar themes from the existing T5 literature of 
integrated teams focused on driving through high standards of performance. They also 
described an important role for the T5 Handbook in documenting the lean partnering 
philosophy. A philosophy that required teams to accept opening book practices and cost 
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“transparency” in return for rewards which were described as “fair”. However, there was also 
discussion about situated controversies and tensions linked to the challenge of controlling a 
reimbursable cost contract, as plans continued to develop and change. Themes of adaptability 
and the “emergence” of control were mentioned and several interviewees stressed how the 
development of “being in control” involved moving from an initial state of “ambiguity” to a 
workable “culture”. This contrasted to T2A which was described as having a rapid initial set-up 
stage, where scope and accountabilities were fixed and agreed up-front. However, over time, 
plans were refined as the programme fell behind schedule. For T2, this raised questions about 
“how” the plans were modified and the role of calculative technologies in achieving a productive 
compromise.  
Breaking the data down into control phases was important at this stage to bracket-off key events 
into a sequence. This was important because common control themes emerged across the cases, 
such as “one version of the truth” but their meaning differed because the context reflected 
different patterns of accountability. For example, on T2, a “single version of the truth” involved 
the establishment of a robust baseline forecast by holding suppliers to account and testing the 
integrity of cost and schedule forecasts. In contrast, on T5, “one version of the truth” referred 
to the establishment of diagnostic routines and collective performance rituals which helped 
capture more realistic performance forecasts and standards. On T5, evaluation was a collective 
process whereas on T2 accountabilities were assigned and centrally directed. This demonstrated 
that although similar terms such as one “version of the truth” were being used, the nature of 
the calculable spaces was fundamentally different. On T2, this involved strictly defined 
territories of accountability and subjectivization through an expectation of suppliers being held 
to account. In contrast, on T5, territories were more fluid and subjectivization encouraged 
collective search for the benefit of the programme. In both instances the order of evaluative 
priorities and “worth” and the use of technologies in building calculable spaces differed.  
Once a timeline of technologies and critical events was developed, distinct themes emerged 
within each phase. The naming of these phases and their progression was more straightforward 
for T2 than T5. For T2, the interviews described a clear “plot” from a “single version of the truth” 
followed by an innovative “dashboard” and finally more visible supplier control through what 
was initially58 described as the “Programme for Success”. For T5, phase 1 involved enrolling 
suppliers into the philosophy of the “client holds the risk” to settle concerns about accountability 
for changing scope. However, the development of the controls methodology emerged during 
                                                          
58 Later this was renamed the “Golden Thread” and this is described in Chapter 6 
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the middle phase described as “one version of the truth”. The final phase was a distinct 
phenomenon called the “Total Cost Management”59 initiative. Once this initial sequence of 
phases was identified, the conceptual framework was used to breakdown each phase into an 
architecture of calculable spaces. Then the project level documents and transcripts were 
analysed in more depth to scrutinise the main calculative technologies. This led to the study of 
patterns of enrolment, order and controversies within each phase described in the next section.  
3.3.2 Full Fieldwork: Operationalising the Conceptual Framework  
The conceptual framework was developed to trace progression through successive phases of 
control.  It was described in the previous chapter as a diagnostic tool to breakdown the phases 
of control into distinct parts for more scrutiny (see figure 2.1 on page 39). The upper part of the 
framework describes the calculable spaces and the creation of an evaluative order shaped by 
“key” calculative technologies. The lower part breaks the process of enrolment down into 
stages, starting with the emergence of intense problematisation debates through to the 
negotiation and mobilisation of agreement. The intention of the conceptual framework was to 
identify “key” technologies that shaped “order” within each phase and then trace the nature of 
modifications necessary for sustained control.  
Callon’s (1986) four stages of the Sociology of Translations were initially used to create a “plot” 
that traced enrolment from: 1. Problematization - as intense debates emerged; 2. Interessement 
- initial agreement of tentative principles captured in technologies to engage allied interests; 3. 
Enrolment - an unsettled period of negotiation and persuasion leading to new responsibilities 
and compromises; 4. Mobilization - the settlement of evaluative principles which enabled 
progress. However, because the analysis was based on past events it was difficult to distinguish 
between the early stage establishment of tentative principles (interessement), and processes of 
negotiation and persuasion that led to enrolment. For this reason, the 2 stages, “interessement” 
and “enrolment” were collapsed into one major heading of “enrolment”. 
Gradually an initial plot was developed which described the evaluative principles and order 
within each phase and the key technologies designed to enrolled progress. However, this 
analysis took several months of note-taking, re-reading of data and scrutinising the transcripts. 
It also involved a dialogue of questions with contacts in the field to place specific calculative 
technologies within the timeline. Conceptualising the analysis of process data as the 
development of a “plot” was particularly useful (Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999). Pentland 
                                                          
59 This was later renamed the “Foresight” phase described in Chapter 5 
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describes a plot” 60 as a sequence of events, with focal actors (client and suppliers), with an 
evaluative frame and possible antagonists (tensions) and protagonists (calculative enablers of 
progress). This initial plot was written up into a narrative which was used as a “sensemaking” 
document (Langley, 1999) to develop dominant themes that underpinned the “evaluative order” 
within each phase. This “narrative strategy” was a particularly useful way of synthesising the 
different data sources to get “on top of the data”, and to clarify sequences and early analytical 
themes (Pettigrew, 1990). The narrative was then used to generate discussions about 
problematisation issues and contestations that challenged the evaluative order. The overall 
intention was to understand the role of calculative technologies and calculable spaces in 
sustaining progress despite unsettling and contentious tensions. During this stage NVIVO was 
used to develop a “thematic analysis” (Braun and Clarke, 2006; 2012).  
 3.3.3 Thematic Analysis “within” Control Phases  
Thematic analysis is a method to identify and analyse “themes” that represent patterns within 
the data (Braun and Clarke 2006; 2012). Braun and Clarke’s work details a staged process for 
analysing central themes in psychology research. It is intended to add rigour to research that 
involves significant levels of interpretative analysis. It usually starts with a bank of transcribed 
interviews. It was most useful for tracing the analytical progression from the more surface 
descriptions described as “semantic” analysis, to a later stage of uncovering deeper and more 
“latent” themes. At this stage within the Heathrow cases there was a need to move from a 
detailed narrative description of phases of control to a more in-depth analysis of the 
assumptions, meanings and contentions underpinning the evaluative order. The narratives 
brought together the data from a variety of documents with the transcripts. As an initial 
exploratory step both the narratives and T5 transcripts were openly coded with an intention of 
searching for the “dominant” themes and a hierarchy of sub-themes within each control phase. 
This process started with T5, because it appeared more complex than T2.  
 
 
                                                          
60 “A clear sequence of beginning, middle, and end in time, 2. Focal actors who play the protagonist or 
antagonist 3. An identifiable voice reflecting some of the actor’s viewpoints 4. An evaluative frame of 
reference of what is right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, and 5. Other indicators of context over 
time and place” (Pentland 1999, p712) 
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The extract below describes the early stage searching for a theme structure based on the phase 
1 on T5, initially named the “client holds the risk”: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Early Stage Searching in Thematic Analysis  
At this (very) early stage of the analysis one parent node was established for control phase 1 the 
“client holds the risk”. Bottom-up coding resulted in 4 main sub-nodes “Partner Selection 
Criteria”, “T5 Agreement and Handbook”, “Tensions” and the underpinning early stage “Control 
Set-up”. The “searching for themes” (Braun and Clarke, 2006) stage helped to gain a sense of 
the significance of each individual theme and its constituent parts. However, a review of these 
early stage themes prompted the need for a more coherent approach that could be replicated 
across the data-set. The coding was restructured to reflect the conceptual framework. This 
moved the analysis from focusing on a chronological description of events to examining the 
generative drivers that mediated and sustained control within the control phase. More reading 
and discussion led to re-grouping the sub-nodes into the headings, “technologies”, the principles 
underpinning “enrolment”, and “controversy” for each phase of control. The description and 
meaning of the parent theme, the “client holds the risk” was gradually refined over time through 
an iterative process of writing the control narrative “plot” whilst scrutinising the existing data 
and engaging with project experts. Gradually “higher” order principles describing each phase 
were rationalised and refined. This led to a clearer definition of the description of the phase of 
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Risk” 
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control and its underpinning dominant themes described in terms of “scope and content of each 
theme in a couple of sentences” (ibid, p92).   
The table below describes the scope and content of the “client holds the risk” - the setup stage 
for the programme where the meaning of “lean” was captured in key technologies. The latter 
were the Handbook and STORM which played a central role in ascribing the evaluative principles 
fundamental for knowledge sharing and active risk management. Enrolment involved settling 
concerns for risk through the incentive structure combined with control procedures to assure 
confidence, assign accountability and reward discovery. The structure of the table is based on 
one parent as the dominant theme “client holds the risk” and six sub-nodes grouped into the 3 
headings. This pattern of one parent and a variety of sub-nodes grouped under the same three 
headings was replicated for each phase of control. Because the headings used to group the sub-
nodes came from the conceptual framework this helped to build a consistent plot. Grouping the 
sub-nodes also linked the analysis to the theory underpinning the conceptual framework.  
 
Table 3.2 Extract from Terminal 5 Phases of Control 
The final column “controversies” reflected situated tensions where divergent priorities or 
competing interests unsettled the existing “order”. For most phases, issues described as a 
controversy inspired change within the calculative infrastructure leading to the following phase. 
For the extract above controversy was linked to a lack of clarity in “how” the lean partnering 
model would be mobilised.  
Dates Phases of Control Key Technologies Enrolment Controversies 
1999-
2001 
“Client Holds the Risk”    
Dominant Theme:  
1. The contract, T5 
Agreement enrolled 
teams into a lean 
partnering 
arrangement 
accepting a common 
identity and agreeing 
to search for 
exceptional 
performance.  
2.The client held the 
risk to settle 
uncertainty & 
encourage discovery 
 
 
1.The Handbook; 
described a 
normative 
framework of values 
for more transparent 
knowledge sharing.  
2.STORM: ascribed 
“Active risk 
management” to 
encourage 
heedfulness and 
acceptance of 
responsibility to 
manage-out risk  
 
3. Incentives: 
Remove supplier’s 
commercial risk, 
distribute rewards 
through milestone &  
value incentives.  
4. Territorialized 
team accountability: 
enabling adaptive 
search for “better 
value”. 
5. Change control: 
to interrogate trade-
offs between 
regulation and 
discovery 
 
 
6.Needed more 
oversight of 
“right” 
behaviours to;  
a. Prevent inertia 
and lock-in  
b.Develop robust 
forecasts to 
capture progress 
and emergence  
c.Stop teams 
hiding 
contingencies in 
safe forecasts  
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Lean partnering reflected a major departure from traditional practices and this period of 
“ambiguity” was elaborated in a problematisation description:  
“Who would be held to account for changing scope and how would they be evaluated?”.  
These analytical steps were replicated for each phase, which were labelled in a way that 
represented the “dominant order” (such as ambiguity for phase 1 on T5). The main 
problematisation description elaborated the nature of the tensions. This provided a basis to 
structure the analysis of mediation, enrolment and modifications which took place to settle 
tensions.   
3.3.4 Tracing the Emergence of the Calculative Infrastructure 
For each phase of control, the changing composition of the calculable spaces and the 
machinations of enrolment to settle tensions were analysed. However, there was a need to 
consolidate the phases of control into a holistic picture of the actual progression across the data-
set. The model below was developed to compare the T2 and T5 calculative infrastructures that 
evolved.   
                 Figure 3.2: Tracing the Emergence of the Calculative Infrastructure 
                        Sustained by? 
                                     Evolution of an Infrastructure  
 P1     P2     P3 
 
 Order 1                             Order 2               Order 3  
                                Mediation by? 
                         P1 – Control Phase 1, P2 – Control Phase 2, P3 – Control Phase 3 
 
The model was used to describe the progression on T5 from phase 1 the “client holds the risk” 
to phase 2 “one version of the truth”. The monthly reports were identified as a key technology 
which mediated tensions associated with risk whilst capturing a collective version of the truth. 
Mediation enabled progression from a period of “ambiguity” (order 1) to a risk management 
order (order 2). The model and conceptual framework were used to explain how this 
happened and the nature of modifications to calculative technologies and calculable spaces 
that enabled progress. The model also summarised “how” control was sustained. For example, 
on T5, “sustained” control was linked to the gradual legitimation of lean principles and the 
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subjectivization of risk “citizens”. This analysis then led to a comparison between the two 
infrastructures detailing the main differences but also similarities.  
This approach resulted in a comparative discussion of different infrastructures for performance 
improvement versus a more regulatory model of governance. In the conclusion, these 
observations were used to extend some of the industry-level discussion about intelligent client 
capabilities. The findings also addressed specific gaps within the existing Heathrow literature by 
identifying the wider calculative infrastructures, and the composition and role of certain control 
innovations, which were previously hidden. The final conclusions also addressed specific points 
within the industrial strategy making suggestions on how different approaches to control could 
contribute to the reform debate.  
3.4 Reflections  
The intention of this thesis was to contribute to the reform discussion by examining “how” 
Heathrow, as an exemplar intelligent client, learned to govern through the numbers. 
Simultaneously, the research addressed gaps in the prior Heathrow literature by examining the 
composition and mediatory role of the calculative infrastructures on both programmes. 
Concepts such as the phases of control and controversies were examined to compare patterns 
of development across both projects. However, this breadth of analysis meant there were fewer 
opportunities to focus on specific periods of contested change or to extend the control phases 
into more detailed states or “sub-plots”. Concepts such as “fabrication” and Callon’s 4 stages of 
the Sociology of Translations were useful for exploring how the different technologies shaped 
patterns of development. However, it was not possible to observe the detailed “inner workings” 
of fabrication “in action” during the resolution of controversies (Preston et al, 1992). This level 
of detailed analysis is an area for further research that could consider the gradual construction 
of some of the innovative calculative technologies described within this thesis. 
The adoption of process thinking was an essential part of acknowledging the complexity and 
indeterminacy of project control. Burns describes how at the heart of “process thinking” is a 
recognition of the continuous “flow” of unpredictability and ongoing change (Burns, 2014). 
However, operationalising these ideas required careful tracing of the emergence of control using 
the conceptual framework and other analytical strategies. Certain techniques were very useful. 
In particular, writing and re-writing the case as a narrative (Langley, 1999) helped to develop a 
plot of changing evaluative principles and suites of technologies that sustained control. The 
flexibility of the conceptual framework and thematic analysis also helped to generate new 
insights (certainly for the T5 case). However, triangulation also involved lengthy periods of 
74 
 
 
 
discussion with contacts in the field. Rather than discussing deep interpretive themes, these 
discussions usually involved the technical details of control or the dates of specific events. These 
points highlight how being a researcher in this type of setting requires not only a grasp of the 
technical concepts of control but also access to control documents and reports.  
Several analytical techniques helped with the process of doing the research. NVIVO is a 
potentially powerful tool and it was heavily used in the early stages to experiment with themes 
as an abductive reasoning tool. However, eventually it became an important tool in refining the 
thematic analysis as described on page 70. PowerPoint was also useful for summarising 
complicated early stage thoughts into a constrained space. However, possibly the most useful 
techniques involved writing, editing, re-writing, and reading and re-reading to compare the data 
with the literature. Engaging more fully in the field helped me to keep the study problem-
focused.  
In summary, this chapter has described how the empirical materials for the Heathrow case were 
collected and analysed. As a final reflection, it is important to recognise that undertaking this 
type of research is particularly difficult because of the commercial sensitivity of the information 
and the need to preserve anonymity. In writing the empirical chapters, I have taken care to 
present the information in a way that respects the sensitive nature of the data. The three 
empirical chapters that follow focus on developing the Heathrow case within its contextual 
setting. The next chapter, examines the evolution of the broken business model reform 
discussion which provides a background to the Heathrow cases.  
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Chapter 4 
The Broken Business Model? 
4.1 The Game 
“But you have to play the industry game. We end up in this game, the dance we know 
we do in the industry, which is very similar to banking, which is we all dance the same 
thing because we're worried that, if we don't, we won't get the rewards. And we're in 
the same thing. So, we know the game. We know we underbid. We underbid, hoping the 
client will change its mind. The client changes its mind, you put the price up. Once you've 
won the contract then now the power has moved from the client to the person who's got 
the contract and then we don't manage the contract very well”     
       (Senior Industry Executive, 2015)  
The intention of this chapter is to explore the contextual setting for the construction industry in 
the UK which formed the background for the Heathrow cases. The construction industry has a 
history of dissonance 61where a variety of experts and professions come together through 
project organisations to deliver complex and often unique solutions. However, tensions 
between competing value systems can lead to situated and contested “moments” of 
controversy that challenge incumbent value systems (Antal et al, 2015; Dewey, 1939). The 
opening quote describes “underbidding” as a rule-based game where contracts are won at the 
lowest tender price but once operational control is transferred to the supplier they intentionally 
seek to create incremental margin. However, gaming can be hidden because of a need for 
suppliers to protect their reputation and hide an intention of manipulating the contract. For over 
20 years task forces and industry reports have commented on the need for reform to “counter 
a strongly ingrained adversarial culture” (Latham, 1994).  Although professional codes of 
conduct advise against intentional underestimation62 many academics have highlighted a 
persistent “misrepresentation” of initial business cases and plans in major programmes (notably 
Flyvberg, 1996; 2012; Winch, 2010; Flyvberg and Cowi, 2004; Clegg, et al 2012). Flyvberg’s work 
(1996; 2012) identifies misrepresentation and underbidding as a strategic choice to intentionally 
hide information in order to win new business. Flyvberg recommends the introduction of checks 
and balances and institutionalised control to create transparency and accountability in order to 
                                                          
61 In this context dissonance refers to contending values and beliefs that can result in different 
justifications of worth rooted in different interests & evaluative priorities (Stark, 2009; Antal et al, 2015, 
Kornberger et al, 2015) 
62 The Project Management Institute outlines that managers should provide accurate and timely 
information & not “engage in or condone behaviour that is designed to deceive others” (PMI 2006, p5). 
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counter political misrepresentation (Flyvberg, 2012). However, attempts to create greater 
transparency through audit and surveillance practices can result in resistance. The concept of 
project level “unknowns” that are “known” but not shared with others is important when 
considering strategies for reform in the governance of risk and control (Winch, 2012; Flyvberg, 
2012; Clegg et al, 2012). 
Construction 2025 describes an important role for the client in developing stronger delivery 
relationships by fixing the front-end of the project to create a “route-map” for improved working 
practices. It recommends the orchestration of common purpose at the procurement stage by 
adopting an open-book environment, profit sharing incentives and integrated interdisciplinary 
teams (CS2025). These approaches are portrayed as a way of encouraging co-production whilst 
aligning commercial interests. However, construction supply chains involve a network of 
“complex interfaces” where performance is based “not only on a single firm, but on the efficient 
functioning of the entire network” (Gann and Salter 2000, p959). In this context the network 
reflects a traditional aversion to uncertainty and a deep concern about being held to account 
for uncontrollable risks. Chapter 1 described a tendency towards hiding “know-how” and 
withholding strategically important knowledge when faced with uncertainty (Gann and Salter, 
2000). Although Construction 2025 recommends the adoption of various approaches such as 
open-book to encourage collaboration, this assumes a willingness to openly share financial 
information. However, in the risk-averse setting of a major construction project, open-book 
practices may lead to resistance. Rather than building deeper relationships, they can result in 
contingency building to protect fragile margins. In turn, incentives designed to encourage profit 
sharing may also be manipulated by developing “safe” initial plans packed with buffers and 
contingencies (Clegg et al, 2012). Power’s 2007 work describes the complexity of organising 
uncertainty and the role that different calculative technologies can play in shaping an appetite 
for risk. This work is important because it describes how risk instruments or calculative 
technologies (such as open-book) can unlock networks of knowledge by balancing trade-off 
tensions. However, the institutional setting for the governance of risk needs to be more fully 
understood.  This chapter examines the dissonant nature of construction and the historical 
context for these underbidding and risk-averse gaming strategies. In the next section the 
discussion returns to an examination of the current policy debate. This is followed by a more 
detailed review of the persistent gaps between industry aspirations for reform and actual 
practices from Egan in the late 1990s to the current day. The final section links industry themes 
and recommendations to the governance models designed to control T2 and T5.  
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4.2 Transforming a Broken Business Model?  
Construction 2025 highlights major opportunities for construction with projected global growth 
of 70% by 2025. The vision for transformation in the industry has five key components:  
1. Better whole life value 63 for construction assets 2. More efficient and sustainable approaches 
to delivering low carbon assets 3. Clear leadership and enduring government-industry 
relationships 4. The development of leading digital design, advanced material and digital 
construction technologies 5. Attracting and retaining talent                 (CS2025, p18) 
These 5 pillars combine to create an image of construction driving productivity growth across 
the economy. However, despite these aspirations, the Construction 2025 strategy describes the 
construction industry’s current broken business model as reflecting persistent problems with 
“late delivery, cost overruns, commercial friction, late payment and accidents” (CS2025, p18). 
The reform discussion amongst the industry representatives (Hansford, 2015; ICE, 2017) focuses 
on the fundamental need for stronger delivery relationships to counter persistent lateness and 
overruns. In turn “fracture” in the execution and delivery of projects is linked to weak 
collaboration (CS2025, p23).  
At the heart of business models is the concept of “value” as a proposition about what customers 
want and an architecture for delivery (Teece, 2010; Amit and Zott, 2012; Zott et al, 2011; 
Mokhlesian and Holmen, 2012). Teece (2010) describes a business model as a “hypothesis” but 
also a methodology of principles about how to deliver value through an architecture for value 
creation and capture. In construction, the notion of value is initially defined by the client and 
key stakeholders in terms of a specification of important dates, key milestones and specific 
operational and financial targets. The procurement of the main suppliers by the client is a 
fundamental milestone because once commissioned, responsibility for orchestrating the 
network of activities amongst the supply chain of engineers, architects and consultants passes 
between the client and suppliers (Cox and Townsend, 1998). Coordinating and organising co-
production between the client and suppliers involves a complex infrastructure where the degree 
of client involvement in overseeing progress varies (Mokhlesian and Holmen, 2012). However, 
sustaining value “capture” in a network of cooperative relationships is key to enable a “viable” 
business model (Teece, 2010; Amitt and Zott, 2012; Söderlund, 2012). Value capture involves 
retaining but also extracting value at a level that is acceptable to suppliers and the client (Amitt 
and Zott, 2012; Teece, 2010). Teece describes an acceptable level of value as a “compelling” 
                                                          
63Whole Life Value incorporates the “relevant” costs and revenues over the useful economic life as well 
as the initial CAPEX (ISO 15686-3)  
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value proposition because it captures sufficient value for the business (supplier) and client in 
terms of acceptable cost and risk structures (Teece, 2010). However, in construction the 
standard business model is currently failing to deliver acceptable levels of cost and risk.   
In 1994 Sir Michael Latham’s influential report “Constructing the Team” was published which 
highlighted the central role of the client in enabling reform by overseeing the organisation of 
delivery relationships through teams. The report described the benefits for the industry of 
having more satisfied clients but also the central role of the client in organising teamwork and 
cooperation. The need to sustain cooperative delivery relationships with suppliers has remained 
a central theme in the current discussion for reform. Construction 2025 suggests that a “key 
driver” for change involves both “earlier” and “fuller” engagement of suppliers. The emphasis 
here is on the creation of “synergies” where a shared conception of value provides the focus for 
delivery efforts. However, although Construction 2025 recognises the importance of the client 
clearly articulating the nature of value in the early stages of a project there is little discussion 
about “how” this would be governed. In chapter 1 the discussion of the ICE 2013 Intelligent 
Client Capability Framework highlighted “how” more capable clients created a setting to foster 
a “safe” culture to encourage open and honest communication. The ICE framework emphasised 
the importance of offering incentives to align and integrate divergent perspectives towards a 
shared sense of purpose.  However, there was little detail about how incentives might enable 
social integration when faced with suppliers that are unwilling to engage in collective forms of 
enterprise.   
The latest reform initiative is “Project 13” which is in a developmental stage with plans to launch 
in the Spring of 2018. Project 13 is a cross industry initiative which intends to bring together a 
range of infrastructure stakeholders to consider pathways that move from “transactional” 
relationships towards collective “enterprise”. It is attempting to move the construction industry 
away from a short-term perspective focused on “lowest cost” procurement models to 
developing shared responsibility across the industry for the delivery of “high performing” 
infrastructure assets (ICE, 2017, p11). With oversight from the ICE and a number of industry level 
champions, the project is considering potential improvements in the governance, leadership and 
organisation of infrastructure projects.  So far, the building blocks to reform recommend a move 
towards more collaborative working practices underpinned by governance frameworks capable 
of encouraging and sustaining productive delivery relationships. However, rather than focusing 
only on the construction stage of an asset, Project 13 is considering ways of lengthening the 
engagement of contractors and suppliers across the lifecycle of the asset. Although the project 
is still in an initial consultation stage, some of the early ideas represent an important move 
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towards recognising the link between improving “value” and sustaining collaborative 
relationships focused on a common sense of evaluative purpose. Project 13’s long-term plan is 
to move the dominant focus of the industry away from “on budget and on time” to the whole 
life value of infrastructure assets (ICE, 2017). However, the initial capital expenditure incurred 
in construction is a major feature of any infrastructure asset. Therefore, fixing the persistent 
failure to deliver projects is a priority before moving on to a vision of high performing 
infrastructure. On Project 13 Heathrow plays a prominent role in leading the Capable Owner and 
Intelligent Client debate because of its perceived capability to effectively govern the 
construction of its major terminals.  These points are revisited later in the thesis. However, for 
now it is important to note that Heathrow represents a significant site for innovation in the 
governance of risk and control. The following section in this chapter returns to the late 1990s to 
chart the development of the reform discussion that provided a setting for the Heathrow cases.   
4.3 From Egan to Wolstenholme  
By the late 1990s a series of influential reports focused on the need to improve poor productivity 
in construction. The most notable was Sir John Egan’s 1998 “Rethinking Construction” which 
introduced concepts of “lean thinking” as a way to challenge wasteful practices by focusing on 
the improvement of quality. At the time Egan was the Chairman of the BAA and the report 
reflected his knowledge of Heathrow and past experience from the car industry. The second 
major report “Never Waste a Good Crisis” was developed in 2009 to evaluate the progress since 
Rethinking Construction by Andrew Wolstenholme and the industry membership organisation, 
Constructing Excellence. At the time, Wolstenholme had spent 6 years as the Programme 
Director on Terminal 5 which opened in 2008. Wolstenholme’s report highlighted a significant 
lack of commitment in the industry to reform, although after 2008 the economic downturn in 
the industry created a more urgent need for change:  
“the industry must rise to the challenge. This together with the dramatic changes being driven 
by the advances in material technologies, the green agenda, the internet revolution and 
globalisation, could create the most exciting and dramatic period in our industry since the 
industrial revolution”.  (CE, 2009, p6) 
In the following section Egan’s initial Task Force report is examined to highlight the evaluative 
principles underpinning the recommendations, which are then compared to Wolstenholme’s 
report and the more recent Construction 2025 strategy.   
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4.4 Egan and Rethinking Construction 1998 
The Rethinking Construction Taskforce was appointed by the Deputy Prime Minister to develop 
recommendations that could transform efficiency and quality outcomes for the industry. It built 
on Sir Michael Latham’s 1994 “Constructing the Team” report which recommended partnering 
to modernise the industry and challenge fragmentation and fracture. Rethinking Construction 
extended these ideas by considering the source of wasteful practices and major themes for 
improvement64. Overall it recommended a client-led transformation to counter a lack of 
knowledge sharing across fractured supply networks.  The report recommended the creation of 
integrated teams within construction projects with a focus on improving customer value through 
the elimination of waste:  
“Continuous and sustained improvement is achievable if we focus all of our efforts on delivering 
the value that our customers need, and if we are prepared to challenge the waste and poor 
quality arising from our existing structures and working practices.”  (Egan, 1998, p3) 
An analysis of drivers for change in the industry highlighted the need for more integrated 
processes rather than the existing fragmented approach to production. These ideas challenged 
traditional construction supply chains that reflected a sequence of sub-contractor arrangements 
with each supplier maximising their own return rather than integrating around customer defined 
“value”. In this context “integration” and long-terms arrangements were viewed as the solution 
to fragmentation and individualistic short-termism.  
The report emphasised team learning combined with a commitment to long-term relationships, 
with suppliers moving away from traditional contracts to more relational forms of agreement. 
The gradual replacement of formal contracts was perceived as a progressive step towards 
fostering a belief in partnering to achieve common objectives. This was described as:   
“if the relationship between a constructor and employer is soundly based and the parties 
recognise their mutual interdependence, then formal contract documents should gradually 
become obsolete.  (ibid, p30) 
The move away from formal contracts elevated the role of the client to a coordinator overseeing 
a “no blame culture” (ibid, p14). The task force recognised the challenges that “mutual 
interdependence”, “continuity of workflow” and the need for “greater predictability” (ibid, p30) 
                                                          
64 Improvement themes: 1. Margins: Persistent Low and unreliable margins discouraged investment in 
R&D 2. Clients: misunderstanding the difference between best value and lowest price/cost. 3. 
Fragmentation: too many small subcontractors preventing continuity of skills and relationships 
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presented to construction but framed the challenge as “companies with the right culture 
deserve to thrive” (ibid, p31). In this context, the “right culture” sanctioned whole team 
knowledge sharing and “right first time” quality initiatives to eliminate waste. These 
recommendations were heavily influenced by Toyota’s “Lean Enterprise” model as a way of 
removing waste and improving efficiency to add value to the construction asset.  
4.4.1 Lean Thinking  
Lean thinking focuses on the movement towards a theoretical point of perfection where 
customer defined value is achieved by integrating techniques and removing obstacles to meet 
customer demand (Womack 1990, 2007). Rethinking Construction described these principles as:  
“Creating flow and pull starts with radically reorganising individual process steps, but the gains 
become significant as all the steps link together. As this happens more and more waste become 
visible and the process continues towards a theoretical end point of perfection, where every asset 
and every action adds value for the end customer. Lean thinking represents a path of sustained 
performance improvement and not a one-off programme” (Egan, 1998, p23) 
Specific lean process improvement initiatives were recommended for projects that included: 
1. Early stage partnership during product development 2. Pre-assembly routines and 
standardised components 3. A variety of quality initiatives to reduce waste and defects during 
delivery.  
Design technologies (3D CAD and single-model software) were identified as playing a key role in 
making “design interfaces” more visible to enable co-ordination. Performance measurement 
also played a key role in tracking quality improvements. The Annual Construction Excellence Key 
Performance Indicators provided a framework to monitor improvements across the industry. 
The selection of targets emphasised the importance of controlling capital expenditure and waste 
with industry-level standards set to reduce capital expenditure (CAPEX) costs by 10% pa 
alongside a 20% p.a. reduction in defects and accidents. To track the accuracy of forecasts a 
targeted reduction of 20% p.a. in the “predictability” of capital expenditure forecasts was set 
(ibid, p16) 
4.4.2 Governing by Numbers  
The belief in the transformative power of partnering to sustain performance improvement 
echoed lean thinking principles explored in the classic book “The Machine that Changed the 
World” (Womack et al, 1990; 2007). In the more recent version of this book the epilogue revisits 
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the importance of social control and visible control technologies in sustaining lean principles. 
Womack et al reflect on the importance of control architectures that facilitated Toyota’s 
“relentless oversight of every design, production, and process by asking hard questions about 
performance every day” (Womack et al, 2007, p65). In this context, sustained improvement was 
linked to the need for flexible and tacit learning responses with “people” being more able to 
adapt to complex change rather than codified procedures and automated responses. Relentless 
oversight was also linked to strong supplier networks based on deep and specific relationships 
that fostered a willingness to accept responsibility to improve the whole. Deep relationships 
combined with a control system to support relentless oversight were key parts of the lean model 
which enabled Toyota to steer supplier conduct towards “re-programmed” responses (ibid, 
p66).  
Egan’s vision of a collaborative construction industry required acceptance of the benefits of 
partnerships and a willingness to invest in lean practices to improve efficiency. Rethinking 
Construction describes a lean model based on shared accountability for performance. In this 
context, performance measurement played a central role in governing conduct towards shared 
goals. Rather than measuring final outcomes at the end of the contract the report recommended 
continuous monitoring and comparison. Collective evaluation was considered a key form of 
disciplinary control and the ongoing monitoring of quality, timeliness and cost performance an 
essential part of:  
 “bringing discipline to the relationships between clients, project teams and their suppliers”  
          (ibid, p30).  
The continuous monitoring of performance improvements was considered to be a more 
effective and rewarding way of governing relationships that managing “by” the contract. 
Although these concepts suggested a move towards continuous evaluation, there is little 
discussion about the implications of moving to a model of control that required more rigorous 
forms of surveillance and interrogation. Womack et al 2007 highlight how deep relationships 
enabled the acceptance of rigorous monitoring and collective responsibility for performance 
improvement. However, within Rethinking Construction there is little discussion of the journey 
to enrol divergent interests and self-seeking opportunism towards accepting shared 
accountability for performance improvement. Ten years later the task force led by 
Wolstenholme revisited the progress of the industry and concluded that the hoped for 
“revolution” was instead just “a bit of an improvement” (CE, 2009, p3).  
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4.5 Wolstenholme and Never Waste a Good Crisis 2009 
Never Waste a Good Crisis revisited Egan’s report and described disappointing progress and the 
need for renewed effort for the industry to “think again” and develop a united vision to move 
away from short-termism. Setting the scene Sir John Egan noted that;  
“People are now measuring performance, and it is heartening to look at the demonstration 
projects to see that some very good work has been done. The opportunity remains just as large 
today, with the added incentives of harder economic crisis and major environmental pressure. 
So, I congratulate the team on a thorough review and on pointing out the next steps on the way 
to radical improvement – every crisis is an opportunity”  (ibid, p3)  
4.5.1 The Minority Club 
In the report, research identified only a “partial uptake” in partnering practices. Standard 
practices continued to favour competitive tendering and procurement based on the lowest 
price. The minority were considered as the few large “intelligent” clients that developed “in-
house” client teams to work in partnership with suppliers to gradually develop leaner and more 
efficient “integrated” processes. An analysis of the poor diffusion of the lean partnering for 
performance improvement approach noted high levels of disinterest in partnering described as 
a lack of will to collaborate (ibid, p9). Research indicated that rather than a lack of will grounded 
in inertia, the persistence of short-term sub-contracting was considered a preferred way of 
limiting exposure in unpredictable projects. Short-term contracts offered low set-up costs and 
minimal maintenance to sustain delivery relationships. However, Sir John Latham’s comments 
below link project failure, over-runs and poor quality to the persistence of tendering based on 
the lowest price;   
“Partnering and close collaboration between the client and the whole of the construction team 
will mean that the project will continue to come in on quality, time and cost as terminal 5 did at 
Heathrow under Andrew’s leadership. But if the lowest price is demanded by the client, the 
tender price will not be the actual financial outturn at the end of the project, because the supply 
side will be looking for claims and variations to make up for what was in the tender. As I said in 
my report 15 years ago, best practice means “all have won and all must have prizes”. Alice was 
in wonderland then. But best practice must essentially continue in the construction industry.”
                                (ibid, p3) 
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Latham’s quote highlights Heathrow’s “whole” team partnering approach as a model of best 
practice to enable superior performance outcomes. In contrast, lowest price procurement is 
linked to cost over-runs because constrained supplier revenues encourage the search for 
opportunities to make litigious claims or force scope changes to bolster additional margins. This 
discussion returns to the “underbidding” game where opportunism within a revenue 
constrained setting leads to over-runs and lateness. Latham’s quote concludes that reform 
requires partnership models based on the Terminal 5 model where common purpose and shared 
prizes enabled “best practice”. The need to move away from procurement based on lowest 
tender price is echoed throughout the report which highlights a link between (low) fixed price 
procurement and first tier suppliers attempting to “retain profits for themselves and pass risk 
down the supply chain, rather than using shared profit to eliminate risk for the whole team” 
(ibid, p8). This spiral of “risk dumping” (Brady and Davies, 2011) creates “much waste” when 
first tier suppliers “charge clients for taking risk, then seek to pass the risk down the supply 
chain” rather than developing a “mature” risk mitigation approach (CE, 2009, p20). This dumping 
of risk downwards reflects a deep concern that emergent changes would damage already weak 
margins and therefore suppliers would pass the accountability for risk on to smaller sub-
contracting suppliers. Latham’s comment claims that “partnering” models are superior because 
they involve common purpose and shared accountability for performance delivery and 
deviations instead of the pursuit of individual interests.  
4.5.2 The “Built Environment” and Common Purpose 
Wolstenholme’s report develops a vision of a “Built Environment” that moves away from a 
narrow conception of construction as an industry focused on the production of built assets to a 
wider network of interactions extending over time across the life of the infrastructure asset. 
Rather than focusing on discrete production processes the Built Environment was extended to 
include multiple actors within a wider network. Wolstenholme describes this as a:  
“complex picture of how people interact sustainably with the environment to maximise health, 
wealth and happiness. This requires integrated planning, design, construction and operation of 
built facilities. We believe that gaining wider acceptance for this concept is an essential step 
towards driving a new culture in our industry” (ibid, p5) 
In the past, the physical location of teams and tangible task interfaces were more dominant 
themes when discussing the organisation of complexity, but the new vision emphasised social 
factors such as a shared culture as a focus for shared meaning. This extended the concept of 
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integration to include not only planning and production but also a shared vision of the future as 
a focus for common purpose across the supply network.  
The reframing from industry to the Built Environment introduced a wider conception of 
efficiency linked to quality measures that compared consumed resources to improved economic 
and social value. This extended the evaluation of performance within the Built Environment over 
the “whole” economic lifecycle rather than focusing purely on the capital cost of construction. 
By reframing the nature of value, the discussion moved beyond measuring just built asset costs 
to evaluating a wider set of returns linked to improvements in social and economic value. This 
new ethos of monitoring non-financial indicators led to recommendations to develop project-
level evaluative frameworks and incentives to reward quality as well as sustainability. Offering 
a “stake” in long-term performance was recommended to enable suppliers to demonstrate 
social, environmental and economic value. However, the report also recognised that the 
diffusion of Built Environment concepts would be gradual and at the time of the report there 
was only “sparse” evidence of change in the industry (ibid, p20).  
4.5.3 Moving from Demand to Supply  
Wolstenholme’s report detailed how the Egan client-led model had stalled because of a 
fundamental need to strengthen suppliers’ capability in delivering more for less. More 
challenging economic conditions had disrupted access to funding and at the same time the 
pipeline of work slowed. Harsh conditions required clients to engage more fully with suppliers.  
However, many clients had failed to adapt. The report noted a:  
“lack of incentives currently provided by client business models for a supplier to innovate and 
deliver more sustainable solutions. As work becomes scarcer during the downturn, suppliers may 
become reluctant to offer value-based solutions through fear of being undercut by competitors 
on initial price. In reality suppliers cannot change the industry on their own. The time has come 
for a strong vision from Government and across industry which recognises the key contribution 
that the built environment makes to the UKs long-term economic prosperity and its aim in 
achieving a more sustainable, low carbon economy”.  (ibid, p14) 
This quote indicates a need for a clear policy vision and a united industry response to legitimise 
the new conception of sustainable long-term value. However, trade-offs exist between lowest 
(short-term) cost versus improving long-term sustainable value through innovation. Although 
investment in new practices and technologies is recommended, the threat of losing business to 
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cheaper suppliers created a significant point of resistance. The table below synthesises the main 
themes underpinning the 6 blockers creating “a spiral of resistance to change”:   
Table 4.1: Blockers to Change  
Blocker Description 
1.Lack of Cohesion of Industry Vision  
 
Tensions about how the built environment 
should contribute to a prosperous & sustainable 
low carbon economy. 
2.Few Business Drivers to Improve Little incentive to invest in change  
3.Construction “does not matter” A belief in the industry that construction costs 
have a low impact on the client model which is 
more sensitive to other factors (land prices and 
location etc).  
4.No Incentives for Change Most client business models focus on short-term 
gains not rewarding long-term sustainable 
solutions. 
5.Construction Regarded as a Commodity 
Purchase 
Clients focus on upfront construction costs, 
rather than lifetime asset value.  
6.Industry Culture Driven by Economic Factors Harsh conditions during the downturn mean that 
many have “abandoned partnering behaviour and 
returned to transactional relationships” 
            Source:  Adapted from Constructing Excellence 2009  
Blocker 1 emphasises a lack of coherence in the policy vision of “how” the built environment 
should contribute to the economy in the future. Blockers 2-5 highlight a set of legitimised beliefs 
and values creating inertia or “lack of will” to change. If construction is viewed as “a commodity 
purchase”, clients would evaluate supplier worth based on the lowest construction cost. In turn, 
the procured asset is a “product” and quality-related risks and rewards are owned by the client. 
These ideas conflict with the new Built Environment model which seeks to share benefits and 
risks through value-based rewards spread over the life of the asset. Blocker 6 highlights how the 
economic downturn strengthened the persistence of the old transactional model of short-term 
relationships and an aversion to change and risk. These points highlight a need to build a 
“united” resolve where suppliers are engaged by clients for long-term value creation. The report 
recommended moving from short-term thinking and a sub-contracting model to the 
development of integrated teams and processes across the delivery cycle.  
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4.5.4 Delivery Relationships for a More Resilient Supply Chain  
A central theme in Never Waste a Good Crisis was the need for suppliers to become more 
innovative and “show how they can create additional value” (ibid, p26). However, the business 
model in construction remained client-led.  The report highlighted that partnering approaches 
required more integrated supply chains. However, fractured and adversarial practices persisted 
which frustrated knowledge sharing because of “competing agendas”. The report noted that in 
2009:  
 “We are seeing a return to long tender lists, firms chasing work at unsustainable margins, cost 
and time overruns, the jettisoning of quality or sustainability initiatives and more of a claims-
orientated approach”. (ibid, p19) 
The roles of “both” the client and suppliers are emphasised to reform a spiral of unsustainable 
margins and fractured interests. For clients, a failure to adopt “smarter procurement” and the 
poor engagement of suppliers is linked to a lack of awareness of the benefits of collaboration. 
Dated procurement practices and a failure to engage early enough with key experts prevented 
fuller engagement of ideas and knowledge from suppliers. The need for reform in the 
management and transfer of risk played a major role in stalling progress. The report 
recommends that clients should avoid unnecessary changes to the specification of work by 
controlling the brief. However, there is recognition that discovery requires organisation to 
sustain closer delivery relationships:  
“The more innovative the solution the closer you will need to get to the supply chain and the 
greater the potential to generate long-term value. Work with the supply chain to understand 
where they are best placed to manage risks on your behalf, and to deliver best value when they 
do so.”   (ibid, p27)  
These points highlight the need for deeper relationships working “with” suppliers to better 
manage risks when innovative approaches require discovery. In this context, discovery requires 
closer relationships and agreement in how risks would be managed to enable “best” long-term 
value. The report recommends the role of the client in clearly articulating how value should be 
conceived and working with suppliers to integrate a shared sense of purpose. In turn, suppliers 
play a key role in “embracing change” and accepting the need to invest in developing new skills 
and capabilities rather than focusing on “saving cash” and making short-term returns (ibid, p26). 
The report recommended a common interest in a more sustainable Built Environment for the 
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end user where the government, regulators and industry collectively play a key role in steering 
construction towards social and economic goals.  
4.6 Construction 2025   
Returning to the present day, Construction 2025 (CS2025) highlights major global opportunities 
in construction and develops a strategy to build on strengths within construction. The report 
synthesises many of Wolstenholme’s themes whilst setting targets to underpin improved 
productivity by lowering carbon emissions, improving delivery speed, lowering construction and 
whole life costs and improved export performance. Strategic commitments and priorities focus 
on transformational change to improve trade performance, reduce costs and switch to new low 
carbon technologies. Upgrading to digital construction software is a key part of this 
transformation with BIM (in particular)65 playing a key role in improving knowledge sharing. 
Digital engineering and design for manufacture 66are identified as ways of upgrading the quality 
of the Built Environment to enable more synchronised operations. This transformation is linked 
to 6 key fundamental drivers depicted in the diagram below: 
       Figure 4.1 Drivers for Change in Construction 2025   
The many themes discussed in Wolstenholme’s report are echoed here but the effects of the 
economic downturn and a difficult funding environment have played out more fully since 2009.  
 
                                                          
65 BIM is one of the largest “centrally driven” programmes in the world sponsored by the UK 
government (Hancock 2015) to encourage a more synchronised and adaptive approach to design.  
66Offsite and modular engineering for manufacture are recommended as a pathway to improved 
operational efficiency (CS2025) 
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4.6.1 Image, Capabilities and Visible Work Opportunity 
On the right-hand side of the diagram (on the previous page), the need to invest and attract the 
right people is of central importance in order to improve the image of the industry and address 
a gap in skills. Career development and competency pathways are part of the strategy to attract 
a diversity of new talent into the industry. Strategic planning for long-term opportunities is also 
considered as fundamental to encourage suppliers to switch their focus to the future. Although 
investment in these areas are hoped to encourage improvement, progress has been stalled by 
the persistent weaknesses in the areas detailed on the left-hand side of the diagram.  
4.6.2 Strong and Resilient Supply Chains 
Progress in building a more resilient supply chain has stalled as the economic downturn placed 
increasing pressure on established relationships, making it difficult for supply chains “to thrive” 
(ibid, p54). Limited access to robust funding, lack of certainty and lateness in payment across 
the supply chain have been major blockers for improvement. Reducing insolvency risks through 
the introduction of project bank accounts and industry standards on fair payment terms have 
become key recommendations to ease cash flow problems. However, a lack of cash has affected 
the ability of suppliers to respond flexibly to opportunities. CS2025 emphasises the need to 
create greater synergies amongst suppliers by “bringing together value adding activities 
consistently so that the whole is more than the sum of the parts” (ibid, p54). However, this rests 
on greater agreement about the basis of client value and accountabilities for risk.  
4.6.3 Client Capability & Procuring Innovation 
Construction 2025 highlights an important role for clients in developing procurement strategies 
that move away from “piecemeal” sub-contracting to focus on procuring solutions for improved 
value. In turn, adopting practices associated with sharing cost information and profit sharing 
incentives are highlighted as building blocks to enable a move towards the deeper engagement 
of suppliers. However, CS2025 also notes that suppliers are not confident that novel and 
innovative products and services “will be commercially rewarding” (ibid, p61). Even when 
procurement strategies encourage innovation, knowledge transfer can be frustrated as the 
temporary composition of project teams result in lost capability. These problems require greater 
commitment to knowledge capture and also improved organisation of knowledge transfer. 
However, the report highlights a fractured approach and “patchy” collaboration across and 
between industry and research organisations.  
90 
 
 
 
Construction 2025 extends many of Wolstenholme’s recommendations with a detailed vision of 
specific industry-level targets. Emphasis is placed on improving how clients articulate value to 
enable integration towards customer defined worth. Digital technologies play a central role in 
encouraging more efficient design and engineering. However, there are also significant 
blockages inhibiting the vision of supplier-innovators partnering with clients to develop long-
term value-based solutions. Although, advanced technologies are viewed as centrally important 
to challenge barriers to co-creation, incumbent industry practices reflect a lack of will to invest 
in innovation.    
4.7 A Discussion of Policy Themes  
An examination of the emerging policy debate has revealed a tension between a policy vision 
based on long-term partnering and the reality of an industry entrenched in wasteful short-term 
sub-contracting and risk-dumping. There remains a gap between aspirations for smarter 
procurement combined with fuller supplier engagement and the reality of entrenched views of 
construction as a commodity purchase. The table below synthesises the main themes:    
 Egan 1998 Wolstenholme 2009 CS2025  
Proposition  Partnering and “Lean 
Thinking” to create 
value by improving 
quality  
Economic and social 
value creation for the 
built environment 
Vision of superior 
productivity and value 
Delivery Metrics, integration of 
the “whole”, 
client/demand led, flow 
and pull lean models to 
improve operations 
Incentives to share risk 
and benefits, foster 
inter-disciplinary 
knowledge sharing, 
match risk to capability 
Low carbon and digital 
technologies, 
procurement to 
encourage supplier-
innovators 
Capture Moving away from 
short-term contracts, 
procuring supply 
partners incentivised by 
share gains  
Clearer articulation of 
value by clients & 
greater engagement of 
supplier ideas  
Integrate around 
customer defined value, 
fuller use of 
technologies  
Inhibitors Lack of continuity in 
demand & lack of will to 
invest in relationships, 
Procurement based on 
lowest price tendering 
and risk dumping 
 
Poor integration, 
persistent lowest price 
tendering at 
unsustainable margins, 
incertitude makes 
partnering and 
innovation too risky 
Insolvency risks and 
cash flow delays, 
weakened economic 
relationships, poor 
knowledge transfer, 
lack of confidence in 
rewards for innovation 
Table 4.2 Policy Themes for Value Capture and Creation 
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4.7.1 Egan’s Model 1998 
Egan’s model emphasised value capture by procuring long-term partnerships and developing 
reward structures to encourage collaborative efforts. The lean thinking philosophy emphasised 
making waste more visible and accepting accountability for improving efficiency. Egan’s vision 
of “delivering value” and governing by numbers elevated the role of client-led performance 
management where oversight focused on tracking improvements and removing obstacles to 
enable a more synchronised supply “flow” (Womack et al, 1990; Egan, 1998). This vision inferred 
an acceptance of client leadership guiding, protecting and overseeing delivery. Governing 
conduct suggests an infrastructure to steer performance towards improving the “whole” rather 
than self-serving forms of opportunism. However, within Rethinking Construction there is little 
discussion about the complexity of transforming existing practices that seek to protect weak 
margins by avoiding deviations from plan. In turn, over the 10 years from Egan to Wolstenholme, 
improvements in performance were persistently blocked by a “lack of will” to invest in 
collaborative relationships or frameworks of governance that sustain a shared sense of common 
purpose. The economic downturn damaged relationships leading to a spiral of lowest price 
tendering that frustrated quality initiatives.  
4.7.2 Wolstenholme’s Model 2009 
Wolstenholme’s Built Environment offered a new perspective to mobilise a shared vision of the 
critical role for construction in delivering social and economic benefits rather than being viewed 
as a short-term “commodity purchase”. The Built Environment created a vision of future 
sustainability with suppliers and clients working towards enhanced long-term value creation 
based on social, environmental and economic returns. For the industry, short-term 
recommendations focused on developing ways of building new interdisciplinary skills and 
rewards structures. However, harsh economic conditions stalled a willingness to partner and 
pool knowledge and “both” clients and suppliers needed to more fully engage. Intelligent Clients 
were identified as exemplars to the rest of the industry in designing and procuring integrated 
ways of working in partnership with suppliers. The future challenge in Wolstenholme’s model 
focused on capturing greater value with the client more clearly articulating the nature of value 
and working with suppliers to identify who is “best placed” to manage risk (CE, 2009, p27). 
However, progress required more visibility of risks and opportunities previously hidden within 
the layers of the sub-contracting supply chains. At the centre of the transformation debate was 
a call for more investment in digital capabilities and interdisciplinary expertise. However, 
damaged delivery relationships provided little justification for investment.   
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4.7.3 Construction 2025 and Heathrow  
The table of policy reform themes describes a shift in emphasis in how the value proposition 
was conceived and captured. Egan’s “lean thinking” model for performance improvement 
focused on improving project-level efficiency with rigorous client oversight. More recent themes 
emphasise strategic goals and doing the “right” things to enhance value in delivery. The 
construction strategy outlines aspirations for improved productivity and whole life value, driven 
by state of art digital design and engineering technologies to enable closer delivery relationships. 
In turn, improved value delivery is linked to synergies from fuller engagement of suppliers and 
procurement arrangements to encourage innovation. Flexible incentives to share efficiency 
gains are considered important ways of engaging suppliers at the front-end of the project. 
However, the design and composition of the calculative infrastructure necessary to enrol 
suppliers to accept closer and more integrated relationships has remained outside the policy 
focus. Although Construction 2025 recommends closer delivery relationships to build synergies 
based on customer defined value, the broken business model highlights a problem with 
sustaining cooperation and a shared sense of purpose across supply networks.  
The ICE Intelligent Client literature emphasises an important role for the client in encouraging 
collaboration and openness through incentive structures as a way of “integrating” a shared 
sense of common purpose. Project 13 outlines significant aspirations to move towards a model 
of collective enterprise that extends across the whole life of the infrastructure asset. However, 
there remains a persistent gap between aspirations for deeper delivery relationships and a lack 
of will to share responsibility for delivery outcomes or commit to innovative and risky 
endeavours. The Heathrow cases offer an important opportunity to reflect on the two very 
different models of governance which both successfully engaged with the supply network. The 
transition from the client-led lean partnering model (T5) to governance through clearly 
articulated accountabilities (T2) reflects some of the themes in the Egan to Wolstenholme 
delivery models described on page 90. However, T2 also moved away from a partnering model 
to an arms-length and perhaps more “transactional” model of governance. With the current 
Project 13 reform discussion highlighting the need to return to partnering and collective 
“enterprise” relationships, T2 represents an important case to examine “how” the programme 
was successfully delivered.  The next section considers the initial orchestration of control on 
both programmes and the evaluative principles that underpinned the design of the two 
contrasting models of governance.  
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4.8 Reform and Heathrow Terminal 5 
Terminal 5 (T5) was one of the largest airport constructions in Europe. It took over a decade to 
plan and gradually a sophisticated lean model was developed which emphasised driving through 
efficiencies by standardising procurement and operational processes (Doherty, 2008; Davies et 
al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2011). The first-tier suppliers were procured through 10-year 
framework agreements which created long-term commercial relationships. Partner selection 
strategies focused on screening suppliers to ensure that they were capable of working within a 
co-dependent partnering environment. One senior executive noted that;  
“It was probably a good half a generation before most people had ever worked this way, truly 
this way. So, we had a huge cultural challenge, whereby even though technically a lot of people 
were very competent. They just behaviourally weren’t able to adapt to working in that 
environment where their priority was to the programme or the project not to their corporate 
entity that they came from.” (Senior T5 Executive, 2014) 
Senior executives were recruited from a variety of industries, including the oil, pharmaceutical 
and car industry where collaborative practices were more common. Recruitment focused on 
people successfully “doing it differently” to the traditional approaches in construction. 
Enrolment of the first-tier suppliers was marked by a signing ceremony where suppliers agreed 
to be part of the T5 Agreement’s ethos of a “co-located, team-based, partnering philosophy” 
(TECHT, 2001).  
Integrated teams were structured around solutions that required a range of experts from a 
variety of organizations to focus on the delivery of common goals. The 1998 T5 Handbook 
accompanied the T5 Agreement. It described a code of conduct designed to shape partnering 
practices, especially a need to “leave yesterday behind” by transforming old practices based on 
a “lack of co-operation” and “pre-assigned” responsibilities and “transactional outcomes” (T5 
Handbook, 1998). A different approach to discovery was recommended:  
“Conventional project logic seeks to predefine all requirements and banish change once the 
project has started. Yet flexibility and adaptability are key objectives of T5. Conventional 
processes and solutions are therefore not tenable” (ibid, p8) 
The Handbook described a new approach to performance management designed to encourage 
continuous improvement and expectations of proactive risk management to achieve 
“exceptional” levels of performance. Teams were co-incentivised and expected to pool 
knowledge for the benefit of the whole programme. However, this required a sophisticated 
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calculative infrastructure to settle tensions associated with how far performance deviations 
would be treated as acceptable forms of scope change or risks.  
4.8.1 Enrolment into Doing Risk Differently 
The construction of T5 presented a major commercial risk for the BAA as the construction cost 
represented 70% of the BAA’s market capitalization at the time (Brady and Davies, 2011). The 
construction involved a business-as-usual approach keeping two of the busiest runways 
operational whilst dealing with the logistical challenge of a hugely space constrained site on the 
edge of the M25 motorway. This played out in the planning consent which took over 4 years and 
when it was received in 2001 it contained 700 specific conditions and restrictions (Doherty, 
2008). In the two years preceding construction the BAA undertook a benchmarked study which 
concluded that no recent airport of this scale had been built on time and to budget. It noted that 
the scale and scope of the task could result in a two-year delay and a possible £1bn over-run 
(Nightingale and Brady, 2011; Doherty, 2008). The size of the business risk resulted in a decision 
to self-insure, with the BAA bearing commercial accountability for risks. However, potential risks 
also required visibility and oversight and the BAA pledged to offer “fair” rewards in return for 
open-book “transparency” by suppliers:  
“The commercial basis between us is based on one of cost transparency. We share cost 
information between us to ensure that each has a good understanding of costs with a view to: 
1. making fair and proper reimbursements, 2. understanding the value and benefit of proposed 
and incurred costs” (T5 Handbook 1998, p346)  
Reimbursements of costs created certainty for suppliers by guaranteeing a 5-15% margin on 
costs deemed to be within scope. To supplement reimbursement, value-based incentives were 
established to reward performance improvement and prevent lock-in to the existing scope. The 
“value fund” rewarded “best” value as the relationship between functionality 67improvements 
and cost. However, the “value challenge” involved trade-offs: 
 “when weighing up the impact of revisions, on your delivery and other delivery teams will always 
need to be balanced, to be mutually beneficial” (ibid, p33)  
Common purpose was encouraged by pooling benefits into a common “pot” to reward value:   
“You can spend all your time blaming whoever. We don’t care, it comes out of everyone’s bonus” 
              (T5 Executive, 2015)  
                                                          
67Functionality involved a combination of KPI measures of time, safety and quality which were compared 
to cost to give an indicator of value improvement. 
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Encouraging collaboration by rewarding shared gains through a shared incentive “pot” required 
careful adjudication by the client teams to resolve tensions. Enrolment into accepting fluid scope 
and shared accountability involved a gradual process of negotiation and participatory 
involvement in setting performance milestones. The latter helped to enrol suppliers into 
agreeing targets which represented a major departure from traditional approaches to planning 
where teams were “normally held to account for the design of someone else’s programme” (T5 
Executive, 2015). Milestone targets focused efforts on a common end point and levels of 
performance and productivity necessary to deliver critical outcomes.  
4.8.2 Balancing Tensions 
Building shared and common purpose through collective evaluation was a major theme on T5. 
However, the lack of fixivity of plans created tensions associated with concerns about how risk 
and emergent scope would be rewarded given the complexity of overlapping accountability. Gil 
2009 and Gil et al 2012 recount how the contested effect of interdependencies and fluid and 
overlapping scope created a team environment like an “ants nest” wrestling over the same 
territory. In this context, Gil’s work emphasises the adaption of incentives structures whereby 
tensions were settled by agreeing new targets to reward performance improvement. The T5 
Handbook extends these ideas by describing two key principles described as important “team 
values”:  
1. STORM as success orientated risk management 2. Actively working “the interfaces”  
STORM was described as a way of thinking developed to challenge traditional (reactive) risk 
management approaches by encouraging teams to adopt “active” risk management techniques 
to prevent risks before they crystallised. In turn, an ongoing search for opportunities to improve 
delivery was encouraged. STORM principles encouraged teams to adopt a “can-do, can-solve” 
(T5 Handbook, 1998, p60) approach where team values required an acceptance of relational 
dependence to achieve a “whole delivery solution” for the mutual benefit of the programme. 
The Handbook described the need to manage interdependencies through “actively working 
interfaces”, building on existing knowledge within and across teams to remove hidden agendas. 
This translated into behaviour described as:    
“look I’ve got budget, but I might be able to do something better with it; because I see what 
you’re doing here and we are going to do this. Then you’d have to dig yours up, to do your thing. 
How about you do yours first and we do ours next?” (T5 Executive, 2015) 
However, managing emergent opportunities also required “fluid” boundaries of accountability 
to prevent teams limiting the search for improvement within their teams. This partnering for 
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performance improvement model created the need for a complex and adaptive architecture of 
control with a clear resolution ladder to prevent the escalation of disputes (T5 Handbook, 1998)  
4.8.3 Reform in Governing Risk on T5 
The earlier policy discussion reveals that during this period, poor procurement practices, pricing 
at unsustainable margins and risk dumping blocked the development of stronger delivery 
relationships. On T5, the careful selection of partners willing to adopt new performance 
improvement approaches was an important foundation for the partnering model. The 
reimbursement of scoped costs created a degree of certainty for suppliers, whilst milestone and 
value-based rewards co-incentivised teams to focus on long-term performance improvement 
for the programme. STORM principles described a code of conduct where teams would search 
for ways of mitigating risks before they crystallised. Actively working interfaces and resolving 
issues for the overall benefit of the programme created a sense of common purpose. For T5, 
governing conduct involved a complex and adaptive architecture of control to support the 
continued acceptance of lean and active risk management. Prior T5 literature (Gil, 2009; Gil et 
al, 2012; Nightingale and Brady, 2011) describes tensions associated with fluid scope whereby 
resolution was achieved through collective evaluation and the adjustment of plans and 
incentives. However, within this literature there is limited discussion of “how” control was 
sustained and the nature of modifications necessary to mitigate destabilising tensions. In the 
next chapter, many of these themes are examined to understand the nature and composition 
of the calculative infrastructure that became visible once controversies challenged the existing 
evaluative order. In turn, there are more detailed considerations of the client’s role in governing 
conduct and the nature of calculative technologies that steered progress towards delivery.  
4.9 Wolstenholme and Heathrow Terminal 2 
By 2009 the economic downturn had created a harsh environment for suppliers with the return 
of competitive tendering at unsustainable margins and an increased risk of insolvency (CE, 
2009). Wolstenholme’s report renewed the call for a more integrated approach to construction 
and a need to reframe the importance of sustainability and social value. In the short term, 
recommendations focused on clients working “with” suppliers to clearly articulate how value 
should be conceived and “who” was best placed to manage risks.  During this time plans for the 
construction of Terminal 2 developed. The Capital Director of the BAA noted the partnership 
model was no longer suitable because: 
“partnerships work well in small businesses and marriages but billion-pound capital programmes 
are too big to work around well-meaning best intentions” (Morgan, 2009, p1).  
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Complex Build Integrators were procured through a standardised set of terms and a framework 
of responsibilities using the New Engineer Contract (NEC3). Integrated teams and an ethos of 
partnering for performance improvement were replaced by clear lines of accountability.  This 
reflected some of the reforms recommended by Wolstenholme, notably the clearer articulation 
by the client of the nature of worth to counter a deeper concern for uncertainty.  
4.9.1 Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? 
Complex Build Integrators (CBIs)68 were engaged to oversee the management of the supply 
chain. The assignment of clear responsibilities set out in the contract was perceived as a superior 
approach to managing change. Quoting the American poet Robert Frost, the Capital Director 
noted that “Good fences make good neighbours” (Morgan, 2009, p2).  
The T2 model stepped away from a client-led project management role to a more arms-length 
commercial arrangement with the client focused on managing responsibilities defined in the 
contract. The Capital Director of T2 described the perils of client involvement in operational 
tasks as “un-intelligent”. Instead a more regulatory approach was adopted with the client clearly 
articulating requirements, enabling them to “get out of the contractor’s way” (Morgan, 2009, 
p1). The CBIs and Heathrow shared risks and gains in a fixed percentage “pain-gain” formula 
69agreed in the contract. The formula was tracked on an ongoing basis:  
“The NEC3 is a good tool for incentivising cost containment, as the contractor shares in the 
savings if the project comes in under budget – but requires discipline on the part of the client not 
to change its mind”  (Morgan, 2009, p1). 
4.9.2 The “Right” Kind of Bribe  
The allocation of pain-gain created a reward for cost management, but other incentives were 
necessary to balance an overemphasis on cost cutting. A further clause was added to the 
contract to broaden the conception of performance improvement beyond cost containment. 
Incentive structures were designed to enrol working practices that focused on safety and quality. 
Specific milestones were incentivised and KPI awards tracked safety and quality performance.  
A discretionary “award fee” was developed affectionately called the “right kind of bribe” 
(Morgan, 2009, p1) because it was intended to encourage the “right” behaviours from the CBIs. 
Evaluation took place every 6 months when the CBI presented a self-assessment case to justify 
payment and Heathrow scrutinised performance evidence. The discretionary fee rewarded a 
                                                          
68 The CBIs were HETCo and Siemens 
69 The sharing formula was 60:40 Heathrow to HETCo and 75:25 Heathrow to Siemens  
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variety of initiatives that were intended to reflect the strategic priorities at the time. This 
exchange was designed to enable agreement about the codes of conduct over the award period. 
The “right kind of bribe” provided a structure to direct the CBIs’ attention towards priorities to 
supplement the focus on cost reduction. However, even though the right kind of bribe was 
developed to encourage shared and common purpose for the benefit of the programme, the 2nd 
tier of suppliers were not incentivised.   
4.9.3 Data as Kingpin 
Data scrutiny played a central role in regulating deviations from plan. The nature of 
subjectivization set an expectation amongst suppliers of being asked to justify the latest 
forecasts based on past and possible future performance.  
“data integrity, this one version of the truth, this was kingpin and if you look to that organisation 
you would think it was the programme manager. This was the kingpin in all of this. So, if the 
information did not stack up, I don’t care what story you’ve got. Go and sort out your data or tell 
me what your data is telling me” (T2 Programme Controls, 2014)  
Data integrity was important because a robust baseline represented the agreed single “version 
of the truth” to underpin performance analysis. The appetite for control described data as 
“kingpin” which created a moral constraint (Miller, 2001; Miller and Power, 2013) whereby 
“telling” a coherent story linked to the performance metrics was expected. In turn, incomplete 
explanations created a form of latent power (Clegg, 1998; Miller and Power, 2013; Miller, 2001) 
to encourage a search for a more credible and realistic story to explain performance. Monthly 
performance meetings provided the space and forum for the client to scrutinise data and pass 
messages back to the CBI through the client’s Programme Directors. For the CBI and Programme 
Directors on the client team, demonstrating an ability to develop realistic forecasts with few 
“surprises” was closely monitored. Performance data played a fundamental role in integrating 
attention towards shared priorities and goals.  
The initial design principles described so far provide an important contrast to the T5 model of 
collective evaluation and co-incentivised teams. The adoption of an NEC contract, risk sharing 
incentives and the intelligent client system reflects a more standard industry approach to 
governing conduct at a distance. However, it also raises questions about how risks associated 
with emergent change were managed and how the 2nd tier was encouraged to share potential 
opportunities for performance improvement. Nevertheless, T2 was successful and the 
programme was delivered on budget and to schedule. These points are elaborated in chapter 6.   
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4.10 Governing Risk in Construction  
This chapter has highlighted a dissonant and complex control environment for construction 
projects where navigating progress can be destabilised by uncertainty and competing interests. 
In this context, sustained value capture requires careful management to ensure that friction and 
rivalries amongst different justifications of worth do not destabilise progress. The ICE framework 
elaborates some of these themes by recognising that clients are intelligent when they develop 
governance and control approaches to enable strong delivery relationships that encourage 
knowledge sharing. In this chapter, the Heathrow cases reveal two contrasting approaches to 
encourage knowledge sharing that reflected very different appetites for risk. On T5, integrated 
teams were expected to proactively manage-out risks and continue to search for performance 
improvements. This involved the gradual enrolled of teams into accepting fluid scope and 
flexible responsibilities for the benefit of the whole programme. In contrast, on T2 a more 
regulatory model was developed to direct suppliers towards specific issues and risks requiring 
resolution. A clear framework of accountabilities defined the nature of performance 
commitments. These contrasting approaches to governing risk raise significant questions that 
are examined in the following chapters: 
• On T5, although the incentive structures co-incentivised teams to accept fluid plans, 
prior research reveals tensions70 over being held to account for performance deviations. 
Calculative technologies such as plans and incentives played a mediatory role, as they 
were adapted over the delivery lifecycle to build a shared vision of evaluative purpose. 
However, the existing literature provides little detail of the composition of the 
calculative infrastructures or the nature of modifications to evaluative principles that 
enabled progress. Therefore, how did the calculative infrastructures mediate and 
sustain control? 
 
• On T2, the intelligent client model organised dissonance by emphasising the importance 
of the integrity of the “single version” of the data to deter divergence. Although a 
sophisticated framework of incentives existed between the Client and CBI; the only 
direct incentives for the 2nd tier encouraged delivering to the initial baseline 
commitments. This raises important questions about “how” the client could sustain the 
engagement of suppliers when emergent change challenged existing plans. There was 
                                                          
70 Gil, 2009, Gil et al, 2012, Nightingale and Brady, 2011 
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little incentive for the 2nd tier to share local intelligence of new emergent risks or 
opportunities. Therefore, how did the calculative infrastructures mediate and sustain 
control? 
 
Both questions address tensions across the industry linked to an aversion to change and a deep 
concern for the damaging effects of risk. Large complex projects pass through a lengthy delivery 
cycle where emergent change challenges initial plans. Calculative infrastructures can play a 
major role in steering conduct towards new plans and targets whilst settling concerns about 
being held to account. In the following chapters, the composition of the contrasting calculative 
infrastructures is examined to show how they sustained control despite emergent change.  
4.11 Summary 
This chapter recounts key policy themes since the 90s and the continued call for collaboration 
between the client and suppliers. The debate underpinning improved value capture focuses on 
more fully engaging “with” suppliers to reach an agreed conception of value. The discussion of 
the policy reform themes reveals several approaches to improving delivery through the 
development of shared incentives, lean principles and digital technologies. Here the emphasis 
has been on techniques designed to improve knowledge transfer and systems integration by 
exercising control “over” resources. However, the summary of inhibitors (on page 90) highlight 
persistent behavioural issues that reflect a lack of will to pool knowledge and engage in 
collective discovery.  Closing the policy-practice gap and overcoming these issues involves the 
enrolment of suppliers into agreeing accountability, accepting responsibility and understanding 
evaluative priorities. These themes involve “social integration” and the fixing of a shared sense 
of meaning and purpose to balance dissonant tensions. Heathrow represents a significant site 
for innovation and so far, the discussion has highlighted two very different but successful 
approaches to governing risk. In the following two chapters, the dynamics of social integration 
and the reproduction of control are studied to understand how the ascribed evaluative priorities 
and principles became institutionalised within the calculative infrastructures on T2 and T5. The 
next chapter returns to T5 to consider in more depth the composition and role of the calculative 
infrastructures in enrolling suppliers towards the performance improvement model which 
reflected a desire to “do risk differently”.   
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Chapter 5 
Terminal Five “Doing Risk Differently” 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the “doing risk differently” approach that enabled the implementation of 
lean thinking on Terminal 5 (T5). Steering conduct away from self-serving opportunism required 
a sophisticated controls methodology. Prior T5 literature identifies destabilising tensions that 
resulted in the modification of the calculative infrastructure. This chapter examines the detail of 
these changes in order to understand “how” the project teams were enrolled into accepting the 
lean performance improvement model. The last chapter described STORM and “actively working 
the interfaces” as key concepts to encourage teams to accept responsibility for discovery. This 
initial section examines the evaluative principles and procedures that underpinned the ethos of 
lean partnering.  
The timeline below describes key dates over the 12 years from the establishment of the Project 
Board in 1996 to T5’s opening in the spring of 2008. Between 1996-8 feasibility plans were 
refined into an initial high-level top-down cost estimate to underpin the business case. The initial 
feasibility phase ended in 1998 as the key first tier contractors/suppliers were engaged through 
the T5 Agreement. Group-level approval was received in 2000 for the initial plans and in 2003 
the final £4.3bn baseline cost was agreed with the regulator, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 
Figure 5.1: The Terminal 5 Timeline of Key Events 
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In the late 1990s the “Project Management Office” was established bringing together controls 
experts from the main UK built-asset consultancy organisations into an integrated team. The 
Control Team was called “TECHT” combining the names of the consultancy firms Turner 
Townsend with EC Harris. When baseline approval was received in 2000 a 3-year period of 
development and co-ordinated design continued.  However, by August 2000 a sufficient level of 
“fixivity” was achieved to set the project baseline and the control activities switched to 
developing a performance management strategy. The control architecture evolved over time - 
an ex-Director noted that it took 3 years to develop;  
“So, don’t assume the programme started with a nice suite of controls and everything beautifully 
in place ready to start on site. Because if it had been like that we would have been in a much 
fitter place. We probably were; first year I would describe as organised chaos, second year I 
would describe as controlled chaos and third I would probably say we were finally in control.”       
(T5 Director, 2015) 
The scale of the programme was huge and at its height it involved 8000 contractors, the 
construction of two terminal buildings, a new air traffic control tower, a multistory car park, 
hotel, the diversion of two rivers and extensions to rail links and motorways close to London 
(Doherty, 2008; Brady and Davies, 2014). Planning consent took over 4 years and when it was 
received in 2001 it listed 700 specific conditions and restrictions for a safe construction whilst 
keeping the airport open for business (Doherty, 2008). The size of the business risk resulted in a 
decision to centrally insure the programme.  In this context, the BAA accepted responsibility for 
oversight and the main suppliers were engaged as partners pooling knowledge to develop a 
superior operational solution. A T5 executive explained: 
“So that ability to manage risk, the main reason for doing it was for transparency and 
understanding our plans”.  (T5 executive, 2014) 
Visibility of progress and “transparency” of threats and opportunities required a willingness to 
pool knowledge. Oversight required a calculative infrastructure to monitor performance and 
steer conduct towards the “can-do can-solve” collective learning approach described in the 
Handbook. The T5 Agreement and Handbook ascribed an environment where suppliers would 
work together in common pursuit of better value. However, “value” was viewed as a progressive 
concept whereby task teams would co-create better design solutions and share their experience 
broadly. The control architecture needed to sustain aspirations for discovery to enable 
continuous improvement. However, fluid scope and blurred boundaries of accountability 
created a major control challenge.  
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5.2 Developing a Dynamic Framework for Control  
The control methodology needed to encourage the proactive management of risks ascribed by 
the STORM approach. Emphasis was placed on sustaining an “open” dialogue:   
“Open communications and easy access to real time information enables managers to constantly 
monitor progress and to make rapid decisions to prevent any ‘nasty surprises’ and reduces the 
need for extensive auditing and checking. Performance measurement supported by a continuous 
improvement mentality and the open, supportive culture ensures managers and suppliers are all 
operating in the best interest of the client and are not investing time in ‘protecting their position’ 
as in more traditional contracts” (BAA, 2001, p1)  
This extract from the BAA’s “procurement concept” working paper describes the importance of 
real time performance information to mitigate “nasty” surprises combined with normative 
standards of behaviour focused on sustaining improvement for the overall benefit of the 
programme. A supportive “coaching” control environment was developed with dedicated 
control experts working with delivery teams to evaluate “what has gone to plan, what has not, 
why and what remains to be done” (Controls Handbook, 2001, p3). The control approach was 
underpinned by four main features described below:  
Cost Reimbursement Because commercial risks are “held” by the BAA: 
“It is fundamental that the Project knows where, when and how costs are 
being incurred and the levels of efficiency being achieved” 
Procurement method  The final cost out-turn and completion date remains fluid until later in the 
programme:  
“Project Controls tools will provide early trend analysis to raise confidence 
in predicted outcomes” 
Philosophy of gain-
sharing 
Shared incentives required:  
“auditable and consistent” processes to capture changes that may affect 
those targets 
The scale of the business 
risks 
Scale of risks faced by the BAA create a control challenge:  
“Necessitating a disciplined approach to Project Controls” 
            Adapted from Controls Handbook 2001 
Table 5.1: Main Features of the Control Approach 
The four main features combined to make a complex control environment. Cost reimbursement 
was introduced to create more certainty for suppliers.  However, testing the robust nature of 
initial plans and removing wasteful contingencies was necessary to avoid lock-in to “safe” 
forecasts. The fluid nature of plans described as the “procurement method” was part of the lean 
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performance improvement model. However, enabling adaptive plans required sufficient 
visibility to prevent dangers from being hidden within the team organisations. Performance 
reports and trend analysis were developed to improve the visibility of progress whilst 
highlighting potential weaknesses in the latest forecasts. The gain-sharing philosophy was 
intended to encourage a common goal of capturing improved value from the programme. 
However, it also required a robust control approach to ensure that gain-sharing bonuses were 
consistently evaluated and rewarded. The “scale of the business risks” required a rigorous 
system of control and the TECHT team became responsible for developing an infrastructure of 
management reports, meetings and forums to govern conduct across the programme.  
5.2.1 Territories of Accountability  
Team structures provided a basis to assign budgets and hold teams to account against targets 
and standards developed in the initial baseline budgets. However, once the baseline was set, 
some flexibility was necessary to allow for design changes. Cost transfers and risk contingencies 
classified as “operational” changes could be authorised at the delivery team level. However, 
fundamental changes in scope were closely regulated in a change control process which 
elevated authorisation up to the Project Board.  
Figure 5.2 The Hierarchy of Authorisation for Change 
                                                                      Commitments (£)       Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The T5 Handbook 1998 
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The Handbook differentiated between the need for routine operational flexibility and scope-
related change noting that;  
“evolving and adapting activity does not constitute change; it may involve re-planning and/or 
transferring roles, responsibilities, budgets, time etc. between teams and team members”  
        (T5 Handbook, 1998, p42) 
Task teams focused on the delivery of a suite of specific work packages. These teams were 
clustered into larger delivery teams. 71 A design development fund known as the “completion 
allowance” enabled adaptability and agreed re-design activities. Risk contingency transfers for 
unavoidable deviations to plan were considered a “project management responsibility” beyond 
the authority of the task teams. They required agreement with the Delivery Team Leader or the 
Project Director. In contrast, change control processes were stringently managed with formal 
authorisation by the T5 Project Board. The rigorous scrutiny of control changes reflected the 
need for awareness of scope changes across the programme.   
This hierarchy created a framework to monitor and sanction certain types of decisions. It also 
formed the basis of a reporting structure to categorise costs associated with change and 
adaptability. This structure enabled developmental learning whilst holding teams to account for 
budget commitments. However, bounding accountability within a defined structure created 
“interfaces” between teams. Task interdependencies could result in a lack of clarity about “who” 
should be held to account for change. Although teams were encouraged to “actively work 
interfaces,” client oversight was needed to resolve disagreements. The fluid nature of design 
development meant that tracking changes to the baseline was complicated. However, it was 
important to accurately monitor change and at the centre of this was a fundamental principle 
that: 
“money should not be moved between budgets without moving the work that the money was 
originally intended to be used for and the time taken to do it”     
       (Controls Handbook, 2001, p p9).  
A control architecture was developed to ensure that costs and schedules were not decoupled. 
This architecture was supplemented by monthly reports that tracked and monitored authorised 
changes to the baseline.  
 
                                                          
71 In total the project engaged 16 main project “delivery teams” divided into “manageable chucks” made 
up of 147 sub-project/task teams. 
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5.2.2 Collective Evaluation  
Collective evaluation was a key feature of monthly meetings. A participatory ethos challenged 
traditional approaches to reviews where reports were “static things that get produced once a 
month and people argue about them and then go away” (Industry Executive, 2014). Instead on 
T5, monthly performance reviews provided a critical space for deliberation. Management 
reports highlighted the progress of “work done”, whilst analysing different performance 
measures against the latest forecast of costs at completion or the “anticipated final cost” (AFC). 
The links between management reports, work package commitments agreed with suppliers, and 
the initial baseline are described in the diagram below:  
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
    Source: Adapted from Controls Handbook 2001 
Figure 5.3 Linking the Baseline to Work Packages and Reports  
This control process facilitated “drilling down” using a work breakdown structure 72to enable an 
in-depth analysis of performance into “what is being delivered and where it is being delivered 
and who is charging for delivery” (Controls Handbook, 2001, p10). Baseline plans were broken 
down into task team plans and individual work packages which formed the basis for authorised 
payment to suppliers. The current “control plan” became the main budget for comparisons to 
analyse progress. Project teams were responsible for developing monthly rolling forecasts which 
                                                          
72 A work breakdown describes a list of deliverables broken down into work packages (PMBOK 2015, 
p567)  
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captured year to date performance plus an estimate for the remainder of the work package. This 
translated into the “anticipated final cost” (AFC).  
Although integrated teams provided a space to pool knowledge when developing forecasts, 
there remained a tendency towards developing more than one version of the forecast “truth”. 
A T5 Director noted: 
“…because you’re in an integrated team, actually the teams would be reviewing their data in a 
way that they normally would, that any project team would. And those teams were made up of 
multiple members of different organisations. So, they weren’t just BAA people or just contactors, 
there were all sorts of people. And most importantly the teams owned their plans and they 
managed their performance associated with those plans. So, it was very hard actually in an 
integrated team for people to create too many different versions of the truth. You might get two 
versions of the truth i.e. the version they want to try and get the “governance” to understand 
and then the version they’ve got in their top drawer as their opportunity; and that happened 
quite often. But getting two versions rather than one version was a challenge; but we didn’t have 
multiple versions of the truth.” (T5 Director, 2015)                                       
Challenging traditional practices such as a “two” book culture, with a “safe” governance forecast 
and the “top drawer” realistic one, required an infrastructure of control that provided sufficient 
oversight to scrutinise and test forecasts. However, rigorous forms of monitoring could be met 
with resistance.  The controls approach needed to balance a desire for surveillance with a degree 
of autonomy necessary for active risk management. Teams needed to own their plans and 
accept accountability for performance. However, accurate forecasting also required a level of 
capability to understand the scale effects of changes on the schedule. As the programme 
progressed the composition of the teams also changed making knowledge transfer and capture 
an issue:  
“All the heavy civils guys leave and all the systems and fit out people arrive. So, from going from 
having half a dozen contractors on site, you go to having 100 or 60 different organisations all 
with different varying scales of capability and you have to start the whole process of education 
all over again. That was a much harder challenge from an assurance and a performance point of 
view than in the first half. Particularly when it came to productive performance and `quality of 
thinking and problem solving. In that part of the job we put more capability in and around some 
of those kinds of people and organisations.”  (T5 Director, 2015) 
Building consistency in to reporting routines became important to prevent new entrants from 
adopting traditional practices that avoided accountability for performance improvement. From 
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2003, once the cost baseline was fixed, activities focused on refining assumptions to develop 
more precise performance targets. Within the existing T5 literature there is recognition that 
incentives and plans were modified but there is limited discussion of “how” or “when”. At the 
end of the last chapter a major question was raised: 
On T5, although the incentive structures co-incentivised teams to accept fluid plans, prior 
research reveals tensions73 over being held to account for performance deviations. Calculative 
technologies such as plans and incentives played a mediatory role, as they were adapted over 
the delivery lifecycle to build a shared vision of evaluative purpose. However, the existing 
literature provides little detail of the composition of the calculative infrastructures or the nature 
of modifications to evaluative principles that enabled progress. Therefore, how did the 
calculative infrastructures mediate and sustain control? 
Prior research emphasises that collective evaluation was sustained by adapting calculative 
technologies over the delivery cycle. This enabled divergent tensions to be settled, steering 
conduct towards a common conception of performance improvement. In the next section, the 
gap in the current literature is addressed to examine “how” Heathrow modified the calculative 
infrastructure to navigate change over the delivery cycle.  
5.3 The Phases of Control  
The following sections examine the phases of control where key calculative technologies shaped 
evaluative principles and practices. In turn, the controversies that challenged each phase are 
considered and the nature of modifications to settle and balance tensions.   
5.3.1 The Client Holds the Risk (1999-2001) 
The BAA’s decision to self-insure the programme meant that the initial stages of T5 focused on 
developing a risk management model to capture and mitigate risks. An initial benchmarking 
study highlighted that the scale and complexity of T5 was likely to result in at least a 20% over 
run unless the client moved from the traditional fragmented subcontracting model (Doherty, 
2008; Nightingale and Brady, 2011). The Integrated Team concept was a successful crisis 
management technique when the Heathrow Express tunnel collapsed in 1994.The recovery 
programme used a single team structure to quickly mobilise a response and mitigate further 
risks to the £440m cost base. This recovery approach demonstrated that rather than taking 
Balfour Beatty to court, resolving the problem by engaging co-located and integrated teams with 
                                                          
73 Gil, 2009; Gil et al, 2012; Nightingale and Brady 2011 
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a sense of common purpose was a superior solution. The concept of “contracts don’t deliver 
projects; people do” (T5 Director, 2015) inspired the creation of integrated teams on T5. The 
team were carefully recruited from a wide range of industries to bring variety and talent to the 
programme. They operated in a co-located environment where emphasis was placed on the new 
T5 team identity rather than the organisations individuals came from. The T5 Handbook outlined 
expectations of how teams would be rewarded but also a code of conduct to guide collective 
problem solving. Teams were tasked with the gradual development of solutions to “exceptional” 
standards, adopting a lean mentality to actively seek-out superior solutions. The Handbook 
ascribed the rationale of “transparency” of costs within and across teams to enabling “fair 
reimbursements” to teams based on “value and benefit”. However, the controls approach 
needed to balance a desire for “transparency” with a level of freedom necessary to support 
active risk management. Gradually clearer processes were developed to deal with design 
development and scope related changes. However, fluid territories of accountability and task 
related interdependencies created tensions about “how” risks would be evaluated and how 
value-based rewards would be distributed across delivery teams. An incumbent tendency 
towards building “safe” forecasts with buffers and contingencies to offset potential over-runs 
could block attempts to develop a performance improvement model. At this point a robust 
reporting framework was needed to capture emergent risks and opportunities. A framework to 
shape attention towards realistic (rather than safe) forecasts and enable the development of a 
single, reliable and consistent version of the plan.   
5.3.2 One Version of the Truth (2002-2003) 
The earlier discussion revealed how running “two books” with a realistic forecast (which 
remained in the “top drawer”) and a disclosed “safe” forecast was a common practice. The 
development of a “one” version of the truth involved a slow process of behavioural change 
where delivery teams were encouraged to share performance information more fully with the 
project control group. The monthly performance meetings became a forum to drive dialogue 
between team members and the wider T5 programme. The control team played a key role in 
building confidence by coaching the delivery teams in how to develop realistic forecasts from 
schedule data. The composition of the reports shaped the parameters for attention and helped 
to focus evaluation by defining an order of priorities. The earliest versions of the reports focused 
on the shortfalls when comparing the budget to performance targets. The report started with a 
summary of the gap between the control budget versus the latest anticipated cost forecast 
(AFC). This comparison would shape a dialogue about current operational issues and drivers for 
performance. The summary was accompanied by tables and graphs comparing cost and 
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schedule progress by month to direct the task team’s attention to trends and areas for 
improvement.  
Earned value methodology played a major role in tracking productivity and progress. Earned 
value management differs from other performance comparisons because it focuses on progress 
to date by tracking how much has been completed against how much was expected at a point 
in time. Earned value is defined as the “value” earned based on the schedule of work completed 
to date compared to the authorised budget (PMBOK, p538). When individual work packages are 
complete they are viewed as “earned” and are then compared to the overall baseline plan. 
Trends in earned value are tracked by monitoring the “budgeted cost of actual work performed” 
compared to the budgeted cost of work planned to highlight efficiencies. This analysis was 
broken down into standard indices, known as the Cost Performance Index (CPI) and the Schedule 
Performance Index (SPI). The CPI highlighted potential areas of concern for overruns by 
calculating the ratio of budgeted cost for work performed with the actual cost. An evaluation of 
less than 1 indicated performance below expected levels and a possible “need to instigate 
appropriate recovery action plans to prevent cost overruns if the performance deficit is not 
addressed” (TECHT, 2002). The SPI measured progress by comparing the budgeted cost of work 
performed to the budgeted cost of work scheduled to establish if work was “taking longer than 
originally planned” (TECHT, 2002). Tracking CPI and SPI trends and earned value movements 
played an important role in standardising the focus for project teams on specific performance 
deficits. The precision of the calculation created a consistent basis to evaluate success as well as 
directing attention to performance exceptions and potential shortfalls. Persistent trends were 
tracked over three monthly periods to provide a warning of “continuing decline” and deficits 
which could lead to major performance risks.  
Monthly reports focused mainly on current levels of productivity to predict underperformance 
risks and pinpoint areas for further scrutiny, intervention and control action. These reports were 
supplemented with weekly analyses detailing lateness or changes to the original schedule which 
could influence delivery. The Project Board report had a similar composition, although it 
contained a section dedicated to tracking change requests to highlight potential scope 
problems. Both the Project Board and Delivery Team (project) reports played a key role in 
establishing a level of consistency in the techniques used to evaluate progress. They also 
articulated an expectation of competence required when developing robust forecasts. The 
monthly meetings provided a forum to explore ideas and develop responses to questions raised 
by interrogating the numbers. The engagement of senior staff from other organisations (the 
principals) helped to ratify the importance of decisions.  
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 “We would sit in a room and we would share with them effectively our management report. To 
get their influence and also their opinion, because obviously there was an awful lot of experience 
in the room. Especially when you do that around issues or changes. Especially early in the 
programme we did a lot of that. Because there's no point in doing that towards the end of the 
programme when the job is nearly finished; you want those people in a room when they can 
actually influence the outcome. So, we would effectively have a principals meeting or a principals 
group then at project level there would be the project team that would have their own report 
and their own meetings.”  (T5 Director, 2015)  
Monthly meetings provided a forum to engage the experience of the senior principals but also 
to agree where they would direct efforts and attention to resolve performance issues. In this 
context, the “one version of the truth” represented the dominant case captured in the numbers 
as the basis for intervention. Over 2002 the composition of the delivery team monthly report 
changed in emphasis (see below) to focus on specific task team issues, trends and narratives. 
Table 5.2: Changes to the Monthly Report on T5  
New Report Sections Change in Emphasis Comments 
Opening Section Traffic lights: (Red-Amber-Green) for 
specific KPIs;  
Variances between Budget and AFC, CPI, 
SPI, Quality, Health & Safety 
Focus on exceptions and rankings 
of targeted KPIs for critical 
questioning. The initial section 
linked a narrative to highlighted 
areas for investigation compared 
to standards to monitor 
conformance.  
Change Control Early warnings, Project Manager’s 
instruction and change orders categories in 
tables and charts  
Mapping change order 
progression highlighted the size 
and value of scope changes, 
raising awareness of persistent 
and possible risks 
Schedule reporting  Traffic lights to highlight progress  Emphasis on significant delays 
and milestone status rather than 
lists of activities  
Narrative Large section of commentary on KPIs 
grouped to explain trends. Quality 
commentary on non-conformance and 
disruption to milestones (red flags). 
Overview comments on risks and 
opportunities 
More focus on diagnosis and 
accountability to track progress 
over time, building a narrative for 
performance evaluation. 
Narratives assigned clearer 
ownership “who” and 
accountability for “what next”  
Overview and 
appendices of granular 
weekly data  
The final section gave an overview of 
budget and forecast supplemented by 
weekly trends in costs and schedule 
performance 
To support discussion of 
diachronic trending data as well 
as synchronic snapshots of overall 
progress 
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Performance ranking in a traffic light format compared the performance of delivery teams.  
Narrative responses required expertise to explain the relationship between specific local level 
issues and their translated effect on cost, quality and safety outcomes. More extensive 
narratives supported the ongoing development of diagnostic skills to respond to questions 
raised by the KPIs. Detailed trending data helped to build a diachronic view of persistent 
problems threatening compliance to standards. The final section of the report highlighted the 
synchronic snapshot of the anticipated final forecast, the control budget and differences 
between the two. This last section was intended to create a dialogue about risks in delivery and 
potential alternatives to mitigate past performance issues. 
During this initial period, monthly rituals established a timetable and reporting schema to shape 
expectations of being held to account. Evaluation focused on narratives and indices mobilised 
to a local setting and used to scrutinise performance assumptions and possible pathways for 
improvement. In this phase technologies were developed to enrol teams into accepting 
accountability for devolved decisions. The controls group explained that “early-on” there was 
“no single point of authority” and this enabled local teams to develop a set of performance 
routines that suited their working practices. The reports tailored information to a few simple 
indicators creating a precision in planning and analysis whilst leaving local teams to interpret 
and develop responses to issues raised. Change control reporting was developed to drive a more 
sophisticated discussion about how changes might impact the overall scope of the program. The 
analysis focused on tracking tasks that persistently required more resources than planned, i.e. 
they became an indicator of a lack of control and therefore risk. Change control reporting also 
became an important surveillance technique delimiting the project team’s freedom to adjust 
plans without justifying and exploring alternatives. However, in July 2004 the programme was 
anticipating a £350m overrun and this led to a new phase in the control cycle. With just 3 years 
to “handover” this triggered an intense period of re-planning to develop a recovery strategy.  
5.3.3 Foresight (2004-2005)  
The first Integrated Baseline Review (IBR1) was the first time that all 25,000 activities and 147 
sub-projects were integrated into a single critical path. The outcome was a “realistic” overview 
of the final delivery dates and associated costs for the whole programme. The review highlighted 
the need to consider different ways of engineering more value through new deals on materials 
or re-scheduling work. The Total Cost Management (TCM) initiative was launched described as 
the primary “change agent” to complement normal reporting routines whilst targeting areas to 
generate savings and performance improvement. In the previous phase of control, emphasis lay 
on developing a consistent and reliable infrastructure for reporting. The primary performance 
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indicators encouraged teams to focus on a narrow definition of success based on the delivery of 
the budget. However, the core T5 team delivery values were founded on principles of “doing 
things differently” to challenge inertia, to encourage discovery and drive up performance by 
proactively managing-out risks. Developing a framework of calculative technologies to sustain 
performance improvement was a major challenge, particularly when large over-runs were 
anticipated. The quote below illustrates the difficulty in keeping a broad vision to drive 
improvement when monitoring narrow measures of cost and time;  
“So, everybody focuses on delivering time and cost, and nobody is saying, "Well, actually, are we 
doing the right thing?". I always think of it in, again, just standard terminology, it’s are we doing 
the right things but also are we doing the right things right? So, the time, cost and scope is just 
about are we doing things right? But we don't know if they're the right things or not?   
          (TECHT, 2015) 
The project management literature (PMI, 2013) uses Drucker’s concept of management 
efficiency as “doing things right” and leadership effectiveness in delivering goals as leading by 
“doing the right things”. The statement above draws these concepts together by questioning 
whether the “right” goals have been chosen and if evaluative priorities reflect broader 
opportunities for improvement. This describes the peril of lock-in to a narrow conception of the 
“right” thing which can become a self-reinforcing legitimate measure of success used as “proof” 
of effective management (Power, 2007) despite better alternatives existing. The issue here was 
that by focusing on CPI performance to date, broader forms of discovery and inquiry had been 
neglected although they were necessary to solve complex, unique and perplexing problems 
(Dewey, 1910; Stark, 2009; Dougherty, 2016). Encouraging discovery and critical inquiry was 
fundamental to the design of the performance management framework to underpin TCM. 
Initially the TCM initiative was associated with a series of high level goals to bridge the 
performance gap highlighted in IBR1. These goals included;  
• Reduction of the central risk contingency by £100m  
• Delivery of existing opportunities in the pipeline of £175m 
• Identifying and delivering £182m of new opportunities 
• Improve Productivity 
• Ensure commercial effectiveness of the change control process    
(TECHT, 2004) 
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The goals of the TCM became strategic imperatives and the project teams were responsible for 
developing plans to deliver improvements. Reducing programme level risk and crystallising 
opportunities required extensive re-engineering of existing plans to consider ways of generating 
greater efficiencies. Project teams were expected to take a proactive role in improving 
productivity. Progress was closely monitored to assess risk reduction, opportunity conversion 
and productivity targets. However, capturing progress across the programme was complicated. 
The TCM programme literature described this as; 
“How do we know that the actions being taken are effective in delivering the required results 
across the projects and the T5 programme as a whole?” (TECHT, 2004)  
Designing calculable spaces to capture, shape and sustain improvements was a major 
performance management challenge. The TCM initiative had pinpointed a pathway for 
improvement, building on the IBR review. New delivery targets were captured in a series of 
critical milestones which brought the activities of the project teams together at key temporal 
points. New territories of accountability were set to match new delivery targets. However, the 
enrolment of allied interests in agreeing the new stretch targets required a period of 
negotiation. Governing by numbers was referred to as “knowing the numbers” and the TCM 
review meetings became forums where KPIs were intensively debated as proxies to monitor the 
delivery of results. Knowing the numbers was described as key to managing with “foresight”  
“Knowing the numbers was partly about discussing the KPIs to date but it was also about giving 
us a heads-up that something had to change if we were still going to deliver the plan and I guess 
that’s all about managing foresight”  (TECHT, 2015)  
Developing foresight was described as having sufficient warning to be able to anticipate the 
need to adapt plans. Foresight was linked to the lean thinking principles and active risk 
management because it involved proactively managing-out waste to deliver superior levels of 
performance.   
5.3.3.1 Mobilising Ownership  
Radar tracking evaluated how far each of the 16 projects team had enrolled into the TCM 
programme by agreeing to specific plans and mobilising active improvement initiatives. TCM 
representatives were commissioned and tasked with agreeing the basis for accountability. 
Bespoke datasheets of key performance measures were developed to generate a progressive 
dialogue in examining performance to date.  
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The bespoke delivery goals were centrally assessed to consider; 
1. Is there a plan? 2. Is there a clear owner of the plan? 3. Is the plan being actively managed?  
A traffic light report summarised the status of the 3 questions and presented the results in a 
radar style analysis. Outcomes were monitored through some of the standard monthly KPIs 
measures that tracked efficiency trends such as the CPI and SPI data. Improvements in the 
Anticipated Final Cost (AFC) were ranked and monitored by project teams to create a sense of 
competition. These measures also formed part of the evaluation for the programme level 
incentives.  
TCM continued for several years until the operations readiness phase began in 2006. TCM re-
introduced concepts of “lean thinking” by encouraging a total quality approach which defined 
and articulated more precisely the “value” improvements required. A new architecture of 
performance measures and plans were refined with teams developing their own targets to 
generate savings. Part of the success of TCM can be linked to the gradual and iterative way in 
which new accountabilities were co-developed (BAA, 2006). TCM encouraged autonomy and 
enterprise but progress was also closely tracked to create a sense of urgency.   
5.3.3.2 Oversight of Risk Citizenship  
Monthly reports were rationalised and visually simplified and the content focused on the 
analysis of specific targets that tied back to TCM. The monthly reports were used to drive a 
discussion about trade-offs and improvements between productivity and sustaining quality and 
safety standards. Productivity and monthly progress was measured via CPI and SPI comparisons, 
and the “gap” between the baseline and the latest AFC. Conformance to safety and quality 
standards was fundamental and compliance statistics gave an indicator of operational 
robustness in executing these standards. The autonomy and freedom previously enjoyed at the 
project-level was replaced by a disciplined approach, whereby project-level risk contingencies 
were frozen to protect the bottom line. In turn “top ten” risks and opportunities were monitored 
and any changes in status routinely interrogated. This reflected a more stringent appetite for 
risk requiring teams to focus on driving-out waste and contingencies. The risk register process 
(called “CP07”) was upgraded to closely monitor emerging risks and to capture more distant 
threats. Due dates and control ratings were used to keep threats visible whilst assigning 
accountability for specific categories of risk. Check-points were developed to scrutinise the 
progression from initial “early warning” notices (EWNs) to project manager instructions (PMIs) 
and finally fully authorised “change requests”. The last part of the report catalogued in detail 
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risks and opportunities and significant hazards or threats to programme completion dates, 
reflecting the tighter control environment 
By 2005 the control infrastructure reflected some of concepts of “risk citizenship” with 
accountability spread across the organisation. Risk became “everyone’s business” (Power, 
2007). TCM improved “heedfulness” (Dougherty, 2016; Weick and Roberts, 1993; Power, 2007) 
within the teams by communicating a coherent vision of productivity improvements through 
precise quantified goals. The re-assignment of accountability for performance gaps devolved 
responsibility for risk management fully to the project teams. The tight oversight of change 
requests and contingency movements narrowed the project team’s parameters of choice. TCM 
created an environment to encourage “proactive” inquiry by rewarding teams for managing-out 
risks. The principles of active risk management moved from vague expectations of proactive 
behaviours to specific metrics designed to hold delivery teams to account. These were described 
in the BAA Step Change document, 2006, p3:  
1. Measures should be few, simple and people should only be held accountable for issues 
that they have some influence over 
2. Motivating behaviour drives change and so measurement should be linked to something 
that makes people want to change their behaviour.   
Sustaining motivation involved teams accepting accountability for specific targets and standards 
reflected in the suite of TCM KPIs. Teams were empowered as risk citizens to work towards 
specific performance improvement goals creating a form of moral economy (Power, 2007) with 
decisions shaped by a few simple measures. This reflected the ethos of lean and partnering 
where collective dialogue was favoured above more directive forms of regulatory control. 
However, at this late stage in the programme, collective dialogue reflected the need for 
precision to steer the programme to completion. A few simple and precise measures enabled 
divergent tensions to be settled, steering conduct towards a common conception of 
performance improvement. 
 
5.4 Synthesis of Themes 
Building an appetite for lean partnering involved the gradual development of an infrastructure 
to steer conduct towards accepting accountability for active risk management. The initial control 
phase, the “client holds the risk” emphasised building confidence in working within integrated 
teams in a co-incentivised environment. By the summer of 2000 a baseline commitment was 
agreed at the group level. However, the scope remained fluid and cost reimbursement set an 
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expectation of guaranteed payments amongst teams. This created a complex control 
environment with a need to discourage using safe numbers packed with contingencies or cynical 
attempts to manipulate scope through change requests. Although a basic control architecture 
was developed to encourage active risk management, a robust reporting framework was needed 
to encourage the “right” behaviours.  
In 2002 construction commenced and monthly reports played a key role in building confidence 
and also a willingness to develop realistic and robust forecasts. Translating schedule data into 
cost forecasts involved a degree of cost management capability, an understanding of cost 
behaviour, and the scale-effects of clustering work packages into delivery team forecasts. The 
gradual coaching of teams by dedicated control experts helped to develop team capabilities 
whilst encouraging teams to pool knowledge into “one version of the truth”. Teams were 
encouraged to develop their own performance management routines to provide credible 
narratives and stories.   Monthly reports focused on progress to date and areas for concern by 
identifying current dips and anticipated shortfalls. Monthly meetings provided a forum to agree 
priorities for attention. Earned value analysis and the SPI/CPI measures provided a consistent 
basis for teams to focus on performance exceptions. Over time reporting was refined and 
competitive rankings and narrative responses focused attention on weaknesses and alternative 
strategies to mitigate performance issues. Collective evaluation and participation in agreeing 
priorities played a key role in enrolling teams into accepting accountability for performance 
shortfalls. 
By July 2004 the first IBR identified the need for a robust recovery plan to mitigate a potential 
£350m over run. At this stage the composition of teams was moving from the “civils” to a variety 
of smaller suppliers. The appetite for risk switched from building a predictable forecast to 
scrutinising “doing the right things right”. A framework of KPIs was developed for each team to 
enrol agreement towards the TCM goals. The autonomy previously enjoyed was replaced by a 
disciplined approach to tracking progress, freezing risk contingencies and monitoring 
performance to generate a deliberate dialogue to mitigate any further slippage. Eventually a 
complex suite of reports shaped attention towards precise targets as the programme moved 
into the final stages of construction.  
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5.5 Enrolment and Controversies 
So far, the discussion of the different phases of control has stressed the role of collective 
evaluation as a way of shaping diverse perspectives. Within each phase key calculative 
technologies created calculable spaces where responsibility was assigned and gradually 
accepted by project teams. Calculative technologies played a central role in settling debates and 
tensions. In phase 1; “The client holds the risk” involved the Handbook outlining the importance 
of “transparency” to support the client in managing business risks. The offer of “fair” rewards 
for more transparent problem solving was intended to persuade teams to share knowledge. A 
variety of key technologies such as the completion allowance and value-based incentives settled 
initial concerns about how teams would be rewarded for searching for improved solutions. 
However, tensions remained associated with traditional construction behaviours of avoiding 
change and holding on to valuable strategic knowledge. Once construction commenced, 
problematisation focused on intense debates about the need for the “right” behaviours to 
challenge a “two-book culture”. Gradually reporting rituals and reports shaped attention 
towards “one version of the truth” and the diagnostic capabilities of the teams developed. 
However, by the summer of 2004 the overrun identified in IBR1 led to phase 3; “foresight” where 
the re-assignment of accountabilities was animated through a framework of more precise 
standards and targets.  
The table on the next page describes the dominant themes within each phase and the 
technologies and evaluative principles that gradually enrolled agreement. Within each phase 
certain technologies played a key role in mediating agreement towards standards of conduct 
and new evaluative principles. However, at the end of each phase major tensions became 
controversies challenging the existing “order”, leading to the modification of calculable spaces 
to enable progress. Progress reflected patterns of development, with settled periods followed 
by disruption and controversy which triggered the need for further modifications to settle 
tensions. Overall the table describes a gradual pattern of emergent learning, with calculative 
technologies adapting to settle tensions and enabling the programme to progress and pass 
through the different phases. An important observation is that there was a persistent trade-off 
between discovery and lock-in which created a dynamic control environment.  
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  Table 5.3 Terminal 5 Phases of Control  
 
Dates Phases of Control Key Technologies Enrolment Controversies 
1999-
2001 
“Client Holds the Risk”    
1.The contract, T5 Agreement enrolled 
teams into a lean partnering 
arrangement accepting a common 
identity and agreeing to search for 
exceptional performance.  
2.The client held the risk to settle 
uncertainty & encourage discovery 
 
 
1.The Handbook; described a 
normative framework of values 
for more transparent knowledge 
sharing.  
2.STORM ascribed “Active risk 
management” to encourage 
heedfulness and acceptance of 
responsibility to manage-out risk  
 
1. Incentives: remove supplier’s 
commercial risk, distribute rewards 
through milestone & value incentives.  
2. Territorialized accountability: 
enabling adaptive search for “better 
value”. 
3. Change control: to interrogate 
trade-offs between regulation and 
discovery 
 
Needed more oversight of “right” 
behaviours to;  
1.Prevent inertia and lock-in  
2.Develop robust forecasts to 
capture progress and emergence  
3.Stop teams hiding contingencies 
in safe forecasts  
2002-
2003 
“One Version of the Truth” 
1.Capability to create realistic plans 
gradually developed through monthly 
reporting forums holding the teams to 
account in explaining the “numbers”.  
2.Reporting technologies evolved 
shaping diagnostic practices which 
converged in a single more robust 
forecast.  
 
1.Monthly narratives, standards 
and targets set parameters for 
freedom through:  
a. Integrated CPIs/SPIs which 
captured progress to assess 
underperformance risks.  
b. Stringent change processes to 
justify transfers to/from budget. 
   
 
1.Mobilising teams required an 
evaluative framework to emphasise 
“realistic” planning, sharing good/ bad 
news (rather than building 
contingencies).  
2.Infrastructure emerged through 
standardised and structured reviews 
 
1.If success is only viewed through 
short-term savings to budget, then 
wider exploration may be avoided.  
2.How do you sustain inquiry and 
novel forms of worth rather than 
lock-in? 
2004-
2005 
“Foresight” 
1.Emphasis on having more visible 
foresight to anticipate risks. Rather 
than directing suppliers this phase was 
characterised by progressive debates 
about alternatives and “doing the right 
things right”  
2.Developed a devolved risk 
citizenship model to capture local 
opportunities  
 
1.IBR provided a critical space to 
assess the overall performance 
risk.  
2.TCM captured performance 
gaps in to specific plans and KPIs. 
TCM reports mobilised active 
risk management 
3. Risk registers broadened 
search to consider more distant 
risks.  
 
 
1.Accountability for risk devolved to 
teams within precise parameters.  
2. Tighter control embodied clearer 
conceptions of efficiency reflecting a 
more constrained appetite for risk.  
3. Teams empowered to explore 
opportunities  
 
1.As the composition of the 
programme changed and new 
suppliers were enrolled; “How” do 
you sustain and drive lasting and 
progressive improvement?  
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5.5.1 Phase 1 – Client holds the risk (1999-2001)  
Teams were procured through the T5 agreement to accept lean partnering principles and a 
common identify. The reimbursement of costs was intended to settle payment concerns about 
how work package claims would be treated. Teams were encouraged to accept greater 
transparency and a heedful approach by “actively working interfaces” and subordinating 
individual concerns for the common good of the programme. The pledge of value-based rewards 
was intended to encourage teams to seek superior solutions for the mutual benefit of the 
programme. Change control procedures and the completion allowance provided the 
foundations for the control methodology. However, the reporting infrastructure was in its 
infancy and tensions developed about how risk would be monitored, assigned and evaluated. 
Cost reimbursement provided a strong incentive to avoid uncertainty and lock into the initial 
scope and enjoy the guaranteed margin. To sustain the iterative learning approach described as 
“active risk management” teams were required to accept fluid scope and adaptive planning 
rather than a lock into existing plans. Although teams had participated in early stage plans there 
was a tendency towards “safe” numbers, creating buffers and contingencies to hide minor over-
runs. Although the Handbook ascribed partnering and lean principles, teams needed to develop 
a willingness and capability to produce realistic forecasts.  
5.5.2 Phase 2 – One Version of the Truth (2002-2003) 
A consistent methodology for more robust forecasts were gradually developed. Structured 
reviews created an evaluative order where teams were routinely engaged in justifying their 
comparative performance. Earned value principles were powerful concepts which travelled 
across the programme mobilising a performance dialogue to explore strategies to mitigate 
productivity shortfalls. Structured monthly routines provided a framework to monitor progress.  
Teams were given the freedom to interpret their results and develop their own action plans to 
mitigate possible risks. Over time teams became more willing to share knowledge in the 
development of robust forecasts. However, at the end of this phase the threat of major overruns 
forced a re-think of existing plans. The current control infrastructure encouraged predictability 
rather than abductive inquiry. By the end of 2003 there was a need for change and a new 
architecture of technologies to rapidly mobilise re-planning and a broader search for novel 
solutions to generate significant savings.  
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5.5.3 Phase 3 - Foresight (2004-2005) 
Within the TCM programme a suite of technologies were developed to mobilise ownership of 
the new accelerated plans. Enrolment involved an initial period of negotiation to agree new 
responsibilities. Once targets were set, technologies were developed which precisely defined 
efficiency and acceptable levels of variability in performance. TCM reintroduced lean thinking 
concepts passing ownership to the teams to develop detailed plans. Principles of active risk 
management were translated into specific commitments to deliver new opportunities, savings 
and productivity improvements. Reports were developed to monitor tangible improvements in 
opportunity conversion and risk mitigation. Trade-offs between improved productivity, safety 
and quality were scrutinised to ensure balanced growth. TCM was considered a vehicle for a 
“step change” by clearly articulating new performance expectations but also creating an 
environment for risk “citizenship”. A sophisticated infrastructure of technologies provided 
oversight of devolved activities. By the end of phase 3, a more precise appetite for risk was 
clearly articulated and active risk management principles were embodied in project level plans. 
In 2006 a BAA project report 74was commissioned which recognised how TCM was a significant 
catalyst for change because it enabled the reassignment of accountabilities to match risks with 
team capabilities. The calculative infrastructure underpinning TCM played a fundamental role in 
developing heedfulness by quantifying and assigning opportunities and risks whilst creating 
calculable spaces to enrol teams into accepting accountability 
5.5.4 Synthesis  
Within each phase, progress was sustained by adapting mediating technologies to enable 
progress. This adaptation reflected an appetite for risk which underpinned the controversies 
and tensions at the time. In phase 1, the lean partnership model required teams to recognise 
the benefits of collaboration and accept responsibility for managing-out risk. At this stage 
ambiguity in who would be held to account for fluid plans created friction and tensions. By phase 
2, monthly rituals and reports improved the diagnostic capabilities of teams working to 
collectively evaluate progress. Earned value management and a focus on exceptions and 
variances enabled the development of more realistic reporting. The calculative infrastructure 
rewarded “predictability” by scrutinising change control processes and analysing trends to 
reduce surprises. However, from 2004 the infrastructure of reports to support TCM devolved 
accountability for risk, quantified and captured in precise targets and standards. By this final 
                                                          
74 A Step Change: the T5 Case Study from the BAA 
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phase, aspirations of “foresight” were enabled by teams agreeing to be held to account against 
a more rigorous framework of standards and targets. However, this acceptance was gradual and 
the machinations of testing and contesting gradually developed an infrastructure capable of 
steering the programme towards performance improvement.  
5.6 How Did T5 learn to Govern Through Numbers?  
In the last chapter, the dissonant setting for construction was discussed in some depth. Egan’s 
lean thinking model emphasised eliminating waste by synchronising supply and steering 
performance towards an agreed conception of value and purpose. However, for many major 
projects, weakened supply networks and an aversion to change had frustrated progress. The 
findings in this chapter describe the careful orchestration of an infrastructure to govern 
performance improvement. Governing conduct required an adaptive framework of control to 
administer reimbursable claims and distribute gain-sharing incentives whilst providing an 
architecture of reports to track progress. However, on T5 the calculative infrastructure played a 
more fundamental role in shaping emergent learning and capturing agreement through 
collective evaluation. Tracing the evolution of calculative technologies over the delivery cycle 
has highlighted how key technologies enrolled agreement towards a shared conception of 
evaluative purpose. In the early phases, ascribed lean principles remained vague and 
ambiguous. The development of a robust reporting architecture settled tensions about 
accountability for risk with the monthly rituals shaping more predictable forecasts. By the final 
stage, acceptance of new territories of accountability and risk citizenship was supported by a 
sophisticated infrastructure that embodied learning from earlier phases. The machinations of 
testing and contesting were part of the development of the infrastructure to govern 
performance improvement.  
These findings contribute to the T5 literature by highlighting the composition of a calculative 
infrastructure that enabled performance improvement. The “system integrator” literature 
emphasises the leadership of the client on T5 as an integrator overseeing component knowledge 
transfer within and between integrated teams (Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2011; 
2014). In this literature, superior levels of learning and knowledge sharing are linked to the 
incentive structures and particularly the cost-plus arrangement underpinning cost 
reimbursement. Emphasis is placed on moving away from the usual risk dumping observed in 
fixed price agreements.  Guaranteed costs were portrayed as a way of settling concerns so that 
teams could focus on generating additional bonuses from the gain-sharing arrangement. 
However, the T5 findings reveal that the reimbursable agreement alone did not remove 
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uncertainty. Instead, the fluid nature of scope created blurred territories of accountability which 
triggered intense debates about evaluating change. A complex calculative infrastructure was 
developed to manage risk contingencies, scope changes and design development. Client 
oversight was supported by a sophisticated suite of reporting rituals, forums, standards and 
targets to gradually enrol the acceptance of lean. This created a calculative infrastructure that 
adapted to balance persistent tensions between discovery and lock-in. The reimbursable 
arrangement was just a part of this wider calculative infrastructure.   
Gil 2009, Gil et al 2012 and the Nightingale and Brady 2011 papers recognise the social 
complexity of control and the existence of contested situations challenging plans and incentives. 
These papers elaborated on how tensions were stabilised by modifying the evaluative principles 
built into incentives and plans. Nightingale and Brady’s 2011 work highlights that flexible 
planning created a “scaffolding” to coordinate and shape diverse behaviours. Plans became 
mediatory instruments to support collective deliberation whilst capturing learning within more 
realistic assumptions. These papers highlight a role for calculative technologies in balancing 
divergent perspectives and settling unstable and contested periods. Although they observe 
reflexive learning through calculative technologies, there is little description of “how” or 
“when”. The T5 findings fill this gap by describing the changing composition of technologies and 
the controversies and tensions that shaped modifications over the different phases of control. 
Although plans and incentives were adapted, the new targets and accountabilities underpinning 
this adaptation created tensions. These tensions were settled “through” calculable spaces; the 
monthly reviews, the IBR and the TCM architecture. An important finding is that incentives and 
plans were part of a wider infrastructure that shaped an appetite for risk as the programme 
progressed over the delivery cycle. An infrastructure that gradually evolved to enable risk 
citizenship.  
5.7 Concluding Thoughts  
Much of the existing T5 literature describes in detail the initial design of the commercial 
arrangements on T5. Although control outcomes are discussed there is little detail of the 
development of the control architecture that enabled delivery. By adopting a process approach 
this chapter has detailed the gradual enrolment of teams into a complex control model that 
enabled emergent learning. Rather than implementing active risk management from day one, 
the findings observe a gradually devolution of accountability which enabled the BAA to 
distribute performance shortfalls through a suite of new targets and standards. Echoing 
Wolstenholme’s 2009 advice, risk was placed with those most capable, however, this was only 
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possible because of the complex and adaptive infrastructure of calculable spaces and 
technologies. The TCM programme created an intelligent system of control that enabled “action 
at distance”. This point is important because as T5 opened in 2008 formative decisions were 
made for T2 that reflected the later stage control approach on T5. Many of the technologies 
developed during the construction of Terminal 5 were adopted on T2. 75These points are 
examined in the next chapter.  
Finally, the T5 case reveals an innovative response to major business risks and uncertainties. 
Rather than removing performance deviations, the T5 approach treated contested situations as 
an opportunity for critical inquiry and emergent learning. However, its success required careful 
management of tensions to sustain progress. These findings highlight the complex and unstable 
nature of sustaining control within a construction project. Social integration and the enrolment 
of a shared sense of meaning was shaped by modifying calculative technologies. Making teams 
“governable” emerged over time by redefining calculable spaces and re-assigning 
accountabilities. The development of “risk citizens” involved a gradual enrolment within each 
control phase. This chapter has developed a picture of the evaluative principles and procedures 
underpinning the acceptance of the performance improvement model. Enrolment within each 
phase involved agreement by modifying evaluative priorities. The gradual shaping of 
institutional subjects, or “subjectivization” within and across the different control phases is 
considered in more depth in the later discussion chapter 7. The next chapter returns to the 
construction of Terminal 2 and the move away from partnering and collective evaluation to clear 
lines of accountability and a foresight model that attempted to govern “by” the numbers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75 The IBRs, earned value management and a structured monthly timetable 
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     Chapter 6 
Intelligent Foresight in Terminal 2 
 
“When roles are confused or blurred, then chaos, disputes, ill will and frustration follow and 
just as in a football game, the whole team goes down in the flames of defeat. It is the contract 
not alliances, that make good team mates”            
         (Morgan, 2009, p2) 
6.1 Introduction  
The economic setting for Terminal 2 was marked by the downturn in construction, which created 
difficult conditions and an increased insolvency risk amongst suppliers (CS2025; CE, 2009). The 
opening quote from the Capital Director overseeing T2 reflected a desire for more clarity in 
responsibilities defined by contract. This was a commercial response to a weakened supply 
network, echoing Wolstenholme’s 2009 recommendation that to settle financial concerns, 
accountability for value and risk should be more clearly articulated. In chapter 4 the quote from 
T2 that “Good Fences Make Good Neighbours” (Morgan, 2009, p2) reflected a belief that clearly 
assigned roles and responsibilities defined “up front” in the contract would settle tensions and 
encourage team work. This chapter examines these themes by elaborating on the dynamic 
control framework which adapted to support these more bounded territories of accountability. 
In turn, it considers the phases of control and the nature of enrolment and controversy that 
resulted in adaptation despite the initial rigid governance design.  
The £2.5bn construction of Terminal 2 (T2) was known as “Britain’s New Front Door” because it 
extended the domestic flight capacity from Heathrow from 2 to 20m passengers. The 
construction involved an 180,000m2 terminal building (T2A), a multi storey car park and a 
satellite pier (T2B) on the Eastern Campus of Heathrow. The planning lead-time for Terminal 2 
was short. The terminal only became part of Heathrow’s strategic master plan in 2007 and within 
a year the CBIs; HETCo and Siemens were appointed. HETCo was a joint venture between Laing 
O’Rourke and Ferrovial Agroman commissioned to design and construct the T2A terminal 
building. Siemens was the primary integrator for the Eastern Campus Baggage Programme with 
oversight of various IT service providers; Cap Gemini, Atkins RI, Fujitsu, Tyco CCTV and 
Schneider. The construction of T2A started in June 2010. 
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The timeline below describes some of the key features of the governance approach for T2 
starting with the acquisition of Heathrow by the Ferrovial Group in 200676.  
 
Figure 6.1: The Terminal 2 Timeline of Key Events 
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                    Construction 2010-2014         
       
 
The performance management approach transferred many of the features from T5 with a 
timetable of monthly performance meetings to monitor progress over the delivery cycle.  
“Heathrow had to act fast and move quickly. So, it moved its contracting model on. It didn’t want 
to take all of that same level of risk. A lot of the upfront work that we’d done in the design and 
development on T5 and Heathrow said very quickly so we can do a bit of the same on T2”  
        (Industry Executive, 2015) 
Although some of the features of controls architecture were transferred from T5, the way in 
which reviews were conducted reflected a preference for precision and auditability. The 
governance model was underpinned by clearly defined contractual responsibilities and an 
intelligent control system to hold the supply chain to account against baseline commitments. A 
timetable of Integrated Baseline Reviews provided a structured framework to formally review 
performance.  
                                                          
76 By 2012 the BAA was renamed Heathrow Airport Holdings Limited known in the interviews as “HAL”    
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127 
 
 
6.2 Governance Framework   
A framework of duties was developed to oversee the execution of contractual obligations with 
functions broken down into contract management, service delivery, commercial management 
and control.  
6.2.1 Church and State 
The contracting officer, informally known as the “church and state”, held oversight responsibility 
for the administration of the contract. The importance of this function reflected the traditional 
approach to contract administration where litigious disputes required swift resolution. Contract 
management also facilitated disciplinary processes to sanction acceptable forms of contractual 
change. The emphasis here was on the diligent management of change to assure the 
administration of scope.   
6.2.2 Service Delivery and Intelligent Conscience  
The Heathrow (HAL) service delivery team leaders were known as the “Programme Directors.” 
They held oversight responsibility for project management whilst liaising with the CBI project 
managers. Programme Directors met on a monthly basis with the rest of the programme 
leadership group to evaluate, interrogate and agree next steps from the monthly performance 
reviews. The commercial team or “intelligent conscience” played a critical role in balancing 
commercial tensions by developing commercial solutions with the CBI.  
6.2.3 Controls  
An “intelligent” performance management framework was developed to provide lateral and 
vertical data to support decision making across the programme. The model of governance was 
described as:  
“a thinner organisation at the top informed by great data which came from the project; with a 
controlled environment of value management feeding up into their leadership so that they could 
make smart decisions” (Controller 2014)  
The intelligent client system monitored progress using an earned value management 
methodology to monitor cost and schedule progress against the baseline. However, in the early 
stages of the programme, the scope changed with engineering and design modifications to the 
baggage system, carpark and rail link. A rigorous framework of change controls procedures was 
developed to ensure that accountabilities remained clearly defined.  
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6.3 Dynamic Control Framework 
The reporting system consolidated detailed work package data from the 2nd tier suppliers. 
Control account structures coded the work packages and assigned accountability to specific CBI 
project managers. Work breakdown structures enabled a detailed level of analysis culminating 
in an overview of the programme schedule. An open-book approach was important to enable 
the control teams to test the integrity of the schedule assumptions regarding tasks, task 
durations, handover points and interfaces between suppliers. This supported modelling of 
alternative configurations when changes and improvements re-framed the scheduled plan. This 
degree of openness and granularity was intended to support detailed diagnostic inquiry to test 
weaknesses within the schedule. Emphasising the importance of robust data was intended to 
deter “safe” forecasts and contingency building. Scrutiny of the data through sophisticated risk 
modelling played a key role in assuring the integrity of the data. Managing the risk reserves was 
part of the financial engineering of the programme and provisions and their corresponding cost 
impact sat in a centrally controlled fund.  
6.3.1 Risk Drawdowns 
The process of making a reserve was known as a “risk drawdown” requiring a dialogue and sign-
off to authorise transfers from the budget into the risk reserve. At a programme-level the 
cumulative value of risk formally accounted for was reported as a “waterfall”, which reflected 
the total level of “risk-funded” change accepted and provided for across the programme. 
Waterfall charts formed the basis of the monthly dialogue that assessed the current year to date 
performance and offsetting opportunities from recovery plans. Over the life of the programme 
the cumulative waterfall 77decreased, as offsetting opportunities were created to mitigate the 
effect of old risk drawdowns. As a visualisation, the waterfall chart played an important role in 
guiding a focused dialogue about next steps to recover drawdowns. 
6.3.2 Float78 
Sophisticated planning techniques were developed to interrogate and test the schedule for 
opportunities to save time. An innovative technique called a “shock absorber” was developed 
to mitigate the effect of delays on the critical path by strategically creating additional time and 
funds to absorb delays. Shock absorbers were also used to de-stress schedule “hot-spots” where 
interdependencies might amplify the effect of delays at points in the future schedule. Float 
                                                          
77 Hence the name “waterfall” because the chart plotted a reduction in reserves over time  
78 Float represented a time provision to create slack in the schedule (PMBOK 2015) 
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creation techniques facilitated more adaptable planning as a form of “time-pacing” within the 
schedule to reconfigure the intensity and direction of efforts (Dougherty, 2016). From a client 
perspective, shock absorbers were a cost-efficient way of resolving issues before risks 
materialised into significant delays, possible claims and disputes. Floats and reserves were 
managed to mitigate risks but they also changed the parameters of accountability, shielding 
contractors from the “pain” of underperformance. Balancing the need to protect the overall 
programme whilst ensuring that suppliers were held to account was part of the complexity of 
managing risk.    
6.3.3 Risk Exposure  
Quantitative schedule risk analysis (QSRA) was used to statistically test the parameters of 
variation embedded within the schedule. Schedule risks were quantified by modelling the 
network of tasks and their interrelationships which informed an analysis of the probability 
distribution of durations. Outputs of this analysis were “P80” (80% percentile) or “P50” (50% 
percentile) reports generated from a distribution of estimated completion dates. This was 
accompanied by a quantitative cost risk analysis (QCRA) where a probability distribution was 
applied to model cost variations and P50 and P80 reports could model expected variations in 
the work breakdown scope. Typically, the P50 was used to calculate the median risk value for 
the whole programme at completion. The analysis could also be used to audit and test the logic 
of the critical path whilst assessing relative risks, potential alternatives and impact. As the 
programme progressed, more sophisticated risk exposure techniques were developed. They 
enabled more precise forms of interrogation and what-if analysis to explore alternative plans 
and milestone configurations. Many of these activities took place centrally to support 
discussions between HAL and the control team, and occasionally to help HAL and the CBIs to 
negotiate reserve levels:  
“So, quantitative cost risk analysis…. We had a P 50 risk level at £32 million, for example, and we 
were holding £30m. So, actually we could use that because we are not holding too much risk 
centrally and so let’s look at what’s been happening with our drawdown on this going forwards 
as well. So, let’s bank that to defend our position.” (T2 Controller, 2015)  
This quote describes how the P50 would result in a £32m variation in baseline cost. However, 
possible reserves for £30m had already been notionally set aside leaving only a £2m exposure. 
The QCRA analysis legitimised the £30m risk drawdown, building confidence that it could be 
“banked” and placed within the central programme-level reserve. This quote demonstrates the 
linkage between risk exposure, the creation of provisions and contingent drawdowns. This link 
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provided a basis to plan mitigating actions such as floats and shock absorbers to minimise the 
financial impact of uncertainty.  
The robustness of risk forecasting and modelling technologies depended on how risks were 
defined, perceived and communicated. Although benchmarking and risk modelling could test 
the underlying principles and variability of assumptions, ultimately a robust definition of scope 
was essential to create a realistic plan:  
“Let’s look at how well you have defined scope, because if you can’t don’t define your scope - I 
can’t give you a good cost plan and I can’t give you a good schedule and I certainly can’t manage 
your risks; because all of those things all stem from here. And if that’s flawed - then we don’t 
move on in a very constructive way.”    (Programme Controls, 2015) 
Risk identification, evaluation and plans to mitigate uncertainties were driven by a scheduling 
“logic” and specific phasing, durations and interdependencies. Uncertainties became quantified 
and recognised when events fell outside the parameters of the scope. However, scope 
assumptions and the phasing of the schedule came from the 2nd tier plans. Aspirations of 
intelligent foresight from sophisticated risk modelling required some forecasting capability. 
Temporal risks could easily arise out of oversimplified phasing and timing assumptions. The 
calculative infrastructure emphasised disciplinary control, scrutinising the integrity of the data, 
and holding suppliers to account against closely defined responsibilities. However, providing an 
accurate forecast also required a form of moral constraint (Power, 2007) whereby 2nd tier 
suppliers were willing to openly share accurate forecasting data. Although the client and CBI 
shared accountability for delivering outcomes, there was little incentive for the wider supply 
network to proactively manage the schedule or flag opportunities for change.  
6.4 Building a Sense of Common Purpose?  
Safety and incentives were two key areas developed to enrol suppliers into agreeing evaluative 
priorities. These areas were linked because a large part of the “discretionary” award fee was 
used to incentivise safety innovations. A sophisticated reward structure was developed to 
incentivise acceptable forms of conduct.  
6.4.1 Rewards and the “Right” Kind of Bribe  
The award fee structure was described as the “right” kind of bribe (Morgan, 2009, p1) because 
it was designed to shape the CBIs’ attention towards an order of priorities co-defined with the 
client. The use of award fees was viewed as a way of shaping standards of conduct by rewarding 
conformance to predetermined targets.  
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The incentive structures were divided into 3 parts:   
• Temporal milestone incentives linked to the programme schedule 
• KPI-based award     
• A discretionary “award” fee to be negotiated.  
For the discretionary award, self-assessment was a key part of the negotiation and deliberation 
process to agree an order of priorities. Evaluation and the final judgement of performance sat 
with HAL and in some cases award fees were held back. Incentives were used as “carrots and 
sticks” for disciplinary control “over” the CBIs:  
“More effective carrots and sticks need to be used. Contractors should not just be wagering their 
fee, they need to feel some real pain if they lose control over cost” (Morgan, 2009, p2)  
The three different categories of incentives are detailed below:  
Milestones  Incentives for the achievement of key milestone dates  
 
KPI Awards Performance Tracking based on indicators for: 
1. Safety, SPI and Quality  
2. Commercial Indicators (actual costs vs forecast, reduction in 
EAC79) 
3. Change instructions answered within period, time to raise a 
EWN80 
 
Discretionary 
Award 
Negotiated award for the CBI to demonstrate exceptional 
performance in various agreed priority areas  
 
Table 6.1 Categories of Incentives on T2 
Milestone incentives created temporal targets to bring together organisational plans and 
interests into a narrowly defined set of deliverables. These incentives focused on outcomes 
associated with key completion dates within the schedule. Monitoring progress towards these 
lead indicators created a tangible incentive for reliability in meeting deadlines. Key Performance 
Indicator (KPI) awards monitored specific targets for Quality, Safety, SPI performance and 
commercial delivery. KPI success was defined by precise standards, such as the number of injury 
free hours for safety. The mix and relative standards evaluated through these indicators were 
periodically reviewed. The “commercial indicators” rewarded predictability in forecasting by 
closely monitoring cost savings whilst tracking the reduction in the estimate at completion (EAC) 
                                                          
79 EAC is “estimate at completion” 
80 EWN is a “early warning notice” to highlight potential delays in the schedule that may become risks  
132 
 
 
over time. Potential trade-offs between cost cutting and retaining scope commitments were 
balanced by tracking change requests drivers and the speed of resolution in authorising change 
to the committed baseline plans.  
Discretionary rewards were intended to shape the “right” behaviour towards Heathrow’s 
espoused core values of integrity, respect, listening, passion, honesty, discipline and 
collaboration. A new basis for the discretionary fee was agreed every 6 months to reflected the 
programme’s appetite for control and preferred strategic imperatives. To achieve the 
discretionary award fee the contractor presented evidence to the “Fee Determining Officer” to 
justify how performance demonstrated the criteria for assessment. A self-assessment ranking 
drove a verification process where the intentionally subjective measures forced a fuller dialogue 
to negotiate and defend discretionary claims. The nature of discretionary measures and 
assessment criteria was adapted as the programme progressed. This enabled incentives to 
shape attention towards different evaluative priorities and “drive different behaviours”.  
The incentive structures were designed to shape attention towards a quantified conception of 
success. Milestone incentives were designed to focus attention on significant strategic points 
within the delivery cycle to sustain progress. KPI rewards shaped parameters of choice by 
articulating acceptable standards in safety, quality and progress in completion. The discretionary 
fee was designed to enrol agreement towards a shared conception of success which evolved to 
match the needs of the programme. However, over time a large part of the discretionary fee 
was awarded for safety initiatives, safety innovations and examples of collaboration linked to 
safety excellence. This reflected the strategic importance placed on safety.  
6.4.2 Safety as a Common Core 
For much of the programme, safety excellence was the one key areas of common purpose. The 
importance of safety as a priority in construction is a common feature of large programmes. 
However, on T2 safety performance was considered “world-class” with an exceptional 5.5 
million RIDDOR hours 81reported. Awards for safety innovations were intended to encourage the 
CBI and suppliers to invest in a safety infrastructure. Several initiatives were developed to 
communicate the importance of safety with posters, storyboards, meetings and slogans “safe 
                                                          
81 RIDDOR hours are hours free of “Reported Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations” 
(HSE 2015) 
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and proud”. The sharing of safety ideas was encouraged and site meetings routinely started with 
a “safety moment” where suppliers shared learning and best practice with others. 
“The contractors were incentivised to continually innovate in safety. Heathrow drove an agenda 
from the leadership down through leadership tours, lots of visibility out-on-site, lots of 
behavioural safety training with the workforce.”  (Controller, 2015) 
An extensive reporting architecture was developed to monitor and reward awareness of safety 
and the mitigation of hazardous risks. The monthly performance reviews summarised trends in 
reportable incidents and time losing events. Oversight reporting was linked to more detailed 
analysis, which emphasised the need for sustained and continued improvement. Supplier league 
tables ranked performance whereby initiatives rated as “excellent” were rewarded through the 
discretionary award fees. Reinforcing the achievement of exceptional safety performance was a 
priority:  
“You can have a good safety culture and you generally get a good quality project. You know when 
you’re on a site and it’s nice and clean and tidy and everything’s orderly? You generally get good 
safety performance as a consequence of that and you also get a great quality outcome as well. 
It’s got to be one of the key focuses.” (Controller, 2015) 
Quality and safety were considered complementary principles focused on mitigating the risk of 
sub-standard practices and lateness by managing-out accidents and the need for rework. Wide 
participation in safety initiatives helped mobilise agreement and commitment across the 
programme. Safety provided a point of common purpose where sharing overlapping knowledge 
helped draw together competing interests in an agreed form of common evaluative purpose 
(Dougherty, 2016, Stark, 2009).  
6.4.3 Synthesis  
 The commercial and evaluative principles described so far emphasised clear territories of 
accountability. Incentives, risk exposure modelling and safety initiatives were designed to 
regulate performance towards acceptable standards of conduct. Emphasis was placed on audit 
and precision in delivering clearly defined responsibilities. The commercial team provided 
oversight by balancing commercial trade-offs with “intelligent conscience”, and incentive 
structures to encourage cost containment. Although sophisticated risk management techniques 
were developed to test the integrity of the data within the schedules, this data came from the 
2nd tier. Various incentives were developed to encourage the “right” behaviours, however, few 
included the 2nd tier. Instead performance management took place through a structured 
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schedule of cyclical performance reviews whereby reports acted as key calculative technologies 
to shape performance dialogues. These technologies evolved over time and their composition 
was modified to address new evaluative priorities that changed as performance issues emerged 
over the programme;  
“In effect, they (the reports) tell their own story. They go from quite broad brush; lots of project 
control type numbers and metrics into very visual towards the end; floor plates, a patchwork 
quilt. But there isn’t one that works throughout the whole life of the project and we certainly 
found that. We certainly found that we had to evolve.” (T2 Controller, 2014) 
 
The evolution of reports reflected progression within the programme. Priorities moved from 
initially testing the data at a broad programme-wide level to the tactical resolution of specific 
issues located on “zonal maps” within precise time frames on the critical path. This architecture 
of reports was studied over the lifecycle of the programme. The next section discusses the main 
technologies and spaces that steered the programme towards completion and the nature of 
progression between the control phases as tensions challenged the existing evaluative order.  
6.5 Phases of Control 
Throughout the programme the Integrated Baseline Reviews (IBRs) played a fundamental role 
in providing space for critical review and an evaluation of baseline commitments. The IBRs 
became the primary forum to sanction programme level change once an assessment of possible 
threats and alternative pathways had been considered. However, the nature of the focus 
evolved as the programme progressed.  
“If I talk about the first IBRs, we just talked about very, very high level of scope and numbers, 
“Have we got the right sort of budgets?” The next IBR, we all talked to our individual scope, to 
try and identify whether we had any scope gaps. By the following one, we were talking to 
control accounts. So, we were in a very formalised work breakdown structure and we had 
individuals owning each of those elements of the work breakdown structure”  
          (T2 Controller, 2014) 
The early IBRs focused on establishing a robust programme-level baseline forecast. Initially in 
2009, IBRs were concerned with building a realistic schedule by testing for gaps in the scope 
whilst identifying weaknesses and possible hot-spots.  By the winter of 2010 the IBR 7 focused 
on checking the integrity of the schedule and running risk models to test the effect of alternative 
plans on the delivery of milestone targets. By the spring of 2012 a thorough review of cost and 
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schedule plans redefined key project interfaces with a new set of milestones, risk allowances 
and mitigation strategies. This led to revised baselines for both HETCo and Siemens. The 
following IBR 9 was more delivery focused with intense debates about how to achieve the new 
delivery targets. The IBRs created a calculable space for strategic oversight where issues that 
emerged in the CBIs performance reviews became visible. However, resolution required an 
environment and calculative infrastructure that encouraged suppliers to pass news up through 
the project organisation. The following sections consider the evolution and emergence of this 
infrastructure.  
6.5.1 Single Version of the Truth (2010-2011) 
The development of a single and robust baseline was important to sustain a belief in the data as 
“kingpin” to be used with authority to sanction and evaluate progress and success. In this initial 
phase integrity tests focused on building confidence in the assumptions underpinning the 
baseline to assure a “single version of the truth”. Unfortunately, the gain-pain sharing 
agreement created an incentive for the CBIs to inflate the initial baseline forecasts. To add to 
this tension the traditional way the 2nd tier was procured82 created a tendency towards lock-in 
and resistance to changes to the initial baseline. To counter this, initial plans were scrutinised 
and tested. Although risk modelling helped to test the baseline integrity, a performance dialogue 
was also necessary and a structured reporting framework was developed.  
6.5.1.1 Monthly Performance Reports (MPR) 
The MPR provided a structured space to test, interrogate and get under the “skin of the data” 
and agree next steps. Gradually reports were modified and refined;  
“for a while we were very data intensive with lots of different bits of information at different 
points in the month and we needed to say stop. You will get it once a month and it will be one 
version of the truth. Once we did that, it was fine. We could then actually start looking forward 
rather than constantly facing this challenge of checking the data integrity” (Controller, 2015) 
In early 2010, an initial period of testing and contesting was necessary to build confidence in the 
control data. Once this period of client scrutiny stabilised, a standardised report was developed. 
Monthly rituals evolved over time to interrogate and develop a consistent “single” version of 
the truth. Being held to account by the data involved an intense and formal discussion focused 
on progress. The HAL Delivery Directors were expected to demonstrate the capability to answer 
                                                          
82 In many cases through fixed price arrangements 
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in-depth questions and respond with coherent and acceptable explanations. The development 
of the MPR reports enabled a more sophisticated discussion amongst the client teams focused 
on safety and quality standards, progress and potential risks exposure. The report contents are 
described below in table 6.2.  
Sections  Contents  Comments 
Overview section 
 
 
Health and Safety – monthly reportable 
and lost time injuries trends  
Cost Performance index (CPI) and 
Schedule Performance Index (SPI), 
Milestone target vs forecast date 
CPI and SPI targets vs actuals, % 
achieved in quality KPIs, Trends in 
Estimate at completion and the original 
“budget” at completion per month 
Monitoring of conformance to 
standards, possible risks and hazards. 
CPI/SPI indicated the direction and 
size of progress in productivity and 
the need for recovery strategies.  
Focus on KPI exceptions for 
investigation that could affect the 
cost at completion and schedule 
progress. 
Risk, Opportunities and 
Earned Value  
Charts with trends: Waterfall by month 
forecast and actuals, opportunity versus 
risk values  
 
CPI, SPI data by control account per 
month and on a cumulative basis   
Reserve management analysis 
focused on oversight planning and 
the creation of opportunities to 
mitigate risk reserves.  
CPI/SPI trends by control account 
gave an indication of persistent 
lateness and possible overruns 
Schedule and Logistics 
Overview  
Delivery forecasts and manpower trends, 
tables of milestone dates  
Progress in productivity was tracked 
to highlight possible obstacles and 
delays requiring resolution.  
Quality statistics  
  
Overdue items, number of compliant 
items, requests for resolution. Inspection 
and testing plans samples, non-
conformance issues to resolve 
Table of significant quality issues, 
impact, progress and accountable 
person and close out date 
Conformance to standards gave an 
indicator of waste, rework and cost 
inefficiencies. Logging issues created 
visibility of shortfalls and ownership 
for non-compliance.  
Table 6.2 Monthly Management Report on T2 
The report opened with an overview of safety measures tracking performance compared to 
standards and targets. Safety was a key part of driving schedule and cost improvements by 
mitigating hazards, delays and potential claims. The safety section of the monthly report 
detailed key leadership activities and the metrics to track performance improvements. The 
monthly review provided a forum to showcase safety successes which tied closely to KPI and 
discretionary award fees offered to the CBI.  The remainder of the report’s first section provided 
an overview of KPIs and critical concerns. Earned value analysis compared monthly and 
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cumulative SPI 83(schedule performance index) and CPI (cost performance index) trends to 
identify productivity issues or cost over-runs. This enabled a discussion of cost recovery plans 
and possible delays and weaknesses in the schedule. This analysis could be linked to the latest 
forecast estimate at completion (EAC) and the original full year budget to demonstrate the 
combined financial effect of cost and schedule performance across the life of the programme. 
Quantitative schedule risk analysis supplemented this analysis by modelling a range of 
completion dates which indicated the likelihood and impact of delays on expected milestones. 
This enabled discussion to focus on mitigation strategies to avoid missing milestone targets.  
The second section integrated concepts of risk and opportunity management with the 
management of earned value. Combining risk analysis with the CPI/SPI created more precision 
in reserve management decisions, linking potential areas of underperformance with 
opportunities or efficiencies needed to mitigate shortfalls. The first chart tracked the overall 
value of known risks offset against opportunities for cost savings to show the net cumulative risk 
balance. The following chart displayed the anticipated cumulative “risk” balance over the 
programme life described as the “waterfall”. This could drive a discussion about persistent poor 
performance in the CPI and strategies to generate savings to mitigate cost overruns. It could also 
be used to reveal continually strong CPI performance (>1) where cost efficiencies could be 
reinvested to mitigate known future areas of weakness or risk “hot spots”. The integration of 
these concepts helped connect past performance to future forecasts with a precision that could 
enable more focused risk decisions.  
The last two sections of the report contained high-level analyses of schedule and quality metrics. 
The schedule section focused on tracking productivity, comparing trends in the delivery of 
“trigger” milestone dates, manpower rates and materials delivery data. Quality statistics 
focused on non-conformance to highlight areas of concern that could hinder progress because 
of the need for rework. This section focused on conformance and deviations from schedule 
which reflected the client’s oversight role and concern with removing delays and clearing “away 
obstacles” rather than proactively84 managing suppliers.  
The MPR enabled the client to take an integrated approach to the strategic management of 
value. Risk management technologies were combined with earned value analysis to drive 
decisions about pooling gains and using funds to mitigate future risks. This systematic analysis 
                                                          
83 If the SPI < 1 this indicated that work was taking longer than planned in the schedule. If the CPI < 1 
then actual costs were higher than budgeted for the work performed.  
84 Instead the CBI was responsible for the management of suppliers 
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supported oversight decisions and the central management of risk provisions. However, this 
dialogue took place at a client “programme-level” rather than engaging directly with suppliers. 
For suppliers, priorities focused on tracking SPI and CPI progress compared to the baseline whilst 
maintaining a robust record for safety excellence. Much of the performance management 
dialogue between the CBI and 2nd tier focused on managing the schedule to date and defending 
poor performance in any given month. However, as productivity started to persistently fall 
behind a new form of reporting was needed.  
6.5.2 The Dashboard (2012) 
By 2012 estimated delivery dates began to slip reflecting poor levels of productivity from the 
HETCo supply chain. A new one page “dashboard” was developed for the HAL leadership team 
to direct attention to mitigate further risks. The dashboard was used as a powerful visualisation 
to mediate a focused discussion. Its design is discussed in Quattrone’s 2017 paper “Embracing 
ambiguity in management controls and decision-making processes: On how to design data 
visualisations to prompt wise judgement”. This paper highlights how the T2A dashboard created 
a visual space for inquiry within a complex and ambiguous setting. The emphasis of the paper is 
on rhetoric and design whereby the dashboard acted as a visual space to balance judgement. 
Quattrone also describes how the dashboard played a generative role in settling trade-offs and 
tensions whilst inspiring creative inquiry.85 This paper focuses on the visual semiotics of the 
dashboard. However, this thesis is more concerned with the evaluative principles and situated 
context which shaped the dashboard’s use. At this point in the programme the appetite for risk 
reflected a concern for productivity and the possibility of delays. There was significant pressure 
to improve productivity and this was reflected in the performance dialogue.  The dashboard was 
developed to agree a strategic focus and steer the programme towards a recovery plan. There 
was a concern that the client delivery teams were working with excessive amounts of data and 
a more precise “message” was needed:   
“you can do a lot of things but just choose 3 things that are going to make the biggest impact, 
because if you make a big impact you tend to find the other things will follow through; but if 
you’re trying to move the amplifier on all of them, a bit actually, you might find you’re not getting 
any sort of tackiness around them” (Programme Controls, 2015)  
                                                          
85 The dashboard was associated with enabling and balancing “in-tensions”, “in-difference” and “in-
divisions” 
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The dashboard was used as a diagnostic tool to enable the leadership team to focus on balanced 
solutions and “big impact” decisions. Although retaining the safety record remained a priority, 
a recovery plan was also needed. The dashboard organised the key evaluative principles into a 
structured framework as a “one-pager” enabling concurrent visibility (Chenhall et al, 2013) of 
strategic priorities. The choice of measures represented HAL’s higher order principles by closely 
monitoring injuries and accidents and conformance to quality standards whilst delivering to the 
cost and schedule targets.  
“So, this dashboard was all around how do we get the pull? Where do we get the focus? And 
where do we focus the effort to get some more driver around all that?” (Controller, 2015)
  
The dashboard provided a space to agree “where do we focus the effort?”. The central 
quadrants described the outcome of year to date performance with the SPI and CPI measures 
displayed alongside accident frequency and quality data. Key risk measures were included with 
a focus on the current level of risk “pressure” which demonstrated how far existing provisions 
covered the expected value of risk. The “pull” came from interrogating the schedule data to 
highlight weaknesses and hotspots whilst developing strategies to mitigate performance 
shortfalls. The “focus” involved retaining high standards of safety and quality whilst managing 
the risk exposure implied by the estimate at completion. The dashboard is shown on the next 
page and on page 141 a framework is developed to explain the evaluative principles that 
underpinned its situated use. 
   Figure 6.2 The T2A Dashboard    Source: Adapted from Quattrone 2017, p599 
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The Principles of the Dashboard are summarised below in Figure 6.3:  
                           The T2A Dashboard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quadrant one: Schedule 
 
        *Based on the P50 
The diagram above describes the key evaluative principles used to shape discussion and 
agreement. The key safety/quality, cumulative (year to date) CPI and SPI metrics could be traced 
back into the framework of metrics replicated in the CBI monthly reports. This consistency 
enabled a drill down discussion to guide performance issues across the rest of the programme.  
  
    Schedule 
Key metrics: Baseline Budget, estimate at 
completion, Actual vs Budget for YTD 
work performed  
Trend “gap” btw budget and forecast at 
completion  
Pain/Gain = Target-Estimate at completion  
CPI Trends < 1= actual > budget for work 
Total £ cost variance  
 
Cumulative CPI 
     Overruns, savings and risk? 
 
 
 
   Cost  
Completion date for milestones  
Trends in float and criticality  
SPI Trends < 1= work performed < budget  
Trend to completion spend and days  
£ schedule variance  
 
 
Cumulative SPI  
Progress & Weaknesses?  
 
 
 Schedule 
 
Key Metrics: Cumulative “accident 
frequency rate” (AFR), Time losing injuries 
& quality conformance % 
Safety Trends by month lost time and 
reportable injuries  
Safety Pyramid of hrs, time lost and injuries 
Quality Conformance: assurance in building 
control issues raised and open, testing 
samples, non-conformance indicators 
Conformance to standards?  
 
 
 
Risk Pressure = Expected level* less YTD 
provision  
Quantitative Cost Risk Analysis values 
(QCRA)  
Change Pipeline value  
Top risks breakdown by sub-project  
Trends in P50 exposure vs provision 
Change Order Tracking 
Appetite for control? 
  SPI   CPI  
 AFR, 
quality % 
Pressure & 
Change 
Safety/Quality    Risk  
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6.5.2.1 Quality and Safety 
Compliance checking and performance monitoring played a key role in sustaining low accident 
frequency rates and acceptable quality outcomes. The safety quadrant focused on monitoring 
hazards and accidents to highlight trends based on the man hour activity in the month. 
Monitoring quality and assurance activities indicated conformance to acceptable standards 
whilst detailing potential weaknesses that could cause delays and waste.  
6.5.2.2 Schedule 
The “pull” in the programme came from the schedule and this quadrant focused on productivity 
trends captured within SPI indicators. Trending data highlighted dips in performance and 
exceptions in any month. The “schedule variance” compared the difference between work 
performed and budgeted work valued at the budgeted cost. The variance was then broken down 
between HETCo and Siemens to assign accountability for performance shortfalls. To link 
schedule performance to possible future delays the report analysed “criticality” and “float” 
trends. The monthly critical % measured the % of activities on the critical path in any month. 
This indicated weaknesses which could delay the critical path. The “float” chart reported the 
time set aside to offset poor schedule performance. Combining float and criticality concepts 
together enabled a discussion about the need to engineer buffers to offset possible future risks.  
6.5.2.3 Cost  
The discussion focused on CPI trends and the effect that performance to date could have on the 
latest estimate at completion. Key metrics included the total “baseline” and the latest estimate 
at completion. The pain/gain calculation demonstrated the difference between the baseline 
“target” and the latest estimate at completion broken down between Siemens and HETCo. This 
analysis refocused discussion on the overall degree of control to date and the effect this might 
have on the baseline commitments. The total year to date “cost variance” was derived by 
comparing the “actual cost of work performed” and the budget for this work. Graphs of monthly 
CPI trends described progress, dips and persistent overruns over time. This analysis could guide 
a discussion of recovery strategies to mitigate persistent overruns or strategies to reuse year to 
date savings.  
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6.5.2.4 Risk 
Sophisticated risk modelling enabled an integrated discussion about risks pressure influencing 
the delivery of milestones and possible ‘hot spots’ and weaknesses requiring mitigating action. 
The “risk” quadrant described the programme level exposure and expected estimates at 
completion based on the P50. Factors that could influence greater uncertainty and variability in 
expected costs to completion were modelled in the quantitative cost risk analysis. The monthly 
risk “pressure” value compared the difference between the risk provision and expected levels 
of exposure based on the P50. Greater exposure in the month created financial pressure that 
might require mitigation planning and additional provisions. A “top ten risk” breakdown focused 
discussion on specific issues, causes and strategies to manage risks whilst considering the 
expected and budgeted levels of risk money set aside. The final part of the risk discussion 
focused on specific pressures for change and change requests in the pipeline which could 
progress from early warnings to full entries within the risk register requiring more risk budget.  
The dashboard was intended to shape messages to take back to the CBI, thereby prompting a 
confident dialogue across the programme. As a diagnostic tool, it enabled an integrated 
discussion about the need to balance financial risks with operational outcomes and progress. 
Throughout 2012 much of the client-level debate focused on the need to drive up productivity 
and capture risks early enough to develop mitigation strategies. As the programme progressed, 
reserves were drawn down to absorb the effect of unanticipated delays and change variations. 
For the supply chain, priorities remained focused on delivering to the baseline schedule. 
Although earned value data was collected and measured monthly, it was generally used as proof 
of performance gains or shortfalls followed by detailed discussion of activities within the 
schedule. By March 2012 IBR 8 involved a full reassessment of “cost pressures” resulting in a 
reassignment of baseline targets. However, by the summer of 2012 there remained significant 
shortfalls in the delivery of critical activities. IBR 9 took place in the winter of 2012, marking the 
end of this period with a plan for rapid recovery called the “Programme for Success”.  
The dashboard and the MPR were key calculative technologies to mobilise an intelligent 
dialogue at the client level. Sophisticated risk methodologies helped drive a broader debate to 
explore, test and anticipate the effects of performance on delivery. However, at this point in the 
programme milestone dates had been pushed out from November 2013 to the following 
February. A new suite of calculative technologies was developed to rapidly recover the 
programme and engage with the 2nd tier.  
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 Then the dashboard became redundant:  
“So, it had its day, because we were suddenly in a lot more granular world of reporting. This 
couldn’t survive and it wasn’t adding any value. You don’t do things that are not adding value, 
there’s no point. But it absolutely added value at the time and shifted the focus from backward-
looking to forward-looking.”  (Controller, 2015) 
6.5.3 Golden Thread (2013-2014) 
This period was described as a “step change” on the programme where a “SPRINT” initiative 
created rapid turnaround plans. Until then there had been limited opportunity to engage 
directly with the 2nd tier in collective problem solving. The golden thread was described as a 
“top” to “bottom” control approach that linked the programme to local decision making:  
“So, we call it the golden thread, you start right at the baseline and say okay show me. Then 
down a level, down a level and down a level. The way the control structure works is that you 
need the same work breakdown structure that goes right down to the first, second, third tier and 
then builds its way back up. And it rolls up and up and up and right up into the client reporting 
system. So, you would test it right from the top. Follow it all the way through and almost to the 
point of; “show me on site?”  (Controller, 2014) 
Operationalising a “golden thread” required mediating spaces to enrol allied interests. By 2013 
milestone incentives were finally shared with the 2nd tier to co-incentivise suppliers to focus on 
strategic dates. Fortnightly meetings provided a space for collective deliberation where the 2nd 
tier leads met “on masse” with the CBI and control team to agree accelerated plans. Previously 
the 2nd tier had focused on schedules using reports such as maps and drop-line lists to talk 
through detailed plans and blockers preventing progress. There was a need to move from an 
unfocused list of activities:  
 “How do you look at a drop-line list and say whether it’s good, bad or indifferent in different 
geographies of the building.” (Controller, 2015) 
With approximately 9000 activities remaining to completion, interpreting the schedule by 
analysing each item in a “drop-down” list lacked focus. A suite of reports was developed to steer 
attention towards the critical path. What was “good, bad or indifferent” was defined by 
considering the impact activities could have on delivering critical activities linked to milestone 
targets. Over time, a recovery plan emerged through a reflexive process of reporting, evaluative 
dialogue and agreement of next steps.  
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6.5.3.1 Driving the Critical Path  
Reports were developed to steer the dialogue towards delivering the critical path. Discussion 
focused on identifying the “biggest bang for your buck” (Controller 2014) critical activities and 
possible hold-ups and delays around these activities. The fortnightly meetings provided a forum 
to discuss blockages and potential action to mitigate delays. Top ten critical supplier rankings 
helped to guide the discussion and assign accountability for performance to specific groups of 
suppliers. These activities created more visibility of accountability for progress. Critical path 
analysis was supplemented by earned value metrics to monitor SPI performance that had 
persistently underperformed. For example, at this stage of the programme there were 
significant issues linked to the door fit-out. Although a door seems like a simple construction, 
they involve the integration of a complex network of tasks. Installing a door requires a 
completed wall, a glass lining and cabling services within the sub-structure of the wall. In the 
airport doors also need to be safety compliant, fire proofed with security monitoring through 
CCTV cameras. Various complex issues delayed the completion of doors linked to fire tests, 
laminate types, positioning of metal strips and manufacturing delays. Eventually these issues 
combined and escalated to have programme-wide impact. The fortnightly meeting provided a 
forum to agree the root cause of delays and set mechanisms in place for swifter resolution. They 
also provided a ritual and timetable of expectations to hold those responsible to account. The 
“door” SPI was used as a simple oversight measure to monitor and capture improvements. The 
door example demonstrates how structured reports, metrics and meetings quickly created a 
space where various perspectives were enrolled in collective problem solving across 
organisational boundaries.  
This final period successfully accelerated the schedule which enabled the programme to be 
delivered on time. A “golden thread” of targets was developed to drive the critical path and 
focus attention on managing critical activities, SPI exceptions and milestone outcomes. This 
refocused supplier interests from individualised schedules to programme-level problems. 
Calculable spaces such as the fortnightly meetings and progress reports shaped conduct towards 
a shared conception of how the programme would be delivered on time. However, at the end 
of the programme, there remained gaps in the completion of the fit-out. The door issue slowly 
improved as the infrastructure mediated and enrolled key suppliers into shared problem solving. 
However, even at the handover date, there remained some incompleteness not captured in the 
reports and a large list of snagging items that reflected coordination issues.  
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6.6 Enrolment and Controversy  
Although the model of governance that evolved on T2 encouraged conformance and 
predictability amongst suppliers, at the client-level it enabled discovery and learning. 
Underpinning the design of T2 was an aspiration of developing “foresight” through calculative 
technologies. Initially enrolment on T2 emphasised clarity in roles and visible authority 
structures to create bounded territories of accountability. These territories were regulated by 
expectations of being held to account within the parameters defined in contract. The initial 
phase focused on regulating conduct by building expectations of audit scrutiny and testing the 
integrity of performance data. However, although the concept of data as “kingpin” was intended 
to deter suppliers from hiding intelligence, reporting silos made it difficult to capture local 
intelligence. In the second phase, the emphasis shifted to developing client capability with 
sophisticated calculative technologies; and the Dashboard and IBR to shape and direct attention 
towards strategies to mitigate performance shortfalls. Calculative technologies scrutinised past 
performance to encourage conformance to specific targets in safety, quality and earned value. 
Suppliers focused on past performance using the performance data as proof to defend payment 
claims. By 2012, CBI and 2nd tier enrolment in forward planning was fundamental to prevent 
over running. By the final phase, a rapid recovery plan was mobilised and Heathrow adapted the 
controls approach to create more visibility of the critical path. 
Calculative technologies played a major role in testing and contesting evaluative principles to 
create productive compromises within each control phase. However, at the end of each phase 
controversies destabilised the existing evaluative order and modifications were made to the 
calculative infrastructure. The table on the next page describes the evolution of the programme 
and the sequence of generative control phases. The movement through evaluative orders and 
the settling of controversies by adapting technologies and evaluative principles is examined in 
the following section.  
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Dates Phases of Control Key Technologies Enrolment Controversies 
2010-
2011 
“Single version of the truth”    
A regulatory architecture was developed to 
govern conduct within clearly defined 
territories. A structured timetable of 
performance reviews and IBRs became 
spaces to scrutinise performance and build 
confidence in the integrity of the baseline 
data as the single source of the “truth” 
 
1.The IBR provided strategic 
oversight 2. Monthly reviews 
interrogated progress in Safety, 
quality and earned value 
2. Risk technologies were used to 
manage provisions and floats but 
also model and test exposure  
1 Contractual clarity to settle 
concerns about being held to 
account  
2. Shared purpose with the CBIs was 
encouraged by pain/gain-sharing and 
outcome-based incentives; 
milestones, KPIs and award fee 
3. Cyclical timetable of IBRs, MPRs to 
shape performance expectations. 
1.Tendency towards “safe” baseline 
forecasts  
2.Lack of opportunity to engage with 
the wider supply network 
3.Shared purpose focused on 
safety/quality and scrutinising past 
performance rather than building 
future plans or mitigating risks.  
2012 “The Dashboard”  
Productivity lags required intense 
discussion to develop a recovery strategy. 
The dashboard was developed to generate 
a focused and integrated value 
management and risk discussion. The 
intention was to pass back a consistent and 
clear message to suppliers to close the 
performance gap.   
1.The dashboard was used to enrol 
agreement towards a shared order 
of priorities amongst the client 
leadership. The composition 
balanced conformance to 
standards with risk exposure and 
value management decisions.  
2. IBR8 re-baselined the CBIs  
  
   
1.Monthly reviews used to 
interrogate and shape a focused 
leadership message. Leadership 
competence developed and 
divergent perspectives balanced into 
a coherent message. 
 
2.CBI enrolment in forward planning 
remained an issue leading to re-
baselining.  
1.Focus on conformance, risk 
exposure and centralised mitigation 
but persistent shortfalls remained 
2. Issue of divergent interests. 
Needed to enrol local intelligence, 
build common purpose and switch 
attention away from justifying past 
performance.  
2013-
2014 
“Golden Thread” 
Programme for Success was developed to 
enrol the 2nd tier into driving the critical 
path to completion. This intense recovery 
period finally enrolled the wider supply 
network into agreeing deliver plans to 
mitigate shortfalls. 
1.Calculable spaces developed to 
build common “evaluative 
purpose” through fortnightly 
meetings, reports and milestone 
incentives.  
1.Milestone incentives refocused 2nd 
tier on shared goals  
2. Reforms introduced new order of 
priorities moving suppliers away 
from justifying granular plans and 
defending past performance   
The focus switched to delivery. 
However, programme-wide social 
integration remained an issue with 
the door example reflecting a lack of 
general common purpose.  
 
        Table 6.3: Terminal 2 Phases of Control  
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6.6.1 Phase 1 - Single Version of the Truth (2010-2011) 
Initially emphasis was placed on developing a regulatory framework to oversee the relationship 
with the CBIs. The MPR reports provided a space for oversight and a structured timetable of 
monthly reviews was established. At the client-level monthly reviews played a central role in 
testing the integrity of forecasts and developing an expectation of the need to provide accurate 
projections. Intelligent data became more robust as the client demonstrated an intolerance for 
overcautious targets. As client teams developed confidence in scrutinising performance data, a 
more refined version of the truth was captured. For the wider supply network, emphasis was 
placed on achieving conformance to safety, quality and baseline commitments. Incentives 
rewarded safety innovations and delivery of the SPI/CPI targets. However, productivity gaps 
emerged. There was a need to refocus plans to mitigate performance shortfalls whilst balancing 
the risk profile. Although an architecture to test the integrity of the baseline had been 
developed, calculative technologies were needed to support the client in understanding the 
performance dynamics of the programme.  
6.6.2 Phase 2 - The Dashboard (2012) 
The dashboard was intended to facilitate a focused discussion at the client level leading to a 
confident tactical dialogue with the supply chain. As a diagnostic technology, the dashboard was 
used to search for balanced solutions to mitigate risks whilst achieving performance standards. 
As a visual technology, it provided concurrent visibility of past performance and future 
projections, highlighting potential exposure to drive agreement about future priorities. The 
sophistication of the risk analysis enabled a broader discussion of possible risks and 
opportunities to agree priorities in meeting milestones. The dashboard enabled intense debates 
providing a strategic space for collective deliberation and learning. However, discussions 
remained at the client-level with limited opportunity to mobilise local intelligence to agree 
recovery strategies. As the productivity gap widened, the 2nd tier continued to focus on 
justifying past performance. By the summer of 2012 a failure to meet the committed handover 
date seemed likely. In the winter of 2012 IBR 9 signalled a “step change” when the CBI (HETCo) 
and HAL finally agreed a recovery plan which formed the basis of new delivery plans.  
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6.6.3 Phase 3 - Golden Thread (2013-14) 
In this final stage, calculable spaces emerged to create an infrastructure to enrol the interests of 
the 2nd tier. After IBR9 the boundaries of accountability were widened to include the 2nd tier in 
a schedule for rapid recovery. The adaptation of the infrastructure created new performance 
aspirations for the 2nd tier. This moved the focus towards driving the programme-level critical 
path.  Structured metrics and meetings provided a space to engage allied interests and agree 
plans. However, the doors issue highlighted gaps in the calculative infrastructure which failed to 
capture delays before they crystallised, resulting in significant rework. This point is important 
because it illustrates how the recovery programme achieved some systems integration by 
allocating rewards and measures towards the critical path. However, this settlement was fragile 
and fit-out issues distributed across the programme remained hidden. In many ways, this 
reflected an emphasis on regulating to specific targets rather than developing an ethos of 
citizenship. However, T2 remains a remarkable example of client learning and although the 2nd 
tier was procured up front to deliver to fixed commitments, by the end of the programme new 
accountabilities were agreed and devolved. This demonstrates the fundamental role that the 
calculative infrastructure can play in enabling adaptability by re-ordering accountabilities even 
though the initial procurement approach encouraged “lock-in”.  
6.7 How did T2 Learn to Govern through Numbers?  
The commercial model for T2 was conceived during a period of instability within the 
construction industry. Wolstenholme’s 2009 report noted that Intelligent Clients remained 
successful when they worked “with” suppliers to integrate activities based on a shared 
conception of value whilst establishing “who” is best placed to manage risks (CE, 2009). T2 
followed these recommendations by commissioning CBI experts rewarded for performance 
improvements through a pain-gain risk sharing model. Following the advice from the ICE’s 
Intelligent Client Capability Framework “visible authority structures” were developed (ICE, 2013) 
and the client worked to balance and align divergence. However, emergent changes destabilised 
productivity in the early stages of the programme. Returning to the earlier question raised in 
chapter 4:  
On T2, the intelligent client model organised dissonance by emphasising the importance of the 
integrity of the “single version” of the data to deter divergence. Although a sophisticated 
framework of incentives existed between the Client and CBI; the only direct incentives for the 2nd 
tier encouraged delivering to the initial baseline commitments. This raises important questions 
about “how” the client could sustain the engagement of suppliers when emergent change 
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challenged existing plans. There was little incentive for the 2nd tier to share local intelligence of 
new emergent risks or opportunities. Therefore, how did the calculative infrastructures mediate 
and sustain control? 
Action at a distance and governing through the numbers required a complex and adaptive 
calculative infrastructure. The phases of control discussion demonstrated the various calculative 
technologies that mediated progress; the MPR, risk technologies, dashboard, fortnightly 
meetings and the IBRs. Throughout the programme there remained persistent tensions with the 
wider supply network focused on conformance to agreed safety standards and baseline 
commitments, rather than improving value. Enrolment involved an initial period of shaping 
expectations of being held to account, following by a period of client-level diagnostic discovery 
and finally devolving accountability to key suppliers. The T2 model reflected a cautious appetite 
for risk with a preference for client-level learning whilst directing the efforts of the supply 
network. Initially the client focused on asserting the legitimate authority of the data to deter 
gaming. The dashboard played a fundamental role in integrating client thinking and this helped 
to develop more realistic plans agreed in the subsequent IBRs. By the final phase, there was a 
need for a step change to capture local intelligence, which led to a re-assignment of 
accountabilities and a period of coaching and engagement with the 2nd tier.  
Construction 2025 emphasises the importance of fixing the front-end with a clear articulation of 
value and risk in procurement. It also highlights the importance of process improvements 
through the adoption of digital engineering and design innovations to synchronise co-
production in delivery. However, there is little discussion about control. The T2 findings describe 
various innovations that enabled the project to capture emergent opportunities whilst 
mediating and sustaining progress. The dashboard was a powerful tool to integrate ideas whilst 
orchestrating discovery between the client leadership group. Risk exposure decisions were 
carefully integrated with value management plans enabling the client to take a balanced view 
of progress. The IBR created a space to “forgive” past performance shortfalls whilst still holding 
the supply network to account to understand the root cause of problems. These innovations 
demonstrate an important role for calculative technologies in shaping evaluative purpose even 
when the commercial framework developed in procurement encouraged lock-in. Rather than 
steering the programme towards predetermined targets, the calculative infrastructure was 
adapted to sustain enrolment. These points highlight an important role for calculative 
technologies in sustaining co-production. These themes are examined in more depth in the 
following discussion chapter.  
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The existing Heathrow literature suggests that T2 represented a relinquishing of “project 
management capability” by commissioning the CBI to undertake responsibility for project 
management. However, the findings in this chapter suggest that although some accountabilities 
were shared with the CBI, the capability associated with leading service delivery and overseeing 
the management of the programme remained with Heathrow. The T2 findings describe a very 
different model of governance to T5, a model that encouraged regulatory oversight whilst 
accepting the need to re-plan when performance risks began to destabilise the programme. 
Although this model moved away from collective evaluation with suppliers to a more centralised 
and directed approach it still enabled client-level learning. The T2 findings are important 
because this commercial approach reflects the more cautious environment for construction 
today. They also highlight important advances in the use of control technologies that enabled 
adaptation. These themes are developed in the following chapters.  
In summary, this chapter has described the evolution of a complex calculative infrastructure of 
risk technologies, a dashboard and the IBRs which enabled the adaptation of the programme in 
response to emergent risks. Heathrow adapted this infrastructure to settle tensions and 
gradually the 2nd tier was enrolled into delivering the critical path. However, the T2 findings 
highlight a very different appetite for regulation in comparison to the T5 lean partnering model. 
The next chapter compares T2 and T5 to identify differences and similarities in the approaches 
to control. It also examines the patterns of evolution of the calculative infrastructures and the 
nature of testing and contesting that enabled progression between phases. This leads to a 
comparative discussion about the different models of client governance and the way in which 
they “sustained” progress by governing an appetite for risk.  
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        Chapter 7 
Discussion: Making Projects Valuable 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings together the Heathrow cases and compares the two different approaches to 
control.  The last two empirical chapters described the composition and development of the T2 
and T5 calculative infrastructures. This chapter returns to the central theme of governing risk by 
considering the different patterns of enrolment which shaped an appetite towards 
“performance improvement” on T5 and “regulation” on T2. Chapter 5 describes a variety of 
spaces and technologies on T5 developed to overcome resistance to fluid scope by agreeing 
“how” risk and discovery would be evaluated and rewarded. Chapter 6 describes T2’s regulatory 
model designed to settle concerns for risk by clearly defining scope and accountabilities “up-
front”. However, gradually plans and targets were adapted to recover performance shortfalls. 
Both cases describe a mediatory role for a variety of calculable spaces and technologies and this 
chapter examines in more depth “how” these infrastructures sustained control.  
7.2 Reform in Governing risk:  Integration “through” evaluation 
The ICE 2013 Capability Framework describes an important capability for Intelligent Clients in 
bridging, aligning and integrating divergent perspectives in order to capture value. Integration 
is a major theme within the control debate because of the complexity of organising diverse 
experts, organisations and tasks in a way that creates value by generating knowledge 
“synergies” (Scranton, 2015; Söderlund, 2012; Brady and Davies, 2011; CS2025). Although 
dissonant perspectives and interests can create an unstable setting for major programmes, 
multiple perspectives can be important to resolve perplexing problems and shed light on 
valuable new and novel solutions (Stark 2009; Antal et al 2015; Kornberger et al 2015). However, 
organising these perspective in a way that settles tensions and captures synergies from 
“productive friction” (ibid) involves mediatory technologies.  The ICE Capability Framework links 
governing and integration to the use of incentives to “integrate” objectives and encourage 
conduct towards open ness and integrity. However, there is little discussion about “how”.  The 
Heathrow cases address these concepts by describing the composition of a variety of different 
incentives designed to build a shared sense of evaluative purpose. However, both cases also 
highlight how incentives were a part of a larger calculative infrastructure which was modified to 
settle tensions. This chapter returns to examine the evolution of this infrastructure.  
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So far, the Heathrow cases have described two contrasting models of governance. T2’s virtual 
“intelligent” control approach reflects a more common industry model of arms-length control 
with emphasis placed on the “integrity” of the data. An infrastructure of monthly reviews, 
dashboards and IBRs played a mediatory role that gradually connected people and performance 
aspirations. The client acted as an overseer to sanction and regulate attention towards specific 
standards and targets. In contrast, on T5 plans and incentives mediated collective learning 
between teams and the client. Collective evaluation within spaces such as the monthly reviews, 
IBRs and TCM forums gradually transformed the traditional aversion to scope change.  Both 
cases describe the central importance of control through a calculative infrastructure as a way 
on enabling emergent and reflexive forms of learning. Both cases also describe the destabilising 
nature of dissonant plural tensions associated with the social integration of evaluative purpose. 
Social integration was observed as an outcome of evaluation where interests were steered 
towards a common sense of evaluative purpose. The next section returns to the concept of 
calculable spaces to consider in more depth “how” evaluation led to sustained control.  
7.3 Calculable Spaces  
Miller and Power’s 2013 work describes how social control occurs within calculable spaces 
where accountability is assigned (territorialized) and individuals are subjectivized as they accept 
responsibilities and respond to performance judgements. In this context, calculative 
technologies play a key role in holding individuals to account by comparing performance against 
acceptable standards and targets. On T5, calculable spaces included monthly performance 
reviews, the IBR and the TCM forums. On T2, the dashboard, IBRs and the Programme for 
Success represented significant spaces. Although similar technologies were adopted in both 
programmes, how they shaped and governed conduct fundamentally differed. This is because 
calculative technologies played a mediatory role that went beyond measuring performance 
outcomes. Instead, on both programmes technologies enrolled collective action by steering 
plans through standards and targets and shaping action towards envisioned outcomes (Miller 
and O’Leary, 2007; Miller and Power, 2013; Boltanksi and Thevenot, 2006; Lamont, 2012).  
The envisioned evaluative order underpinning these outcomes reflected a fundamentally 
different appetite for risk in terms of a spirit of enterprise (Power, 2007) in comparison to a 
more cautious regulatory approach. On T5, territories of accountability remained fluid as the 
scope underpinning work packages changed to capture design and performance improvements. 
Calculative technologies enrolled collective action to resolve perplexing problems where 
subjectivizing encouraged proactive risk management. In contrast, on T2 subjectivization 
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involved building the legitimacy of “client intelligence” with greater emphasis on being held to 
account against forecasts and an expectation of scrutiny. Bounded territories reflected a belief 
in the importance of clear lines of accountability to settle tensions associated with uncertainty. 
The calculable spaces on T2 reflected an appetite for learning and discovery by the client. 
However, on both programmes this appetite was not static. Instead it evolved to reflect a 
changing order of priorities over the delivery cycle whereby testing and contesting resulted in 
modification.   
Miller and Power’s 2013 work described a process of making agents “governable” which 
emerges through a recursive territorializing of calculable spaces. In these spaces calculative 
technologies enrol and adjudicate progress to shape the conduct of institutional subjects. Over 
the last few chapters the process of enrolment was studied by tracing the changing composition 
of practices, technologies and evaluative principles. Sustained control involved “fabrication” 
(Preston et al, 1992; Chua, 1995; Latour, 1986) where tensions were settled, and new evaluative 
principles were captured within the calculative infrastructure to enable progress. The patterns 
of fabrication differed across both programmes in terms of “who” was engaged in enrolment 
and “how” allied interests were settled. This is examined below.  
7.3.1 Different Patterns of Fabrication  
Fabrication represents the end of the process of enrolment into a final settled state when a 
translation moves from one phase to another. The study of patterns of fabrication and “fixing” 
of meaning can help reveal the solutions that enabled progress but also the nature of tensions 
that become visible during controversy and the process of settlement. On T2 and T5 different 
patterns of fabrication were observed in terms of “who” was involved but also the nature of 
problematisation and the way in which allied interests (interessement) were settled. On T5, the 
lean partnering philosophy encouraged collective learning. Interessement was shaped by a code 
of conduct designed to integrate interests and values. Enrolment was sustained over time 
through calculable spaces that enabled collective deliberation; the monthly forums, the IBRs and 
the later TCM programme. In contrast, on T2 in the initial orchestration of the programme, work 
packages were assigned to individual suppliers creating clear lines of accountability. 
Problematisation involved client-level critical inquiry through monthly reviews with little 
collective deliberation with the wider supply network. Instead progression was sustained by 
settling tensions and directing attention after dashboard discussions or during the 6 monthly 
IBRs.  
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These different patterns reflected a different appetite for risk and tolerance for divergent 
perspectives. The literature on innovation and dissonance has emphasised the importance of 
organising friction in a way that sustains “creative” tensions. This involves organising collective 
evaluation in a “principled way” which broadens the search space whilst balancing contending 
perspectives (Stark, 2009; Kornberger et al, 2015; Antal et al, 2015). This organising can enable 
deep learning and innovation by capturing “novel forms of worth” by recombining diverse 
perspectives in co-creation (ibid). This can lead to moments of inspiration described as a 
“collective ah ha” whereby new solutions and perspectives can shed new light on perplexing 
situations (Dewey 1910; Antal et al 2015). On both programmes, Heathrow recognised the 
persistence of behavioural risks and the need to modify and adapt technologies to prevent 
tensions from destroying progress and value. However, the appetite for acceptable levels of 
deviation from existing plans differed with T5 accepting the need for emergent scope and 
discovery whilst T2 reflected a more regulated model.  
Different patterns of fabrication were observed on the programmes and this reflected different 
approaches to collective learning when resolving controversies. On T5, collective evaluation was 
fundamental to resolving perplexing problems. However, on T2 until the final phase of control, 
the client’s role emphasised regulation and settling tensions by ratifying acceptable solutions. 
Across both programmes the appetite for risk evolved. The previous chapters describe a general 
pattern of development from an initial “set-up” period to a period of developmental learning 
followed by an intense delivery phase. The next section returns to the T5 case and then back to 
the T2 case to examine in more depth the generative movement between control phases that 
enabled progression. This is intended to consolidate the phases of control into a holistic picture 
of the actual progression.     
7.4 Terminal 5 - Doing Risk Differently   
Chapter 5 detailed the gradual development of a lean partnering philosophy intended to 
encourage collective discovery. A code of conduct was ascribed through the T5 Agreement 
which laid out how multi-disciplinary teams would partner and manage risks. The performance 
improvement model was underpinned by STORM principles with the expectation that teams 
would be proactive in managing-out risks before they crystallised. Greater openness between 
the integrated teams was encouraged by offering “fair and proper” rewards (Handbook 1998).  
Within each control phase a “dominant theme” emerged which represented the focus of the 
evaluative order. In phase 1 the control methodology underpinning “doing risk differently” 
depended on a willingness to accept fluid scope. This required a belief that the pooling of 
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knowledge for performance improvement would result in superior performance and that a 
collective search for better ways of delivering the programme would be recognised and 
rewarded. Although the “client holds the risk” concept was a central feature to settle 
uncertainties, a calculative infrastructure was needed to encourage acceptance of a search for 
performance improvement. The table below summarises the problematisation themes within 
each control phase, problematisation debates and underlying tensions.  
Phases (P1-3) with themes Problematisation Tensions 
P1: Client holds the risk 
Handbook ascribed codes of conduct & lean 
principles to encourage knowledge sharing but in-
scope reimbursement created inertia and aversion to 
scope change  
 
1.Who would be held to 
account for changing 
scope and how would 
they be evaluated?  
1.Trade-offs between 
encouraging a search for 
improvement & “lock-in”  
P2: One version of the truth 
Monthly rituals and reports improved diagnostic 
capabilities in a reflexive process of collective 
learning. However, standards and targets rewarded 
predictability 
 
2.How do you capture a 
realistic version of the 
truth?  
2.Trade-offs between 
realistic and safe 
forecasts. How do you 
encourage sharing 
inconvenient truths?  
P2: Foresight 
IBR1 provided the space for critical oversight. TCM 
provided forums for participation to reassign 
accountability for risk. How is control sustained? 
 
3.How do you match risks 
with the capabilities of 
teams? 
3. Balancing oversight 
with foresight through risk 
citizenship 
Table 7.1: Summarising Problematisation Themes for T5 
In phase 1 “fluid” scope created intense debates about who would be held to account for risks. 
Over phase 2 concerns were settled as diagnostic capabilities were developed. By phase 3 the 
TCM created forums to enrol the supply network into developing recovery plans. Over time the 
management of risks was devolved to the teams through new accountabilities and stretch 
targets. Devolution reflected an acceptance of lean principles, and an acceptance that the 
continual search for improvement for the benefit of the programme was a collective 
responsibility. This fundamentally challenged traditional self-seeking opportunism. However, to 
understand “how” this gradual transformation emerged we need to consider in more depth how 
conduct was governed across the control phases.  
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7.4.1 How did the T5 Calculative Infrastructure Mediate Control? 
7.4.1.1 From Ambiguity to Order: Phase 1 to phase 2 
The lean philosophy required acceptance of fluid scope. However, guaranteed reimbursement 
created a strong incentive to lock into initial plans. This created tension and ambiguity in how 
deviations from plan would be judged and who would be held to account for changing scope. 
Monthly reporting rituals provided a space to enrol teams into developing more realistic 
forecasts. Teams were given the freedom to operationalise recommendations and to co-develop 
more convincing and predictable performance narratives. Reporting visualisations articulated a 
schema of qualifying standards describing “how” performance success would be judged and 
how risks would be evaluated. Over time contentions were settled as team roles and evaluative 
routines became clearer. However, the building of diagnostic capabilities to create “one version 
of the truth” was only possible by engaging team interests and steering divergent perspectives 
towards acceptable standards and targets. By the end of phase 2, a first attempt to forecast the 
programme outturn identified significant strategic risks.  
7.4.1.2 Risk Management to citizenship: Phase 2 to phase 3  
In the lead-up to IBR1, teams became more familiar with the performance dynamics of the 
programme and the scale effects of changes to delivery outcomes captured in the “one version 
of the truth”. The client adjudicated decisions by overseeing performance through a framework 
of standards and incentives sanctioning an acceptable degree of variation in performance. As a 
calculable space, the IBR provided a forum for critical oversight to draw together team plans 
into a unified snapshot. It provided a forum for constructive deliberation to consider “are we 
doing things right?” and “should the nature of plans change”? The outcome of the IBR was TCM 
and the establishment of a new set of high-level financial goals.  The issue of sustaining devolved 
control was managed by adopting a participatory ethos to engage the teams to develop bespoke 
recovery plans. New territories of accountability were established and calculative technologies 
were developed to direct attention towards a suite of targets and standards. During the final 
phase, the complexity of devolved risk management was reduced into a precise framework of 
measures. A form of risk citizenship emerged which translated the principles of proactive risk 
management into specific standards and targets.  
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7.4.1.3 Progression Between Phases  
Productive compromises were achieved when calculative technologies moved beyond just 
coordinating activities to mobilising a progressive debate.  Establishing a risk management order 
(phase 1 to 2) was complex because of a need to build new partnering and lean performance 
expectations which moved away from traditional risk aversion. Over time the calculative 
infrastructure mobilised teams by legitimising “realistic” rather than safe forecasts and 
rewarded driving out waste rather than hiding cost improvement. Monthly rituals created a 
forum to enrol teams to provide convincing explanations and forecasts. Moving from risk 
management to citizenship involved teams accepting accountability for risks. IBR 1 provided a 
space for critical oversight and TCM animated rituals to encourage heedful interrelating based 
on the new risk management accountabilities.  
During each phase, a re-ordering of priorities was observed to address performance risks and 
surface hidden dangers. The client acted as an “adjudicator” (Miller and Power, 2013) animating 
progress by evaluating, judging and rewarding the “right” forms of legitimate action. However, 
what was considered “right” evolved as lean principles were accepted and refined. Over time an 
“order of worth” (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006) representing risk citizenship emerged 
embodied within the calculative infrastructure. However, this emergence was gradual as the 
programme transitioned between successive stages. The next section considers the broad 
themes which enabled “sustained” control as the infrastructure accumulated over time.  
7.4.2 How did the T5 Calculative Infrastructure Sustain Control? 
Teams were expected to engage in a form of “heedful interrelating” (Dougherty 2016) by 
contributing to the lean agenda and subordinating action to resolve problems for the benefit of 
the whole programme. In this context, the ongoing pursuit of performance improvement was 
considered a higher order principle. Over time, lean principles became fabricated and embodied 
within the calculative infrastructure. The mobilisation of the network had two broad stages;            
1. The legitimation of lean thinking for risk management and 2. “Fixing” the meaning of risk 
citizenship by creating an order of worth to sustain control action across the programme. These 
stages are examined below.  
7.4.2.1 Legitimation of Lean Thinking 
Lean thinking models of control fix on specific standards of performance and continuous 
improvement moves towards eliminating waste to achieve defined levels of quality (Womack et 
al, 1990). However, on T5 the emergent nature of scope created an indeterminacy in control as 
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the standards of performance necessary to deliver the “ends-in-view” (Dewey 1939) remained 
fluid until 2003. Calculative technologies built an evaluative order over time and this involved 
an initial period of qualification to test “how” lean principles would be applied, given the 
changing nature of design. The monthly reports played a key role in the articulation of qualifying 
standards. The replication of monthly rituals focused on giving a realistic account and written 
narrative to explain performance deficits. Subjectivization involved the agreement of 
recommendations and responding to queries raised in the monthly reviews. A lean methodology 
evolved as teams learned to pool knowledge and provide credible narratives. Baseline 
forecasting became a more realistic “one version of the truth” and client oversight became more 
rigorous and precise. The gradual legitimation of lean principles emerged as teams became more 
adept at understanding the performance dynamics of the programme.  
7.4.2.2 Fixing the Meaning of Risk Citizenship  
IBR1 provided a space to draw together the client and supply network into collective 
deliberation. The TCM programme resulted in the rapid re-casting of territories of 
accountability. Strategic priorities were elaborated into a critical path of activities proposed by 
each delivery team. At this late stage, the complexity of active risk management was finally 
reduced into precise standards and targets. This approach to citizenship used quantification to 
rationalise and fix the meaning of performance expectations into specific cost saving targets. 
Rather than centrally managing risk, the client mediated control by allowing teams to build their 
own tactical plans and match their capabilities to emergent problems. This approach accepted 
the dynamic and complex nature of risk management and the client provided visible oversight 
of progress and KPI incentives to reward progress. This clarity of meaning enabled risk 
citizenship to devolve across the project organisation supported by an infrastructure of monthly 
rituals and performance principles. Tensions associated with trade-offs, such as balancing the 
need for disclosure of realistic versus “safe” forecasts, or improvement versus cost “lock-in”, 
provided a basis for critical inquiry. Diverse interpretations and “unintended” and contested 
tensions were important for learning. The outcome of mediation and enrolment was captured 
within the calculative infrastructure. The next section considers the dominant features of the T5 
calculative infrastructure.   
 
 
 
160 
 
 
7.4.3 Learning to Govern Performance Improvement 
Performance improvement was sustained over the phases of control by enrolling the network 
into a series of temporary settlements. The territories of accountability remained flexible 
enabling learning during design development. However, the legitimation of lean principles was 
progressive and gradual because of the need to overcome a powerful aversion to scope change. 
Calculative technologies played a central role in guiding learning and collective evaluation. The 
client adjudicator played a central role in balancing dissonant tensions to prevent disagreements 
and delays. The diagram below describes the gradual development of the performance 
improvement infrastructure:  
                   Sustained by Fabrication    
              Infrastructure for Performance Improvement 
 P1 Legitimation of Lean P2 Fixing Risk Citizenship P3 
 
 Ambiguity               Order   Citizenship  
Mediation  
P1 – Client Holds the Risk 
P2 – One Version of the Truth  
P3 - Foresight 
 
Figure 7.1: Development of an Infrastructure for Performance Improvement 
The initial period of ambiguity reflected tensions and uncertainty because the T5 lean partnering 
model represented a major move away from traditional lock-in strategies. By phase 2 the risk 
management order steered conduct towards collective evaluation and the giving of realistic 
accounts. Gradually teams developed the capability to build a robust version of the truth. By the 
final phase, risk citizens accepted accountability for a search for better plans. The calculative 
infrastructure of KPI targets and rewards enabled the client to capture and anticipate 
performance issues with “foresight”.   
7.4.4 Implications for the Heathrow Literature 
The current T5 literature emphasises the importance of integration, with a key role for plans and 
incentives in agreeing shared purpose (Brady and Davies, 2011:2014; Davies et al, 2009; Gil 
2009; Gil et al, 2012; Nightingale and Brady, 2011). The “systems integration” literature (Brady 
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and Davies, 2011; 2014; Davies et al 2009) emphasises the importance of client oversight and 
the client acting as a knowledge broker coordinating learning activities in order to enable 
progression. The T5 case findings extend these ideas by describing the calculative infrastructure 
that enabled learning. However, the findings also describe an unstable control environment 
where the powerful aversion to scope change created a difficult and dissonant setting. Lean 
thinking concepts were gradually refined through a performance dialogue that legitimised a 
search for improvement and rewarded the giving of realistic accounts. In this setting the findings 
suggest that rather than being an integrator of knowledge, the client acted as an adjudicator 
and integration was an outcome of a gradual process of enrolment through collective 
evaluation. 
The existing T5 literature (Brady and Davies, 2011; 2014; Davies et al, 2009) emphasises the 
importance of the risk transfer arrangements rather than the process of risk management. 
However, even though the BAA commercially insured the risk, they did not bear the financial 
effects of performance shortfalls because they were gradually devolved across the programme.  
Flexible plans and incentives were part of the framework enabling devolution. Rather than 
removing deviations, the T5 model encouraged collective learning, where creative tensions and 
controversy were tolerated because they provided an opportunity for critical inquiry. This 
flexible and adaptive approach was sustained by the calculative infrastructure that shaped and 
steered divergent interests towards new standards and targets.  
Much of the T5 literature (Brady and Davies, 2011; 2014; Davies et al, 2009) deemphasises the 
institutional complexity of the reproduction of control. Instead success is attributed to client 
leadership or adaptive plans and incentives but there is little discussion of the calculative 
infrastructure enabling change. However, changing incentives and plans created high levels of 
uncertainty and calculable spaces such as the IBRs, monthly rituals and the TCM played a 
fundamental role in settling concerns enabling the agreement of priorities. The T5 findings 
reveal the importance of recognising tensions and the destabilising effects of the incumbent 
aversion to scope change. In this context, the calculative infrastructure steered productive 
compromises towards a lean performance improvement model. However, sustaining lean 
performance improvement and risk citizenship involved a continual balancing of friction with 
temporary settlements towards a shared sense of evaluative purpose. These points are 
elaborated in the next chapter where specific gaps in the prior literature are matched with the 
T5 findings and linked to the wider reform debate. In the next section, the development of the 
T2 calculative infrastructure over the delivery cycle is considered.  
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7.5 Terminal 2 - Developing Intelligent Foresight  
Wolstenholme’s 2009 report described how economic uncertainty had weakened supply 
resilience, which damaged a willingness to engage with more innovative builds. In response to 
this, the orchestration of governance on T2 reflected a regulatory model and a contract that 
shared risks with the CBI through a pain-gain formula. Subjectivizing emphasised the data as 
“kingpin” with an expectation that the client would scrutinise and test the integrity of the data. 
Over time calculative technologies constructed a more robust “version of the truth” through 
focused interrogation. The discussion in chapter 6 highlighted 3 main phases of control, from 
P1: a “single version of the truth” to P2 “dashboard” to P3 the “golden thread”. These phases 
evolved in response to a need to draw together divergent interests and then rapidly deliver a 
robust plan. Initially, phase 1 focused on strengthening territories of accountability described by 
Capital Director as “fences” (Morgan, 2009) by developing an expectation of audit scrutiny. By 
the second phase, the emphasis shifted to mobilising client learning through the dashboard and 
the IBR which were designed to shape and direct attention towards strategies to mitigate 
performance shortfalls. In the final phase, a rapid recovery plan was mobilised which required 
more visibility of the critical path. Here the emphasis shifted to building a “golden thread” of 
control that connected supplier targets to critical activities. Calculative technologies played a 
fundamental role in developing the client’s diagnostic capability whilst asserting the client’s 
authority as an Intelligent Client. However, the enrolment of the wider supply network was more 
lengthy and complex. The role of the calculative infrastructure in mediating control is examined 
in the next section.  
7.5.1 How did the T2 Calculative Infrastructure Mediate Control?  
The harsher economic climate was linked to a return to gaming behaviours such as building 
contingencies into “safe” baseline projections. Although the pain-gain formula shared 
accountability for risks between the client and CBI, it also provided a strong incentive to 
overestimate the initial cost baseline. The procurement of the 2nd tier was based on fixed work 
package commitments and this provided little incentive for performance improvement. Initially, 
Heathrow focused on interrogating schedules to remove waste by developing a regulatory 
framework to test the integrity of the data.  
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The table below highlights the dominant themes within each control phases, problematisation 
issues and major tensions.  
Phases (P1-3) with themes  Problematisation Tensions 
P1: Single version of the truth 
The development of a regulatory framework to 
test the integrity of the data. However, the 
framework needed to capture local intelligence  
 
1.The authority of the “data 
as kingpin” required a 
common focus   
1. Little incentive for the 
2nd tier to focus on 
performance 
improvement  
P2: Dashboard  
Dissonance was organised by the leadership 
team in monthly meetings where priorities were 
agreed & passed down to suppliers. However, 
productivity issues intensified   
2. There was little opportunity 
to engage local intelligence 
and yet complex performance 
dynamics required a pooling 
of knowledge  
 2.Suppliers continued to 
defend past performance 
rather than contributing 
to performance 
discussions  
 
P3: Golden Thread 
IBR9 “pardoned” performance shortfalls and a 
golden thread was constructed to drive the 
critical path. How do you capture emergence? 
 
3. A lack of visible common 
purpose manifest in an 
incomplete build (doors) 
3.Focused delivery against 
specific outcomes  but 
how do you sustain 
attention towards the 
performance of the whole 
programme?  
Table 7.2: Summarising Problematisation Themes for T2 
Divergent interests were a major theme on T2 and progress was stalled because of a lack of 
opportunity to engage the wider supply network. Instead the IBRs and performance reviews 
were used by the supply network to defend past performance. The CBI continued to hold the 
2nd tier to account for pre-committed work packages rather than developing plans for recovery. 
Although the dashboard was a powerful diagnostic tool used to develop client tactics, there was 
limited direct engagement with the wider supply network until later in the programme. 
Gradually suppliers were enrolled to contribute to the performance discussion in the final phase 
of control. The next section considers the nature of the generative progression between the 
phases to identify “how” specific technologies and spaces mediated and enrolled control.  
7.5.1.1 Defining intelligence: From Integrity to Order (phase 1 to phase 2) 
Initially, risk technologies were used to test the integrity of projections and the monthly reports 
tracked productivity and safety conformance. However, even though client teams became more 
capable of asking critical questions, it became clear that there was a divergence in priorities 
between the client and supply network. The dashboard played a fundamental role in giving 
“concurrent visibility” (Chenhall et al, 2013) of operational priorities. Rather than reducing 
complexity, it broadened the client discussion through visualizations to explore key relationships 
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between risk exposure and value. This enabled the leadership team to consider how far the 
continued performance plans would create risk pressure and the direction and timing of 
mitigating action needed to limit risk exposure. This helped to develop a consensus amongst the 
client teams about an order of worth. The dashboard enabled the client to agree priorities and 
tactics for value management and to pass consistent messages back to the CBI. However, it was 
not used to enrol a performance dialogue across the whole programme or to agree a shared 
conception of value. Instead it played a key role in preparing the groundwork for the IBRs where 
issues would be more fully scrutinised, bringing the whole programme more fully to account.  
7.5.1.2 Golden Thread: From Order to Enrolment (phase 2 to phase 3) 
IBR8 highlighted specific concerns about schedule delays but there was lag in mobilising 
attention from the 2nd tier. The fortnightly reports re-emphasised the importance of programme 
level priorities (such as the CPI/SPI indicators) switching attention from defending past 
performance. Reporting forums provided a space to agree priorities and make supplier 
contributions visible through competitive ranking. Gradually, the wider supplier network was 
enrolled to focus on specific critical targets and milestones. Although phase 3 represented a 
rapid turnaround, issues such as the doors remained hidden until they became significant 
problems. This lag in visibility reflected a separation of accountability into distinct territories. By 
the time the door issue became visible, its effects were amplified across the programme because 
of the interwoven nature of interdependencies. This point is important because it demonstrates 
the destabilising effect on the whole programme when there is a lack of opportunity to agree 
and articulate common goals.   
Calculative technologies mobilised different groups within the programme; the dashboard as a 
client diagnostic, the IBR to hold the CBI and supply network to account, and monthly rituals to 
test conformance. However, there were limited spaces to develop common evaluative principles 
and as controversies and risks emerged, temporary settlements were achieved by asserting 
conformance against standards. This appetite for risk reflected a preference for reducing 
deviations into specific plans and standards rather than keeping a broad dialogue open with the 
supply network. Although EVM measures monitored supplier performance, they were used as a 
proof of success or failure to focus on compliance rather than future value. The outcome of 
mediation by holding suppliers to account was a prolonged period of dissonance which 
interrupted productivity. Over time, the destabilising effects of this divergence was mitigated 
and eventually the supply network was more fully engaged. This period of translation can be 
viewed as a “long translation” (Mouritsen et al 2009) where fixing allied interests into agreement 
165 
 
 
involved a complex process of persuasion and negotiation. The complexity of this long period of 
problematisation and the role of calculative technologies in sustaining control is examined in 
the next section.  
7.5.2 How did the T2 Calculative Infrastructure Sustain Control?  
7.5.2.1 Organising Dissonance   
Initially the development of the intelligent system required an architecture of technologies to 
test and clarify boundaries of accountability. The authority of the data as “kingpin” helped to 
create an expectation of scrutiny. This expectation was an important foundation of the style of 
disciplinary governance or governing “by” the numbers where the client acted as an overseer of 
conduct. However, gradually major problems emerged, and the client only became aware when 
they had crystallised into significant delays. The main space for client oversight were the IBRs 
where the whole supply network was formally held to account. In between the IBRs, productivity 
issues were centrally debated but there was limited opportunity to engage directly with the 
wider supply network. Instead the 2nd tier was engaged by the CBI to explain past performance 
rather than pooling knowledge to mitigate performance risks.  During this period, control was 
sustained by the client developing sophisticated risk management strategies to offset delays in 
the schedule. The management of floats and programme-level savings created risk 
contingencies, which softened the financial effects of performance shortfalls. The dashboard 
provided the critical space for these activities enabling the client to build consensus and pass 
clear messages back to the CBI.  
7.5.2.2 The Long Translation  
The monthly performance rituals helped legitimise the IBRs as a space to fix plans and 
communicate performance expectations. Finally, by IBR9 a shared interest emerged in a 
tentative plan, as the CBI conceded the need for a new recovery approach. This translation 
moved into a final stage of mobilising support once milestone incentives were shared with the 
2nd tier. An “intelligent” set of reports steered attention towards delivering the KPIs and critical 
path. Innovative calculative technologies, risk modelling and the dashboard played a 
fundamental role in building the client’s capability to steer and direct a dialogue with the supply 
chain. The critical path which emerged from IBR9 was underpinned by in-depth analysis of the 
schedules provided by the suppliers. Incentives were placed on realistic milestone targets which 
helped to motivate a shared sense of purpose. Supplier ranking and performance reports 
charted the progress of critical activities. This re-emphasised the importance of delivering the 
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targets on the critical path. This final stage of control highlighted that it was possible to rapidly 
develop recovery plans if the 2nd tier suppliers were more fully involved in the performance 
dialogue.  
The long translation demonstrated the complexity of sustaining control when bounded 
territories of accountability stall social integration. Eventually a golden thread was constructed 
to drive the delivery of the critical path. However hidden problems, such as the door issue, 
created waste and fit-out rework resulting in delays and minor cost overruns. This point 
indicates how managing risk by placing incentives on specific outcomes can focus priorities. 
However, unforeseen and emergent change can destabilise these outcomes. At the end of the 
programme, a temporary agreement was achieved to deliver the programme on time. Although 
the intelligent system was intended to provide client oversight to support the development of 
strategies for value management, bounded territories of accountability limited the visibility of 
risks and opportunities. Periods of intense debate resulted in a dip in productivity and although 
this was recovered at the end of the programme there was evidence of waste in rework. The 
next section draws these points together to consider the evolution of the infrastructure to 
support learning and control on T2.  
7.5.3 Learning to Govern a Predictive Model  
The initial orchestration was intended to build a predictive model that would enable intelligent 
foresight. Calculative technologies were designed to reduce the need for client adjudication as 
the monthly reviews would clearly articulate accountabilities, standards and performance 
expectations. Deviations would be mitigated by testing the integrity of data, and controversies 
would be managed and directed through the CBI. The patterns of development are described 
below:                     Sustained by Adaptation     
                               Infrastructure for regulation  
 P1     Dissonance    P2        Long Translation  P3 
 
    Integrity      Order                Golden Thread  
               Mediation   
P1 – Single Version of the Truth  
P2 – The Dashboard  
P3 – Golden thread  
                  
   Figure 7.2 Development of an Infrastructure for Regulation 
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Patterns of mediation reflected an initial period of establishing the integrity of the data with 
technologies to judge conformance to agreed commitments. A lengthy process of “defining 
intelligence” through the dashboard settled multiple evaluative perspectives at the client level. 
However, the long translation reflected a lack of opportunity to engage the supply network. 
Over time these issues were settled. Innovative spaces and technologies such as the IBR and the 
latest value management methods played a central role in developing the recovery plan. 
Milestone incentives provided a “fix” to focus attention on critical milestones. However, the 
doors issue highlighted a lack of programme-wide visibility and a lack of common evaluative 
purpose. Although these issues were resolved, persistent dissonance had significant implications 
for productivity and delays.  
The T2 case highlights a mismatch between aspirations for foresight with the design of a 
calculative infrastructure that emphasised regulation. Rather than engaging suppliers in a 
dialogue to explore possible future projections, subjectivizing involved directing supplier 
attention towards specific targets and standards. Control was sustained through the IBR 
recasting and “pardoning” performance delays. However, the doors issue reveals the perils of 
emergent change in complexity and the importance of capturing and engaging local intelligence 
to mitigate risks. This final point is important and has significant implications for the 
management of risk in complexity. Without forums or technologies to engage collective 
deliberation, large projects can be destabilised when faced with emergent change. This is 
because perplexing problems can require deeper forms of learning and critical inquiry. 
Resolution of perplexing problems can involve a wider search for solutions and the orchestration 
of a “collective ah ha” (Dewey, 1939; Antal et al, 2015). A search that may involve challenging 
“taken for granted” assumptions and abductive forms of reasoning (Quattrone, 2015; 
Dougherty, 2016). On T2, the lack of social integration in the first 2 phases of control resulted in 
hidden problems which gradually became visible once they caused significant delays. This last 
point demonstrates the limitations of a rigid regulatory approach that closes down reflexive 
learning and dialogue as controversies emerge. In the next section, the two infrastructures are 
compared to consider “How did Heathrow learn to govern through numbers?” across the 
delivery lifecycle.  
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7.6 Calculative Infrastructures and Heathrow as an Intelligent Client  
The table below compares the two calculative infrastructures and the way in which they 
mediated and sustained control:  
Table 7.3 Comparative Infrastructures 
 
 Terminal 5 Terminal 2 
How did 
they learn 
to Govern? 
Phases and technologies: 
P1 “Client holds the risk” T5 Handbook 
principles were translated into reimbursable 
incentives & team territories 
P2 “One version of the truth” reporting 
technologies evolved shaping diagnostic 
practices 
P3 “Foresight” oversight through the IBR 
and eventually foresight built through risk 
citizenship 
How did they learn? Calculative 
technologies mediated collective 
evaluation, fabricating learning by settling 
tensions and re-ordering priorities  
Phases and Technologies:  
 P1 “Single version of the truth” intelligent 
system established as an architecture to hold 
suppliers to account  
P2 “The Dashboard” building diagnostic 
capabilities of the leadership team for a tactical 
dialogue with the CBIs  
 P3 “Golden Thread” constructing a critical path 
to mobilize local attention to deliver 
performance goals 
How did they learn? Calculative technologies 
defined client intelligence, regulated 
conformance, sanctioned “pardons” and 
directed attention towards tactical targets.  
Tensions  i. Trade-offs between safe/realistic 
projections, hiding improvements vs driving 
out waste 
ii. Risk aversion and lock-in safer than 
possible scope creep risks 
I. Incumbent focus on justifying past 
performance as a proof of worth vs realistic 
future projections 
 
ii. Incentives excluded 2nd tier and encouraged 
CBI to overstate cost baseline in “safe” forecasts 
 
Mediation? i. From Ambiguity to Order: By articulating a 
schema for signification of how success 
would be judged & failure evaluated 
 
ii. From Risk Management to Citizenship: 
From client adjudicated to precise standards 
& devolved ownership of risks to the teams  
i. From Integrity to Order: Defining intelligence 
through the dashboard prepared the 
groundwork for the IBR to develop tactics to 
balance exposure and value 
ii. From Order to building a Golden Thread:  
Refocusing attention in the IBR to deliver the 
critical path  
Sustain? 
 
i. Legitimation of Lean Thinking: Sanctioning 
performance improvement by collectively 
defining “who” would be held to account 
through qualifying standards and targets 
ii. Fixing the Meaning of Risk Citizenship: IBR 
was a forum for collective deliberation. TCM 
a vehicle to match risks/opportunities with 
capabilities.  
Client adjudicator & calculative 
infrastructure enabled productive 
compromises by embodying learning in 
rituals, targets and standards to sustain 
risk citizenship 
 
i. Organising Dissonance: Disciplinary control 
governing “by” numbers and risk modelling 
used to soften effects of performance shortfalls   
ii. The Long Translation: IBRs “pardoned” 
performance gaps, new milestone incentives 
and reporting rituals enrolled the 2nd tier into 
delivering the critical path    
 
Client regulator & calculative infrastructure 
slowly mobilised allied interests by re-focusing 
attention on specific goals and removing 
hazards and performance gaps 
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On T5, lean partnering for performance improvement involved a gradual mobilisation of teams 
“through” collective evaluation. The territories of accountability remained fluid to enable 
learning during design evolution. However, fluid plans required adjudicatory intervention to 
sanction discovery. Gradually, lean principles were developed through an iterative process of 
judging and rewarding performance improvement. In the final phase of control, the meaning of 
risk citizenship was captured in precise standards where the IBR and TCM enabled a matching 
of capabilities with risks and opportunities. Calculable spaces emerged that embodied deep 
learning by capturing novel ideas and emergent opportunities from the various suppliers 
engaged on T5. The interplay between the client adjudicator, technologies and reporting rituals 
enabled social integration through a reflexive process of emergent learning.  
In contrast on T2, the more standardised intelligent system was rapidly implemented, designed 
to drive efficiency by regulating control and reducing risks into precisely defined performance 
standards. The dashboard played a major role in building client intelligence and diagnostic 
capability to balance risk exposure and value. However, the assignment of tasks rather than 
enrolment and engagement of local intelligence destabilised the progress of the programme. 
Rather than embodying the learning from across the programme, there was a lack of 
opportunity to engage and shape the interests of the 2nd tier. Pardoning performance gaps 
through the IBR was fundamental in turning the programme around and milestone incentives 
nudged suppliers towards completion dates. However, a lack of heedful interrelating resulted in 
social integration problems, reflected in rework in the final fit-out stage (doors). This illustrates 
how it is possible to deliver a programme on time and to budget by directive technologies which 
coordinate systems integration. However, progress stalled because of unsettled periods of 
negotiation where the basis for evaluative priorities remained contested and unclear.  
7.6.1 Similarities in Governing Models  
Returning to the initial question “how did” Heathrow learn to govern? The Heathrow findings 
describe how a continued investment in new approaches to control was a key part of delivery 
success. Rather than adopting a traditional model of fixing the “front-end” (De Meyer et al, 2006; 
Morris, 2003) and keeping the project on track towards a predetermined set of instructions, 
Heathrow designed spaces for reflexive learning “through” evaluation. The continual investment 
in different control approaches reflected a changing appetite for risk. This appetite reflected 
evaluative orders within each control phase and the calculative infrastructure was adapted to 
enrol an agreed conception of evaluative purpose. This purpose reflected an ordering of 
priorities and underpinning assumptions about an “order of worth” (Stark, 2009; Boltanski and 
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Thévenot, 2006; Antal et al, 2015) and what was conceived as a risk or acceptable discovery.  
Returning to Dewey’s quote:  
“All deliberate, all planned human conduct, personal and collective seems to be influenced, if not 
controlled, by estimates of value or worth of ends to be attained” (Dewey, 1939, p2) 
Emergent controversies created an unstable control environment where the pathways to the 
“ends-in-view” (Dewey 1939) continued to change. Making projects valuable involved a dynamic 
process of governing by enrolling conduct towards what was perceived as a worthy ends-in-
view. However, notions of “worth” changed as the programme evolved. The sequence of 
development reflected initially early stage definition of how risks and value would be judged, 
followed by a period of diagnostic learning and finally a more intense delivery phase. There were 
3 key similarities to this emergent learning approach 1. The development of building blocks          
2. Pragmatic pardoning 3. Balancing persistent tensions. These are examined below:  
7.6.1.1 Building Blocks for Learning 
The initial phases of control enabled learning and innovation later in the programme. The initial 
periods of defining and organising an order of worth were followed by periods of diagnostic 
discovery to test the dynamics of the programme. On T5, although the Handbook ascribed lean 
approaches, principles were only animated once calculable spaces were established. Within 
these spaces the machinations of testing, contesting and fabricating agreement enabled 
learning. On T2 clear territories of accountability and the IBRs created a regulatory framework 
to set expectations of how suppliers would be held to account. However, the dashboard 
provided the space to agree operational priorities whilst exploring ways of mitigating 
performance shortfalls. These early periods of diagnostic learning created building blocks which 
enabled the development of more robust plans in later stages.  
7.6.1.2 Pragmatic Pardoning 
The IBR played a major role in both programmes as a space to routinely re-visit plans with an 
intention and willingness to pragmatically pardon unsustainable performance targets. This 
benevolent forgiveness was important to demonstrate the legitimate authority of the client in 
holding suppliers to account whilst forgiving past failures. This enabled the programme to 
progress. On T5 IBR1 enabled the BAA to exercise critical oversight and engage in constructive 
deliberation with the supply network to develop a recovery plan. On T2 the focus of the IBRs 
changed as the programme progressed. Initially they focused on testing the integrity of plans 
but later they provided a formal space to formally “pardon” past performance. Pardoning past 
171 
 
 
failures is a major departure to traditional project management guidelines that recommend 
managing uncertainty with rigorous definitions of programme requirements up-front. However, 
pardoning enabled the reassignment of accountability to those most “capable” of generating 
incremental value. This resulted in the gradual devolution of risk.  
7.6.1.3 Balancing Persistent Tensions 
Dougherty’s 2016 work on innovation in complexity describes how learning can be fostered in 
distributed settings if shared goals are organised so that heedful action responds to emergent 
opportunities. To take advantage of these opportunities, problem solving is organised towards 
collaboration, where heedful interrelating encourages joint action focused on common goals. In 
turn, collaboration is animated by abductive routines where repetitive action by diverse actors 
can generate new hypotheses. These ideas describe how deep learning can be achieved in 
distributed settings if shared goals are organised so that heedful action responds to emergent 
problems. However, within this literature there is little discussion about “how” subordinating 
action focused on discovery is sustained in contested and uncertain settings. However, on both 
programmes learning to govern through numbers was an ongoing and dynamic process where 
unintended controversies and contested tensions were an important part of learning. Sustaining 
heedful interrelating and encouraging abductive reasoning to challenge taken-for-granted 
assumptions required a calculative infrastructure to settle tensions. The table 7.3 on page 168 
describes how tensions on T5 associated with an aversion to scope change were stabilised by 
collectively agreeing how risks would be judged, assigned and evaluated. On T2, initially there 
was little incentive to move away from justifying past performance until the calculative 
infrastructure refocused attention. In both cases, Heathrow recognised the existence of 
persistent tensions and modified the calculative infrastructure to sustain enrolment. Periods of 
testing and contesting, were part of the development of the calculative infrastructure which was 
modified and adapted to translate friction into creative tensions.  
7.7 Return to the Reform Discussion 
At the beginning of this chapter the discussion focused on the need for reform in governing risk 
and the importance of calculative infrastructures in shaping “how” risk is conceived. 
Construction 2025 recommends that a key driver for change in the industry rests on stronger 
delivery relationships to permit knowledge sharing. However, it also recognises that “how” risk 
is managed can destabilise and inhibit a willingness to collaborate when faced with uncertainty. 
The 2013 ICE Intelligent Client Capability Framework elaborates these concepts, recommending 
an oversight role for the client in working with suppliers to encourage deeper relationships by 
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encouraging openness and knowledge sharing. The ICE framework describes the need for clients 
to balance destabilising factors by agreeing goals and bridging, aligning and integrating divergent 
interests. However, the ICE framework does not describe “how” divergence” might be settled. 
The Heathrow findings address this gap by describing two alternative intelligent client models 
that represented different appetites for “divergence”. T5’s performance improvement 
infrastructure sustained integration through collective evaluation. Discovery was sustained by 
enrolling suppliers in to a common dialogue to agree how value and risks should be managed. 
T2’s intelligent system emphasised regulatory control. However, divergent interests persisted 
because suppliers continued to be held to account by justifying past performance. On T2 the 
recovery was possible because Heathrow was willing to pragmatically pardon past performance 
shortfalls. On both programmes, rather than dealing with controversy by removing deviations, 
contested tensions provided a basis for critical inquiry and emergent learning. These points are 
important because they suggest that either performance improvement or regulatory models of 
governance enable delivery success when the Intelligent Client: 
• Recognises and develops strategies to balance persistent tensions (including innovative 
recovery strategies, such as pragmatic pardoning)  
• Invests in a complex and adaptive infrastructure that develops the building blocks for 
learning  
Integration is a major theme within the reform debate and Construction 2025 emphasises 
balancing diversity to enable knowledge “synergies” to develop. However, the Heathrow 
findings demonstrate that the creation of synergies was more complex than “organising” 
knowledge transfer. Instead, within each control phase there was an ongoing dialectic (Power, 
2007) between different appetites for risk as new tensions and trade-offs emerged. These ideas 
echo Stark’s 2009 work that describes how creating a form of “productive friction” involves the 
careful organisation of tensions to encourage creativity. Rather than removing differences, 
creativity can be sustained by carefully structured temporary settlements so that novelty and 
discovery are encouraged. The Heathrow cases describe this careful structure and organisation 
as a complex and adaptive calculative infrastructure. Recognising the importance of social 
integration was a key feature of Heathrow’s success as an intelligent client. This suggests that 
there are opportunities to extend the Intelligent Client concept to incorporate a capability that 
recognises the importance of social integration in effectively sustaining control. However, social 
integration and the development of common “evaluative” meaning and purpose is a dynamic 
concept involving the recursive construction of calculable spaces, the re-ordering of evaluative 
principles and the shaping of institutional subjects.  
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In summary, this chapter examined how Heathrow navigated complexity on both programmes 
to sustain control. Different patterns of fabrication and learning were observed, which reflected 
a different appetite for novelty and divergence. On T5, tensions associated with trade-offs 
between aspirations for performance improvement with an aversion to change were gradually 
settled. Monthly rituals, IBR and TCM created forums and spaces to overcome initial concerns 
for ambiguity. Gradually, control was sustained by capturing concepts of risk citizenship into an 
infrastructure of precise targets and accountabilities. Here the client adjudicator judged, 
evaluated and sanctioned collective deliberation. These findings extend the existing Heathrow 
literature by revealing how the emergence of control on T5 was underpinned by a complex and 
adaptive infrastructure to shape evaluative purpose towards performance improvement. In 
contrast on T2, aspirations for foresight resulted in a model that developed the predictive 
capabilities of the client team. Although suppliers initially continued to defend past 
commitments, this dissonance was gradually settled by creating forums for collective 
deliberation and eventually pardoning delays.  
The Heathrow findings move away from conceiving control as an outcome of fixing the front-
end and removing deviations to keep the programme on track. Instead, in both cases control 
emerged as Heathrow learned from controversies and continued to invest in developing an 
infrastructure to sustain reflexive learning. The next chapter draws these ideas together into a 
conclusion that uses the Heathrow findings to contribute to the key policy themes. The chapter 
also describes the contribution to the existing Heathrow literature by extending some of the 
concepts of “integration” and “scaffolding”.  There is the potential for a major stream of further 
research in this area and the chapter identifies the main headings and themes.   
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion: The Intelligent Client 
8.1 Introduction 
Projects are an organisational form developed to bring together a variety of perspectives in 
order to resolve complex and often indeterminate problems86. Large-scale construction projects 
have a history of dissonance which creates a distinct challenge of competing value systems, 
commercial tensions and an unstable control environment. Traditional project management 
approaches recommend clearly articulating accountabilities at the front-end in procurement 
whilst implementing “checks and balances” to deter gaming strategies87. However, rigid control 
methodologies can lead to “lock-in” and a lack of will to innovate thereby inhibiting collective 
problem solving. In contrast, the Heathrow cases demonstrate the benefit of adopting an 
emergent learning approach as a way of navigating complexity. On both programmes, plans 
were captured in a “version of the truth” which was gradually modified as emergent risks 
became visible. This was possible because the calculative infrastructures enrolled suppliers into 
accepting new stretch targets and accountabilities. On both programmes the machinations of 
testing and contesting new evaluative priorities was a key part of the emergent learning 
approach. Both cases describe how Heathrow navigated complexity by adjusting the appetite 
for risk. A complex and adaptive calculative infrastructure was developed to balance tensions 
and steer conduct towards a common sense of evaluative purpose. The nature of evaluative 
purpose also reflected the policy and reform debates at the time. T5 reflected Egan’s lean 
partnering philosophy and T2 a more cautious regulatory model. This chapter compares these 
case findings to the existing Heathrow and policy literature to contribute to the current reform 
discussion. It also matches some of the key findings to the Egan, Wolstenholme and current 
Construction 2025 recommendations. This leads to a discussion of a number of areas for further 
research focused on governing risk and intelligent client infrastructures.   
8.2 Making a Contribution  
Although the prior T5 literature88 discusses the initial orchestration of control and the design of 
mechanisms for coordination; there is little discussion about the process or composition of 
control over the delivery cycle. For T2, prior literature comments that the complex build 
                                                          
86 Scranton, 2015; Nightingale and Brady, 2011; Soderlund and Tell, 2012; Soderlund, 2012 
87 Flyvberg, 2012; Morris, 1994; Flyvberg and Cowi, 2004  
88 Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2011; 2014; Gil, 2009; Gil et al, 2012; Nightingale and Brady, 
2011 
175 
 
 
integrator model represented a relinquished level of project management capability89, however 
there is little detail about “why”.  The next section initially returns to these points followed by a 
more detailed discussion of the contribution of the case findings.  
8.2.1 The Existing Heathrow Literature  
The T5 “systems integrator” literature90 describes the role of the client as a broker and integrator 
of component knowledge across and between integrated teams. This literature emphasises the 
development of an open-book environment where the client removed the burden of 
commercial pressure from the supply chain by “bearing” the risk which enabled collective 
problem solving. Although suppliers were expected to share performance information, Power’s 
2007 work describes well how calculative practices (such as open-book accounting) are shaped 
by an appetite for risk. In this context, open-book may be part of an appetite for enterprise or 
reflect a more regulatory audit mentality (Power, 2007). The systems integrator literature 
assumes that open-book was linked to openness, enterprise and knowledge sharing as these 
aspirations were described in the T5 Agreement. However, there is little detail about the 
development and acceptance of this new order of worth. Yet a recurrent theme within 
construction over the last 20 years has been an avoidance of openly sharing cost information 
and strategic knowledge (CE, 2009; Egan, 1998; Latham, 1996; CS2025; Gann and Salter, 2000; 
Flyvberg, 1996; Clegg et al, 2012). Traditionally when faced with incertitude within construction 
projects, open-book becomes part of an architecture of control to enable audit scrutiny and 
regulatory checks (Gil et al, 2012; Clegg et al, 2012). Power’s 2007 work describes a complex 
dialectic and continual balancing of tensions between enterprise and auditability.  However, the 
T5 “systems integrator” literature does not address the social and institutional complexity of 
moving to the new lean partnering “enterprise” model.  
The second set of T5-related papers91 described a less stable control environment where 
adaptive plans and incentives mediated progressive change. Nightingale and Brady 2011 
highlight how plans provided an adaptable “scaffolding” to coordinate reflexive learning across 
the programme whilst capturing more realistic assumptions. Gil (2009) links the adaptation of 
incentives to the removal of ambiguity associated with overlapping accountabilities. Although 
these papers suggest a mediatory role for plans and incentives leading to stability and control, 
there is little detail of “how” or “when”. These “gaps” provided an opportunity to examine the 
                                                          
89 Brady and Davies 2011 
90 Davies et al 2009; Brady and Davies 2011; 2014; 
91 Gil 2009; Gil et al 2012; Nightingale and Brady 2011 
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composition of the calculative infrastructure and the evolution of spaces, principles and 
practices that mediated control.   
8.2.2 How did the Terminal 5 Calculative Infrastructure Mediate and Sustain Control? 
The progression through the three phases of control described in the boxes below reflected the 
translation of lean principles into risk citizenship practices animated by monthly performance 
rituals. Although the principle of the “client holds the risk” was developed to enrol suppliers into 
a proactive search for performance improvement, there was an initial ambiguity about “who” 
would be held to account for fluid scope. Establishing order was gradual because of a need to 
move away from an incumbent aversion to scope change and traditional contingency building 
in safe forecasts.  
           How Sustain?  
  Legitimation of Lean                        Fixing Risk Citizenship  
 
 
       
           Ambiguity                Order                                  Citizenship 
         to          How Mediate?    tn  
                                  Figure 8.1 How did T5 mediate and sustain control? 
Initially monthly reports engaged teams by articulating a schema of qualifying standards. 
Gradually “one version of the truth” was shaped through a collective performance dialogue 
where teams were given the freedom to explore solutions. Subjectivization of lean emerged as 
teams learned to pool knowledge and provide more credible narratives and predictable 
forecasts. The first integrated baseline review (IBR1) identified a need for “foresight” to 
anticipate risks and develop mitigation strategies. Rather than centrally managing risks the TCM 
approach devolved accountability to those most capable of generating incremental value. TCM 
enabled the re-assignment of accountabilities and an appetite for risk citizenship evolved as 
teams were enrolled into developing their own tactical plans. Over time, the complexity of risk 
was fixed into a precise infrastructure of KPIs and targets co-developed with the teams.    
Client Holds the Risk One Version of Truth   Foresight  
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The “systems integrator” literature92 emphasises the importance of hierarchical client oversight 
of team activities and knowledge sharing with little detail of how coordination was sustained 
over the delivery cycle. However, the case findings describe the role of the client as an 
“adjudicator” (Miller and Power 2013), judging performance against the “version of the truth” 
and rewarding realistic and credible forecasts. Social integration was part of the process of 
enrolment as divergent priorities were shaped into preferred solutions. Collective evaluation 
was fundamental to the agreement of who would be accountable for generating more value and 
mitigating risks. Both social and systems integration were observed as outcomes of a gradual 
acceptance of lean thinking principles.   
The 2nd body of Heathrow literature93 links sustained control with adaptation, focusing on the 
way in which flexible plans and incentives can enable knowledge sharing and learning. However, 
the adaptation of plans and incentives also results in new territories of accountability. In the 
dissonant setting of a large construction programme this can have a major destabilising effect 
as priorities and rewards are adjusted. This level of change can create a spiral of tension within 
the supply network. However, on T5 the wider calculative infrastructure played a fundamental 
role in stabilising tensions. Monthly reports and performance review meetings, the IBR and the 
TCM programme, all enabled acceptance of fluid and changing plans. This point extends the 
concept of scaffolding beyond plans and incentives to include the different types of calculable 
spaces which were developed to enable productive compromises and the reassignment of 
accountability.  
The existing T5 literature does not recognise the composition or role of the calculative 
infrastructure that underpinned T5. The case findings fill this gap by describing “how” the lean 
partnering model was translated into an infrastructure of technologies and spaces that shaped 
conduct towards performance improvement. Rather than implementing principles of active risk 
management and flexible planning on day one; they were defined through a recursive and 
collective process of testing and contesting. The client played a central role as an adjudicator 
shaping evaluative purpose through the development of a suite of calculative technologies and 
spaces. Tensions were balanced within each phase by collectively agreeing how risks would be 
assigned and evaluated and this enabled progression. Overtime the calculative infrastructure 
evolved which enabled performance improvement by translating lean principles into a 
sophisticated risk citizenship model.  
                                                          
92 Brady and Davies, 2011; Davies et al, 2009; Brady and Davies, 2014 
93 Gil, 2009; Gil et al, 2012; Nightingale and Brady, 2011 
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By 2009 the set-up of the T2A programme reflected Wolstenholme’s recommendations of a 
clearer articulation of value and risk. Partnering was replaced by clear lines of accountability and 
an intelligent system to support decision making. However, a rigid framework of responsibilities 
raised questions about “how” action at a distance would be sustained when emergence created 
unanticipated problems. This point leads to the T2 case which examined “how” the calculative 
infrastructure sustained control.  
8.2.3 How did the Terminal 2 Calculative Infrastructure Mediate and Sustain Control?  
Asserting the authority of data as kingpin was fundamental to counter the return of traditional 
contingency building within safe forecasts. Initially emphasis was on testing the integrity of a 
consistent “single version of the truth” captured within the intelligent client system. The 
patterns of progression are described below: 
      How Sustain?  
     Dissonance                                 Long Translation  
 
 
     Integrity                 Order            Golden Thread 
         to        How Mediate?    tn  
                                Figure 8.2 How did T2 mediate and sustain control? 
Initially monthly reports provided oversight by tracking productivity, quality and safety 
conformance. As risks emerged, temporary settlements were achieved by asserting 
conformance to agreed plans. Although emergent change resulted in a need to explore 
alternative solutions to recover performance shortfalls, the CBI continued to manage the 2nd tier 
against pre-agreed work packages. The dashboard was developed as a diagnostic technology to 
broaden the client-level discussion by demonstrating a range of relationships between risk and 
value. It created a material space to mediate consensus and organise dissonant perspectives 
amongst the client teams about priorities. However, it was not used to enrol a performance 
dialogue across the whole programme. Instead the dashboard prepared the groundwork for the 
IBRs. By the autumn of 2012 after months of intense debate new recovery plans were finally 
agreed and captured in a” golden thread” of targets and standards. Once milestone incentives 
were shared with the 2nd tier; the fortnightly reports steered attention towards delivering the 
critical path.  
Single Version of the truth        The Dashboard    Golden Thread  
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Although the intelligent system was intended to build foresight and enable strategies for value 
management; the supply network continued to work towards committed targets rather than re-
evaluating the effects of emergent change. In effect, debates about the meaning of evaluative 
principles were silenced which limited opportunities to shape the interests of the 2nd tier or 
capture localised learning and intelligence. Fixing allied interests was observed as a “long 
translation” where acceptance and agreement involved a complex process of persuasion and 
negotiation. For the client, long periods of critical inquiry developed a capability to understand 
the dynamics of the schedule. This learning was captured in the dashboard, as standards and 
targets reflected an acceptable relationship between value and risk exposure. The monthly 
performance rituals helped to legitimise the regulatory scrutiny of the IBRs as a space to “fix” 
and communicate performance expectations. The pardoning of performance gaps through the 
IBR enabled the programme to progress. However, the issue of incomplete doors reflected a 
lack of shared purpose and compromised visibility. This final point reveals the importance of 
creating spaces and forums to engage a performance dialogue when emergent changes 
challenge existing plans.  
8.2.4 Differences and Similarities  
Although the two calculative infrastructures contrasted in their overall appetite for risk they 
both enabled emergent learning. The continued development of new approaches to control was 
a key part of delivery success. Rather than fixing the front-end to deliver predetermined 
standards and targets, the ongoing re-ordering of priorities steered the programmes towards 
completion. The initial phases of control provided the building blocks for learning and 
innovation. On T5 lean principles were animated once reporting rituals were developed to test 
and contest evaluative priorities. On T2, a regulatory framework was initially established 
through the early stage IBRs and performance reviews. Later the dashboard provided the space 
to explore priorities to mitigate performance shortfalls. These early periods of diagnostic 
learning enabled the development of more robust plans later.  
The IBRs were a key foundation of the governance of risk on both programmes.  They created a 
critical space to pragmatically pardon performance failures, which demonstrated the legitimate 
authority of the client whilst forgiving unsustainable targets. On both programmes, pardoning 
failure enabled Heathrow to reassign accountabilities and this was a key part of proactively 
managing risks. This form of benevolent forgiveness moved away from the traditional emphasis 
on holding suppliers to account against the initial commitments. Instead pardoning enabled 
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Heathrow to reassign accountability to those most “capable” of generating incremental value. 
The IBRs enabled the programme to progress and move on.   
8.2.5 Governing Risk in Construction  
Traditional approaches of managing risk by rigidly controlling scope can reflect a deep concern 
for uncertainty (De Meyer et al, 2006; Clegg et al, 2012; Loch et al, 2006 ). When emergent 
change creates unanticipated performance deviations this can lead to a spiral of litigious claims 
and risk dumping. Although the policy literature94 suggests working “with” the supply network 
to find “who” is most capable of managing risk; the Heathrow cases reveal this as a continuous 
process. The cases describe a dynamic process of risk management. A process that involved the 
recursive development of calculable spaces to enrol different parts of the programme into a 
series of temporary settlements as the programmes progressed. Rather than placing risk in a 
one-off transfer and sporadically measuring the outcome of deviations from plans the 
reassignment of performance risks was ongoing.  
The ordering and re-ordering of standards and targets helped to adapt and shape an appetite 
for risk and discovery. Similar patterns of development were observed on both programmes 
with an initial period of organising an order of worth, followed by diagnostic discovery and a 
final period of recovery to devolve risk to suppliers. The appetite for risk changed with an initial 
period of narrowing to establish a methodology, followed by broader forms of exploration, and 
the final stage of capturing risk in more narrowly defined targets. Rather than removing 
deviations, Heathrow adapted the calculative infrastructure to shape and balance persistent 
tensions. These findings are important because they demonstrate the central role of evaluation 
in enabling progress by defining what is valuable and therefore what was considered an 
acceptable appetite for discovery and risk. The next section returns to the reform debate to 
consider the different appetites for risk underpinning the progression from Egan to 
Wolstenholme.  
8.2.6 Revisiting from Egan to Wolstenholme 
Egan’s Rethinking Construction (1998) placed the client in a central role, organising supplier 
learning and integrating processes towards improved client value and quality. Deeper partnering 
relationships were seen as a pathway to transform years of entrenched adversarialism. 
However, the performance improvement model required a major shift away from an aversion 
to scope change and self-seeking opportunism common amongst suppliers. The study of T5 
                                                          
94 Constructing Excellence, 2009; Construction 2025 
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reveals the social complexity of transformation to the Egan model. It also describes the need for 
a complex and adaptive calculative infrastructure to gradually enrol teams into accepting fluid 
scope and accountability for performance improvement. On T5, the replication and refinement 
of monthly performance rituals played a key role in providing a space to test “how” lean conduct 
would be operationalised. Teams were given the freedom and autonomy to develop evaluative 
routines. The gradual sanctioning of giving coherent and realistic accounts all played a part in 
encouraging teams to pool knowledge and remove waste from forecasts. The IBR provided an 
important critical space for reflection to consider the “whole” programme perspective. This 
sequence of control strategies enabled the gradual legitimation of lean thinking principles. 
However, sustaining lean also required a devolved model of risk citizenship to enable the 
proactive management risks. These points echo Womack et al’s (1990; 2007) work on lean 
enterprise that describes the importance of relentless oversight to sustain performance 
improvement as well as strong supply relationships. On T5 the calculative infrastructure played 
a fundamental role in providing this visibility and developing the capability of risk citizens to 
proactively manage risk.     
By 2009, Wolstenholme’s report described the effects of the economic downturn on the 
construction industry: 
 “firms chasing unsustainable margins, cost and time overruns, the jettisoning of quality or 
sustainability initiatives and more of a claims-orientated approach”   (CE, 2009, p19) 
To improve productivity the report recommended closer engagement with suppliers to share 
the benefits of success. Value-based performance incentives were recommended and working 
with suppliers to establish who was best placed to manage risk. On T2 clear lines of 
accountability were developed to reduce ambiguity and the latest risk modelling techniques, a 
dashboard and intelligent system to manage risks. Although the intelligent system was designed 
to enable virtual control “by” the data, when productivity problems emerged there was limited 
opportunity to engage the wider supply network. Progress was stalled because suppliers 
continued to justify past performance as a proof of worth. Eventually dissonant tensions were 
settled by modifying the calculative infrastructure to create calculable spaces that shaped 
common purpose towards recovery plans.  
The Heathrow cases describe how it is possible to successfully adopt different models of 
governance such as lean partnering (Egan) versus more regulatory approaches (Wolstenholme) 
if the client accepts the need to adapt the control approach and learn from controversy and 
emergence. The destabilising effect of dissonant and competing value systems is a major theme 
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here. Persistent tensions associated with competing justifications of worth can fundamentally 
destabilise progress. However, Heathrow successfully navigated these issues by developing a 
shared sense of evaluative purpose through the calculative infrastructures. An infrastructure 
that adapted to re-define what was valuable and therefore what was considered an acceptable 
appetite for discovery and risk.   
8.2.7 Reform and Delivery Relationships 
The Intelligent Client Capability Framework and Construction 2025 both emphasise the 
importance of stronger and more resilient delivery relationships as a pathway to improvement 
in construction. Construction 2025 focuses on aspirations for deeper supplier-client delivery 
relationships and the potential for improved learning synergies. The broken business model 
debate stressed the linkage between improving value in construction and the coordination of 
networks of cooperation between suppliers and the client. The Heathrow findings connect these 
ideas with the development of complex and adaptive calculative infrastructures to shape a 
performance dialogue thereby balancing tensions whilst orchestrating collective discovery.    
8.2.7.1 Intelligent Client Capabilities  
The ICE Intelligent Client Capability Framework 2013 describes important capabilities associated 
the governance of divergent objectives. It emphasises the role of financial incentives to bridge 
and align divergent priorities thereby enabling stronger delivery relationships. However, there 
is no explicit discussion about the different types of incentives or the role of the client or other 
forms of calculative technology. Alignment is a concept closely linked to subjectivization in terms 
of shaping attention and responsibilities towards acceptable standards and priorities. However, 
subjectivization has two different dimensions 1. Being controlled by another 2. Freedom of 
choice (Miller and Power, 2013). The Heathrow cases examined these two dimensions through 
the lens of calculable spaces designed to mediate priorities by evaluating and “adjudicating” 
performance. The cases describe a dynamic and recursive process of mediation and adjudication 
which combined to create both systems integration (control “over”) and social integration 
towards a shared sense of evaluative purpose. However, subjectivization also involved the 
recursive shaping of various calculable spaces beyond incentives. On T5 milestone and value-
based incentives were intended to combine with the reimbursement of in-scope costs to 
encourage performance improvement. However, uncertainty about “how” fluid scope and 
discovery would be rewarded resulted in lock-in rather than “alignment” towards performance 
improvement. Gradually, the wider infrastructure of monthly performance rituals, the IBR and 
TCM forums legitimised performance improvement practices. These points, reveal the 
183 
 
 
importance of viewing the individual elements of the calculative infrastructure as part of a wider 
complex and entangled “whole” (Miller and Power, 2013). For Heathrow, alignment and the 
shaping of conduct involved gradual enrolment through a sequence of evaluative orders and 
calculable spaces. These points suggest that the ICE Capability Framework would benefit from 
thinking beyond control “by” incentives to consider more carefully the nature of control and the 
wider role of calculative infrastructures in governing conduct.    
8.2.7.2 Construction 2025  
Construction 2025 outlines ambitious targets for productivity growth over the next 8 years. 
However, the economic downturn, poor margins and slow payments have made it difficult for 
supply chains to “thrive”. Developing more robust relationships “with” suppliers is considered a 
fundamental part of unlocking knowledge synergies to improve project delivery. The Heathrow 
findings describe how generating learning synergies required extra effort in order to overcome 
negative friction within dissonant tensions. Learning required spaces and technologies, an 
infrastructure to encourage collective discovery and sanction new solutions. The T2 case 
revealed the importance of spaces to engage a performance dialogue when emergent changes 
challenged existing plans. The T5 case described how it is possible to develop a performance 
improvement model to encourage learning synergies if the entrenched aversion to scope-
change is challenged. However, on T5 the successful adoption of performance improvement 
involved a lengthy and gradual legitimation of lean with oversight by an Intelligent Client 
adjudicator. In both cases transformation was facilitated by a pursuit of continual learning.  The 
development of learning synergies was more complex than coordinating tasks or brokering 
knowledge transfer, instead it involved an appetite for critical inquiry to challenge and test 
evaluative principles when faced with perplexing problems.  
The conception of control described in this thesis moves away from the traditional project 
management language of viewing the “numbers” as measures to objectively capture and report 
progress. Instead control and performance management is viewed as a process of shaping 
evaluative purpose by governing conduct - a purpose that is “value-laden” reflecting a schema 
of evaluative priorities and an order of worth. On both programmes control was observed as an 
unstable and iterative process of subjectivization to enrol heedful interactions as the 
programmes passed through different phases of control. Rather than silencing contested 
debates, ambiguous situations provided an opportunity for collective learning to recover 
performance. Returning to Stark’s 2009 work on dissonance, the existence of multiple evaluative 
perspectives was fundamental to resolve perplexing problems. However, balancing divergent 
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perspectives involved careful organisation to transform friction into creative tensions. On both 
programmes, this alignment was observed as a sequence of settlements reflecting a changing 
appetite for risk. Heathrow developed deeper delivery relationships by balancing tensions whilst 
encouraging critical reflection. However, this was only possible by developing a complex and 
adaptive calculative infrastructure.   
8.3 Areas for Future Research 
Recently initiatives, such as Project 13, have started to open the reform discussion to a wider 
audience for consultation. There are now a series of initiatives for Heathrow and other industry 
leaders to share best practice of how a “Capable Owner” and Intelligent Client construct and 
manage infrastructure assets. Within these discussions Heathrow continues to play an 
important role as a perceived exemplar to the rest of the industry. It is hoped that the findings 
from this thesis will contribute to this debate. Potential areas for further research could include: 
8.3.1 Revisiting the Broken Business Model  
Over the last few months Project 13 has started to examine the case to move from traditional 
“transactional models” of governance to different types of partnering and alliancing models. The 
T2 and T5 comparison is relevant to this discussion because it represents a partnership approach 
versus a more virtual and arms-length model. Further research could extend the Heathrow 
findings by examining the orchestration of a variety of different governance approaches to 
consider how these models engage and enrol suppliers during delivery. In this context, it might 
be useful to develop a comparison between the initial design of governance arrangements and 
other factors that contribute to the delivery of projects. This could include examining some of 
the features in the Heathrow findings such as different approaches to collective learning, 
appetites for governing risk and the engagement of innovative technologies and calculable 
spaces.   
8.3.2 Virtual Control and Accountability 
The way in which calculative technologies enable virtual control is also an area for further 
research. This could continue the Project 13 reform discussion by examining the role of control 
systems in enabling “action at a distance” within major projects. The T2 case findings could be 
extended to compare T2 with other types of “intelligent” system. Other approaches could be 
compared to the T2 “data as kingpin” model, to consider different ways of shaping 
accountability and holding suppliers to account. This stream of research could consider different 
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types and forms of justification and the role of evaluation in the shaping worthiness in the giving 
of accounts.      
8.3.3 Governing Risk 
Although the need to improve the management of risk in delivery is a recurrent theme 
throughout the reform discussion, there is little advice about “how” risk should be governed 
over the delivery cycle. Construction 2025 focuses on initiatives to improve the procurement of 
risk rather than the management of risk in delivery. However, the Heathrow cases reveal the 
importance of the initial building blocks for risk management as well as the various calculable 
spaces that assign, define and evaluate risk. Ideas developed within this thesis could be used for 
future research into:  
i. A focus on specific innovative technologies such as the dashboard, the IBR and 
the TCM initiative as novel approaches to integrate value management and risk 
governance. These studies could focus in more depth on the “inner workings” 
of these technologies, the evaluative principles and the detailed debates that 
underpinned “how” they resolved specific controversies to enable progression. 
The use and development of these technologies could be compared to 
literatures that consider the role of risk and value management instruments. In 
particular, it would be useful to compare the findings of the study to traditional 
project management texts95 to explore gaps between theory and practice.  
 
ii. Different types of calculative infrastructure beyond the Heathrow “emergent 
learning” models of performance improvement (T5) and regulation for foresight 
(T2). The evolution of other models of governance and calculative infrastructure 
could be studied to explore how they define and organise risks during delivery.  
 
iii. The relationship between governing risk and organising discovery within 
projects. In particular, the role of different forms of technology used to 
instrument risk. E.g. risk registers, floats, dashboards and shock absorbers or 
calculative practices such as specific reporting forums and cyclical reviews. 
Research could examine the link between these different technologies and 
“factors” that contribute to a different appetite for discovery or risk.   
 
 
                                                          
95 For example, PMBOK and practitioner texts such as Navigating Complexity 
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8.3.4 Process Research and “How” Questions 
Much of the prior Heathrow literature uses T5 as an exemplar case to link different features and 
traits to innovative outcomes. This type of “know-what” modelling is intended to reveal the co-
variation between certain traits and outcomes, to inform discussions of best practice             
(Burns, 2014). However, the process approach taken in this thesis was intended to be 
sympathetic to the importance of time in the development of both programmes. Rather than 
making assumptions about the role of specific loci of control; the methods traced the sequence 
of events to understand “what happened and who did what – when” (Langley, 1999, p692). This 
approach seemed the most suitable, given the nature of the “how” questions which focused on 
the complex relationship between time, control and the accumulation of learning. Temporal 
bracketing provided a basis to break the sequences down into manageable blocks for analysis. 
The “controversies” used to punctuate phases represented more obvious and visible points of 
disjuncture within both programmes. In this thesis, I felt that the level of detail in the three 
phases was sufficient to contribute to the “problem” posed in the research questions and the 
more general reform debate. However, there is still potential to break the sequences down in 
to smaller blocks of time, in order to scrutinise features of certain calculable spaces in more 
depth. This research could be used to extend the analysis of the governance of risk and 
accountability described on the previous page.  
In this thesis, the study of emergence and controversy yielded unexpected findings which moved 
away from some of the perspectives described in previous research. Much of the prior T5 
literature emphasised the critical importance of the commercial bearing of risk by the client as 
an important risk innovation to enable discovery. However, the T5 findings describe the “client 
holds the risk” as the initial phase of control. By the last phase, risk was gradually devolved and 
distributed across the programme. On T5, prior research emphasised the reimbursement of 
costs as a strategy to stabilise uncertainty and encourage discovery. Although the T5 case 
findings recognised it as an important enrolment strategy, reimbursement was also a source of 
early stage tension and trade-offs between lock-in and the need for discovery. These points 
highlight how process studies can uncover surprising events and interactions that shape the 
development of a project. They suggest that the adoption of more “how” style research 
questions and process methods could contribute to project management research when 
considering complex, plural and emergent phenomena.  
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8.3.5 Final Thoughts  
In summary, major projects gather together a variety of experts and organisations in order to 
resolve complex and often indeterminate problems. However, plural tensions and competing 
value systems can create an unstable control environment. The broken business model debate 
reveals a need to improve the coordination of cooperative networks in order to improve value 
and productivity. The Heathrow cases describe the role of adaptive calculative infrastructures in 
mobilising allied interests. For Heathrow the ongoing process of testing and contesting of 
evaluative principles resulted in emergent learning. However, this was only possible by enrolling 
institutional subjects into agreeing evaluative priorities. A central theme running throughout 
this thesis has been the need to stabilise dissonance towards a shared conception of purpose 
and worth. However, as ends-in-view changed the nature of worthiness and priorities also 
changed. The cases reveal how the appetite for risk evolved from an initial setup, to a period of 
exploration and a final stage where risk was captured in precisely defined targets.  Social 
integration emerged by enrolling agreement through a sequence of settlements within each 
control phase. However, the settlements were temporary. Heathrow acted as an Intelligent 
Client aligning, bridging and integrating objectives; but only up to a point. Rather than removing 
the deviant and deviations from plan, controversies provided a basis for critical inquiry to 
challenge and examine initial assumptions. This point is important because it highlights the role 
of friction in resolving perplexing problems.  These points suggest that a major challenge for 
Intelligent Clients is to develop calculative infrastructures that organises “productive friction” in 
a way that settles but does not remove or silence creative tensions and critical inquiry.  
Over the last 20 years, the need to improve the governance of risk has been a central theme in 
the reform debates. This thesis describes a powerful role for architectures of control in 
governing risk by encouraging discovery. The calculative infrastructures played a central role in 
making projects valuable by continually testing and contesting evaluative principles. Calculable 
spaces were adapted to steer conduct towards resolving perplexing problems. Once resolved, 
the solutions were embodied into standards and targets that represented new accountabilities, 
evaluative purpose and worth. This thesis highlights the potential for far more research into 
governing risk and accountability to improve value within construction. More research into the 
nature of different calculative infrastructures and the role of technologies and spaces in shaping 
different forms of evaluative order. To achieve the level of reform described in Construction 
2025 this may involve asking more “how” style questions to challenge the traditional conception 
of control as a process of delivering predetermined targets and goals. Both T2 and T5 were 
delivered on budget and to cost but the pathway to success was not visible at the outset. This 
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suggests that there is a benefit for the reform discussion to step away from just focusing on the 
front end and instead think more carefully about preparing for the journey ahead.   
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